Sudan: Government-Imposed Impediments to

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 000291

SIPDIS

AIDAC
SIPDIS

STATE FOR AF/SPG, PRM, AND ALSO PASS USAID/W
USAID FOR DCHA SUDAN TEAM, AF/EA, DCHA
NAIROBI FOR USAID/DCHA/OFDA, USAID/REDSO, AND FAS
USMISSION UN ROME
GENEVA FOR NKYLOH
NAIROBI FOR SFO
NSC FOR JMELINE, TSHORTLEY
USUN FOR TMALY
BRUSSELS FOR PLERNER

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: EAID PREF PGOV PHUM SOCI KAWC SU
SUBJECT: Sudan: Government-Imposed Impediments to
Humanitarian Assistance

REF: Khartoum 0149

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Summary
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1. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) working in
Darfur are becoming increasingly frustrated by Sudanese
government Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC) procedures
on reporting, hiring, permits, and visas. The Technical
Coordination Committee, which was formed to monitor the
implementation of the "fast-track system," no longer
meets, and the U.N. has not engaged donors on this issue
as it had in 2004 and 2005. The increasing number of
restrictions, combined with the insecurity in the region
(reported septels),is slowly but steadily eroding
humanitarian space and capacity in Darfur.

2. These constraints gradually reduce the ability of
NGOs to deliver services in Darfur in an efficient
manner. Added to this is the closing of humanitarian
space owing to insecurity (reported in septels).
Humanitarian actors in Darfur believe we are returning to
the situation as it was in 2004, when the humanitarian
community was blocked from delivering services to war
victims in Darfur. As reported reftel, the U.S. Charge
d'Affaires met with the Government of National Unity
(GNU) Minister of Humanitarian Affairs and HAC
Commissioner regarding many of the challenges to the
humanitarian community outlined here. Post will raise
these issues yet again with the HAC and Ministry of
Humanitarian Affairs. On February 7, post sent a letter
signed by the USAID Senior Humanitarian Affairs Advisor
to the HAC Commissioner urging action on particular
issues concerning HAC impediments to the work of the
humanitarian community in Sudan. However, the U.N. also
needs to show leadership on this issue by reforming the
donor principals group to advocate on these issues with
the government. End Summary.

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Background
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3. Since the surge in humanitarian needs in 2004, a
continuing dialogue has been occurring with the
Government of Sudan (GOS),and now the Government of
National Unity (GNU),regarding humanitarian access in
Darfur. In 2004, the GOS dragged its feet on permitting
new NGOs to come to Sudan to work in Darfur because of
the military operations that were underway at the time.
Following very heavy diplomatic pressure from a strong
donor principals group, a special status known as "the
fast track system" was negotiated for NGOs coming to
operate in Darfur. This system imposed a moratorium on a
number of procedures that normally could take up to a
year to accomplish, if an NGO followed the normal
application process to work in Sudan. The moratorium
authorized the following: (a) immediate accreditation to
work in Darfur (only); (b) visas within 48 hours issued
at all Sudanese embassies around the world, limited to
validity of three months; (c) expedited handling of all
requests for importation of project supplies for Darfur;
and (d) rapid customs clearance of drugs imported for
health programs and limited sample testing in order to
maximize shelf life in the field.

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Visa Restrictions
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4. Since that time, the government has maintained the
three-month visa system despite efforts by the U.N. to
obtain one-year visas for humanitarian workers in Darfur.
The current moratorium for Darfur expired on December 31,
but was extended until January 31 in view of the end of
year holiday season. All NGOs therefore had to renew
their employees' visas on January 31. Some staff who
were out of the country on that date are now having
difficulty obtaining re-entry visas. It is worth noting
that visa renewal costs USD 240. With approximately

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1,000 relief workers in Darfur, this is a significant
source of income for the HAC.


5. Development Alternatives, Inc (DAI),the implementing
partner of USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives
(USAID/OTI),has been unable to obtain a one-year visa
for its chief of party, an Irish national, much less a
three-month renewable visa under the Darfur practice.
Another expatriate staff member, a U.S. national, has
been denied a visa to return to Sudan. The Embassy and
USAID have raised this issue with the authorities, but
with no positive results to date other than the issuance
of a work permit for the chief of party, which is useless
without a visa.

