Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06KHARTOUM2761
2006-11-29 14:39:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Khartoum
Cable title:  

CDA HUME, MFA OFFICIAL KARTI DISCUSS PKO IN DARFUR

Tags:  PREL PGOV KPKO AU CLOK CVIS SU US UN 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO1427
OO RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #2761/01 3331439
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 291439Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5427
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 002761 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF/SPG, AF/SE, AND CA/VO/L/C FOR KOTVAL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/28/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV KPKO AU CLOK CVIS SU US UN
SUBJECT: CDA HUME, MFA OFFICIAL KARTI DISCUSS PKO IN DARFUR

REF: A. STATE 159712

B. KHARTOUM 02408

C. KHARTOUM 02737

Classified By: P/E Chief E. Whitaker, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 002761

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF/SPG, AF/SE, AND CA/VO/L/C FOR KOTVAL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/28/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV KPKO AU CLOK CVIS SU US UN
SUBJECT: CDA HUME, MFA OFFICIAL KARTI DISCUSS PKO IN DARFUR

REF: A. STATE 159712

B. KHARTOUM 02408

C. KHARTOUM 02737

Classified By: P/E Chief E. Whitaker, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: In a November 28 meeting, CDA Hume and State
Minister of Foreign Affairs Ali Karti discussed the way
forward on peacekeeping operations in Darfur following the
November 16 Addis Ababa agreement. Addressing issues such as
troop levels and financing, CDA Hume encouraged the Sudanese
government to see this as a moment of opportunity and urged
Karti to seek a constructive resolution of the crisis. In a
private aside, CDA Hume advised Karti that the USG would not
issue him a visa for travel to the United States (reftels).
End summary.

--------------
Moving Forward From Addis
--------------


2. (C) On November 28, CDA Hume met State Minister of Foreign
Affairs Ali Karti to discuss peace-keeping in Darfur and the
way forward following the High-Level Consultation on Darfur
held November 16 in Addis Ababa. Karti requested the meeting
to exchange views with the CDA on the Addis Ababa agreement
and on the upcoming African Union Peace and Security Council
(AU PSC) meeting in Abuja. The MFA Spokesperson, MFA Deputy
Director of the Americas Ambassador Abdel Rahman Sharfi, and
DCM Powers attended the meeting. At the outset, Karti
expressed his regret that S/E Natsios, schedule did not
permit a visit to Sudan for discussions prior to or following
the Addis meeting. He understood that his availability was
limited but felt that a discussion would have been useful
given what he perceives to be a not very large gap between
his Government's and the USG's thinking on a peacekeeping
force for Darfur. Karti reiterated that the Sudanese
government believed that a force of 10,000 troops would be
enough, but understood that the UN was seeking a force of
17,000. Given the time that it would take to get forces on

the ground, he believed that the number of troops is not an
issue.


3. (C) In response, CDA Hume welcomed the opportunity to
meet and briefed Karti on his November 25-27 visit to Darfur,
including stops in El Fasher, Kutum, and El Geneina. He
informed Karti that S/E Natsios is scheduling an early
December visit, but that dates had not yet been decided. CDA
Hume stated that, although U.S. and Sudanese positions
differed, the USG position remains defined by UNSCR 1706. He
underscored that the real task now is to focus on a way to
move the process forward, emphasizing that Bashir's
statements rejecting a hybrid force, as highlighted in the
press and privately, were not helping this process. Karti
denied the veracity of these reports.

--------------
Raising Troops
--------------


4. (C) CDA Hume emphasized that, despite the disagreement
between the Sudanese government and UN position on
peacekeeping forces in Darfur, the aim now must be to move
forward on those points where agreement can be reached. He
acknowledged the difficulty of getting even 10,000 troops on
the ground in Darfur within the next six months, given the
logistical challenges stemming from wells, shipment of
supplies, and road conditions. He said that there is terrain
for an intermediate period for troop-building and urged the
Sudanese government to seize the opportunity. CDA Hume
stated he had little idea what would come out of the Abuja
conference.


5. (C) CDA Hume stated that the Addis meeting was highly
useful, and that it helped to expand slightly the room for
maneuver and discussion concerning peacekeeping forces for
Darfur. It had opened a door for possible agreement, and he
hoped that this door would remain open. In response, Karti
stated that Addis would provide an opportunity for the UN to
understand what Africans want. He repeated that any
resolution coming out of the Abuja meeting would be an
African resolution and, thus, not a UN resolution. He urged
the UN to take advantage of any such resolution in order to
understand Africa's thinking fully. Karti pondered what
would be the next step or outcome if there was agreement
among the Africans in Abuja on extending the AU forces for
another six months. He stated that he believed that this
would afford more time and make it easy for other parties to
come together and talk. CDA Hume stated that the essential
thing is that something be decided in this direction, and

KHARTOUM 00002761 002 OF 002


that the doors for discussion not be closed.

--------------
Financing
--------------


6. (C) CDA Hume noted that troop financing remained a serious
issue, and that the USG continued to believe that any
financing should be under the UN framework. He further
expressed his concern about whether UNSG Annan would even
support UN funding given what appeared to be Sudan's position
on phase three. He believed that whatever position Annan
takes on this issue would be persuasive for most governments.
CDA Hume underscored that troop funding remained a serious
issue not only for the USG--given that the USG is currently
operating under a continuing resolution--but also for
Europeans who have similar budget constraints.


7. (C) Karti stated that his Government and Africa's position
remains in favor of extending the mandate for AU troops.
Some form of cooperation to allow troops to remain in Darfur
was possible, that no one wanted a security vacuum, and that
his Government was trying to find a way out of the impasse.
Under the right conditions Sudan could accept up to 10,000
troops, and it had not categorically rejected the concept of
a hybrid force (despite President Bashir's public
statements). He said the Sudanese delegation at the Addis
meeting had understood that these issues could still be
discussed and even the U.S. acknowledged they would not be
obligated to accept the phase-three force as described by the
SYG.

--------------
Visa Revocation
--------------


8. (C) At the conclusion of the meeting, CDA Hume informed
Karti (alone) that we could not issue him a visa for his
intended travel to the US in early December and explained the
circumstances. He grumbled but took this in stride.


9. (C) Note: On November 29, 2006, Sharfi telephoned DCM
Powers to inform him that the 25-mile travel restriction on
the movement of Americans in Sudan had been lifted and that
the MFA had been so informed. He stated that a note to this
effect would be forthcoming. End note.
HUME