DESPITE OPTICS ON FM VISIT, NO NEW FRENCH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 002697

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF/SPG, AF/SE, AF/RSA, AND EUR/WE
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY
PARIS FOR D'ELIA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/18/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO SU FR CD
SUBJECT: DESPITE OPTICS ON FM VISIT, NO NEW FRENCH
INITIATIVE FOR DARFUR

REF: KHARTOUM 02671

Classified By: P/E Chief E. Whitaker, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: Despite the positive coverage in both the
Western and Sudanese press of French Foreign Minister
Philippe Douste-Blazy's recent trip to Khartoum and reports
of a French initiative to resolve the Darfur crisis, French
Political Counselor Francois Colas characterized the visit as
an unsuccessful attempt by the Sudanese government to lure
the GoF away from its Western allies and divide the
international community on United Nations intervention in
Darfur. He denied the existence of a new French peace
initiative. Noting French concern that the Darfur crisis
could result in a wider regional war, Colas said his
government would continue to encourage the Sudanese
leadership to accept international forces in Darfur, reign in
Chadian rebel leaders, and press Darfur rebel leaders to
develop a more unified leadership structure. End summary.

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French objectives unclear despite Sudanese flirtations
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2. (C) During a November 16 meeting with Poloff, Colas said
that the Sudanese government had used Douste-Blazy's November
12-13 visit to court the French government in an effort to
lure it away from its Western allies and lessen its support
for UN intervention in Darfur. This approach was part of an
ongoing Sudanese strategy toward France that included NCP
insider Ghazi Salaheddin's October visit to Paris and
Presidential Advisor and former Foreign Minister Mustafa
Osman Ismail's planned trip from November 16 to 19. Colas
could not articulate what the French government had hoped to
achieve with Douste-Blazy's visit to Khartoum, indicating
that it is unlikely to expend much political capital to
resolve the crisis. He said only that his government was
unswayed by "Sudanese flattery" on the important role that
Paris could play in a resolution of the crisis and that a
purported French initiative for Darfur did not exist.

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The Chadian Question
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3. (C) Colas noted the French government's concern that the
Darfur conflict could broaden into a wider war involving Chad
and the Central African Republic. He said that some factions
of the Sudanese government had expressed similar concerns
during their meetings with Douste-Blazy and asked for French
assistance in facilitating a rapprochement between Sudan and
Chad. Colas, however, said that hard-liners in both the
Sudanese and Chadian governments were obstructing such a
reconciliation despite French pressure on both sides to reign
in rebel groups. "You cannot convince those that are not
ready to be convinced," he stated, noting that Sudan
continued to harbor most of the Chadian rebel leaders that it
had promised to expel following the normalization of
relations between Sudan and Chad in July.


4. (C) Contradicting press reports that President Bashir
would consider supporting international "observers" on the
Chadian side of the border, Colas said that this idea was not
raised during Douste-Blazy's meeting with Bashir and that
other Sudanese officials had been "non-responsive" on the
issue. Colas attributed this to the hard-liners' belief that
international forces in Chad would be a way for the United
Nations to "sneak into Sudan through the backdoor." (Note:
Given the Sudanese government's mixed messages following the
November 16 agreement in Addis Ababa (covered septel),it is
difficult to determine if the government's attitude on
international observers in Chad has changed. End note.)

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DPA Non-signatories
--------------


5. (C) Regarding the non-signatories to the Darfur Peace
Agreement (DPA),Colas said his government was skeptical
about a Justice Africa initiative, funded by the European
Commission, for a conference of rebel leaders. He added that
the "USG initiative" to support a conference of non-signatory
commanders and promote a more coherent leadership structure
within the movements would be more productive and said he did
not understand why the European Commission had chosen Justice
Africa as its partner, given that it had no permanent
presence in Sudan. (Note: In using the term "USG

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initiative," Colas was referring to the joint USG, UK, Dutch,
and Norwegian working group that has been engaging rebel
commanders and is working to facilitate a conference in
Birmaza in the coming days (reftel). Prior to Colas'
comments, French representatives had not raised any concerns
about the EC/Justice Africa plan during numerous meetings of
the international community in Khartoum. End note.)


6. (C) Noting SLM leader Abdulwahid Al Nur's upcoming trip to
Paris, Colas said the French government would use the
opportunity to underscore the importance of unifying the
rebel movements in order to enhance their bargaining position
with the Sudanese government. He said that the GoF would
cite the example of the successful Eastern Sudan Peace
Agreement. Reformulating the refrain of "divide and rule,"
Colas said the Sudanese government's policy was "divide and
survive," which would remain effective until the rebel
movements could develop a more unified leadership structure.
HUME