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HAC Involvement in Staff Hiring
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6. The most intrusive of HAC policies, and the one to
which NGOs object the most, relates to the level of HAC
involvement in staff recruitment. All hiring must go
through the HAC. When an NGO wishes to advertise an
opening, the HAC must first approve, the NGO must pay a
fee, and the HAC posts the job. Applicants submit their
paperwork to the HAC, not to the hiring NGO. The HAC
sets a review date, sometimes several months after the
job has been posted. The NGO comes to the HAC office to
review the applications, many of which have been
misplaced or confused with other NGOs' applications. The
HAC selects the individuals it deems most qualified for
the jobs and very frequently attempts to dismiss the CVs
selected by the NGO. If the NGO rejects one candidate
that the HAC wants, the HAC usually slips the CV back in
at the bottom of the pile to be reviewed again.
Southerners who attempt to submit applications are often
eliminated immediately because they have not fulfilled
the military service "requirement" in the north.
Diaspora applicants, particularly southerners, withdraw
their applications when they learn that the HAC will be
screening them.


7. Following this lengthy screening process, the HAC
selects a date for interviews, again, often several
months away (due to the "workload" at the HAC). Usually,
the NGOs tell us, only one or two of the applicants show
up on the appointed day. All interviews are conducted on
the HAC premises, with no opportunity for NGOs to
interview candidates in private. NGOs are also unable to
contact applicants themselves, because the HAC does not
show them the applications. (Comment: At times, NGOs
have been able to "read" phone numbers from the
applications, most often those belonging to applicants
who failed to come for their interviews and are often the
candidates the NGOs prefer to hire. When NGOs have
contacted these candidates, they have learned that the
HAC never invited them to an interview. End comment.)
The HAC schedules a second round of interviews and,
again, only a few candidates show up. The interview
process is accordingly lengthy, while this cat and mouse
game with the HAC is played. One NGO reported that it
took five months to hire a cashier.


8. NGOs must inform the HAC of expatriates who are
arriving in the country. It is not unusual - indeed it
was frequent during the early days of the Darfur crisis -
for the HAC to refuse an expatriate NGO employee a work
permit on the pretext that a Sudanese member of staff can
do the job adequately. An NGO recently had this problem
with technical staff in water and sanitation. It makes
it difficult to meet the HAC's requirement for "capacity
building" if NGOs cannot bring in experts capable of
training national staff, or local organizations which
might work with the NGO.

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New Reporting Requirements Linked to Travel Permits
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9. Beginning in late 2004, the HAC insisted that all

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NGOs submit reports on their activities in Darfur, as
they are required to do for work elsewhere in the
country. These reports are submitted monthly and provide
the key information about NGO activities. Often, they
are nearly the same reports submitted to donors, but the
NGOs do not provide financial details to the HAC. The
HAC has also introduced a new annual reporting format
that calls for more detailed information than required in
the past. NGOs object to the intrusive questions on
finances, especially as they relate to payroll and
salaries. The international NGO consortium members have
agreed to provide annual and monthly reports to the HAC,
but have refused to provide detailed budget information.
In the regions, HAC officials are now linking submission
of reports by NGOs to issuance of travel permits to field
sites. Several NGOs that have failed to submit monthly
or annual reports have been denied permission to travel
to the field. DAI's chief of party has been denied
permission to travel outside Khartoum despite having
submitted a report. The HAC is demanding the financial
details on DAI's activities.

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Training Requirements
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10. For the last few years, HAC has been trying to
broaden the role of national NGOs in the humanitarian
response. There is general agreement that this is a
desirable goal, but the HAC is denying visas to some
international staff of NGOs on the grounds that national
staff can fill the indicated position. International
NGOs are objecting on the grounds that the international
staff are needed precisely in order to train national
staff to take a given job. As a result, HAC has
instituted a new system of "internships" under the guise
of building national capacity. HAC's real intention
appears to be, based on a review of this issue with a
number of NGOs, to place friends and relatives with
organizations. The NGO is not given the opportunity to
select the intern or the position to be filled. Quite by
luck, a qualified individual may be chosen, but in most
instances, NGOs have had to accept "interns" with
backgrounds unsuited to the positions. OTI's partner DAI
has also been instructed to take on interns.

HUME