SLA COMANDERS CALL FOR A SINGLE LEADER

C O N F I D E N T I A L KHARTOUM 000364

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

FOR AF/SPG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/14/2016
TAGS: MASS MCAP PREL SU
SUBJECT: SLA COMANDERS CALL FOR A SINGLE LEADER

REF: 05 KHARTOUM 01654

Classified By: P/E Chief E. Whitaker, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) (Note: this is a re-transmission of 05 Khartoum 01654
to reflect redrafting and reclassification of para 4 per
AF/SPG request. End note.) Summary: The lack of a clearly
defined leader at the top of the SLA has left field
commanders with divided loyalties, hungry forces, and time on
their hands. Without an identifiable and decisive leader,
many SLA units have reverted to being clan and tribal
militias that rob convoys for food and loot. The military
leadership has not led, and subordinate commanders are
beginning to grumble. Field commanders lack clear guidance
on how to run the areas under their control; local governance
is spotty. Despite Abdul Wahid's long absence from Darfur,
Mini Minawi has not yet been able to fully consolidate
control under his lead. Still, Mini appears to us to be the
front-runner in the SLA leadership sweepstakes. End Summary.

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Divisions Widening
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2. (C) Poloff spoke with field commanders and staff officers
at all levels in early October. Commanders from all three
regional commands said the Sudanese Liberation Army (SLA) was
divided, and that the divisions were widening. The primary
division, between groups loyal to Secretary General Mini
Minawi and Chairman Abdel Wahid al Nur, run more or less
straight along tribal lines and divide the SLA vertically
between Zaghawa and Fur/Massalit. But several leaders said
there is also a growing divide between field commanders and
the political leadership. This rift has widened in the past
few months, dividing the SLA horizontally between fighters
and expatriate supporters. There is a tribal dimension here,
too. Many SLA field commanders are Zaghawa. One North
Darfur commander explained to us that he and his men take the
risks fighting for freedom while the expatriates and the
politicians live well in Europe and in Abuja. The fighters,
he said, have so far seen no reward for their sacrifice.
This divide is mirrored at the senior levels of the SLA, but
taking a few commanders to Abuja may have helped to mend that
rift.


3. (C) The lack of a clearly defined leader at the top of the
SLA has left field commanders with divided loyalties, hungry
forces, and time on their hands. In recent months, the
absence of large-scale fighting means that regional
commanders have only limited control of subordinate forces,
many of which have reverted to the control of their tribal
and clan leaders. In the relative calm of the past few
months, the SLA concentrated on consolidating its position
vis-a-vis the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) in South
Darfur and moving its general headquarters back to Jebel
Marra from Berengil (South Darfur),but done precious little
rebuilding or training.

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Political and Structural Questions
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4. (SBU) Hassan Salah, chief of intelligence for the SLA
General Command, discussed his senior commanders at the
regional and sub-regional level, and referred to Chief of
Staff Jedou Izza (aka Thagir) as a valiant fighter.


5. (C) Bokhit Abdul Karim, a Southern Area commander who may
now be deputy to Juma Hagar, said that the political
leadership has not explained how the SLA should manage
commerce and governance in the areas its controls. This
leaves lower-level commanders to make these decisions on
their own, often with mixed results. With no standardized
governance policy, there is no uniformity among areas
controlled by different clans.

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"The Cat's Away"
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6. (C) Across Darfur, field commanders continue to raid
humanitarian and commercial convoys for food and loot. This
is gradually becoming a commercial activity replacing
traditional forms of livelihood. A Zaghawa commander in
South Darfur told us that if Mini called the SLA to war, all
of the clans would follow him. But with no clear leader and
little guidance, control of the tribal and clan militias has
reverted to traditional leaders. Government of Sudan
security forces have closed many commercial routes into SLA
held areas, so the people, both civilian and rebel forces,
are hungry.

7. (C) Commander Omaru, the senior SLA commander in the Jebel
Marra, said that until Mini and Abdel Wahid solve their
problems and one of them takes charge, commanders would
continue to run amok. "When the cat's away..." he said.

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Comment: Most Commanders Appear To Support Mini
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8. (C) The complaints from the field cross tribal and
regional lines. The commanders with whom we spoke said that
they want and need a decisive leader. Cease Fire Commission
member Colonel Abdou Abdallah Ismail told us that the field
commanders would not follow a political leader they cannot
trust. Abdou is Fur and would, according to the conventional
wisdom, align himself with Abdel Wahid. However, he said
that Abdel Wahid is considered by many to be militarily weak.
A Zaghawa staff officer said that Abdel Wahid "ran like a
girl" in the early days of the fighting. Abdel Wahid's
extended absence from Darfur and poor reputation among field
commanders would seem an onerous handicap. So, if we were
handicapping the race, we would have to say that Minawi seems
to be the front-runner. Nonetheless, Mini has thus far
proven unable to unite the SLA under his leadership even with
Abdel Wahid out of the country. Abdel Wahid was scheduled to
return to Darfur on October 20 and immediately begin
consultations with his supporters. Minawi's SLA leadership
conference in Darfur, tentatively scheduled for
October 26-28 could be a decisive event, perhaps even a
showdown between the two.
HUME