SE NATSIOS MTG WITH MINAWI: NCP IMPEDES PROGRESS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 002598

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER AND AF/SPG
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/01/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL SU UN CD ER
SUBJECT: SE NATSIOS MTG WITH MINAWI: NCP IMPEDES PROGRESS
ON DARFUR AUTHORITY


Classified By: CDA E. Whitaker, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: In a meeting with Special Envoy Andrew
Natsios, Senior Assistant to the President and leader of
the SLM Minni Minawi described the efforts of the National
Congress Party (NCP) to delay the implementation of the
Transitional Darfur Regional Authority (TDRA),foreign
influence on other rebel movements, his attempts to
negotiate with DPA non-signatories, and discord between the
Arab militias and the Sudanese government. END SUMMARY.

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NCP PROMOTING CHAOS
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2. (C) During an October 14 meeting with Special Envoy
Natsios, Senior Assistant to the President and SLM leader
Minni Minawi described the Sudanese government's efforts to
weaken his leadership, avoid full implementation of the
DPA, and maintain the status quo in Darfur. "The
Government does not want to support or undermine the DPA,"
he said. Minawi continues to negotiate with the Sudanese
government on the establishment of the TDRA but said his
interlocutors want to delay full implementation of the
agreement in order to foment chaos in Darfur and avoid a
challenge to their authority. Later in the conversation,
Minawi predicted that the Sudanese government would attempt
to improve the security situation through its own military
offensive in order to pre-empt UN intervention.


3. (C) Minawi stated that he had begun thinking about
returning to Darfur to re-assert his control over the SLM
but that the NCP opposed this and had warned him that it
could not guarantee his safety. Minawi explained that the
NCP is funding some members of his movement who oppose UN
intervention to launch a coup against him but said he could
guarantee his own security. He indicated that the NCP was
trying to keep him in Khartoum in order to "break" him.
"If you join the Government, they will divide you in two.
If you're alone, they will also divide you in two."


4. (C) One of Minawi's assistants, Ali Trayo, said that the
SLM's lack of resources weakened its position vis-a-vis the
government and prevented it from influencing the NCP to
implement the DPA. He also noted that many of the
pro-Minawi commanders had not see any dividends from the
DPA, which made the environment conducive to a coup. "The
NCP does not want to take us seriously because we don't
have resources to stand on our own," said Trayo. By
contrast, Minawi indicated that a coup was improbable and
seemed uninterested in discussing details of how the USG
could use its capital within the international community to
provide assistance to the SLM. (NOTE: Ambassador Sam
Ibok, African Union head of DPA implementation, told AID
Mission Director and Poloff on October 21 that he had
attempted on numerous occasions to discuss with Minawi how
the AU could facilitate non-military logistical support.
However, he was unable to illicit a substantive response
from Minawi. END NOTE)

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FOREIGN INFLUENCE
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5. (C) Minawi said that strident Chadian and Eritrean
support for the National Redemption Front (NRF) was the
principle factor in undermining the DPA. "I don't think
there is anything called the National Redemption Front
anymore--it's all Chad." He stated that 90-percent of the
NRF forces engaged in the recent fighting near the
northwest Darfur town of Tine were Chadian and that at
least three or four NRF commanders want to dissolve the DPA
and overthrow the Sudanese government. Trayo added that
Chad had wanted to control the SLM but began to actively
undermine it once this was not possible.

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OUTREACH TO NON-SIGNATORIES
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6. (C) Minawi said that he continues to encourage DPA
non-signatory Abdul Wahid to join the agreement and that
the SLM/Minawi vice chairman was scheduled to meet with
Abdul Wahid in Asmara on October 15. "Abdul Wahid's
actions--and some of his commanders--are positive right
now," said Minawi. He said that compensation is the main
outstanding issue, and that another non-signatory leader,
Ahmed Abdul Shafie, could also be brought to the DPA in the

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near-term if this issue was addressed. Minawi said that he
plans to absorb many of the dissident commanders into the
upper echelons of the police, military and security forces
through the TDRA in order to gain their accession to the
DPA but that its structure might need to be expanded in
order to accommodate them, which would require further
negotiation with the Sudanese government. (NOTE: In an
October 21 meeting with AID Mission Director and Poloff,
Minawi said that he had spoken to Abdul Wahid for two hours
earlier in the day and that his efforts to unify the two
movements were gaining traction. END NOTE.)

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JANJAWEED-NCP DISCORD
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7. (C) According to Minawi, Arab militia and tribal leader
Moussa Hillal is frustrated with the Sudanese government
and is distancing himself from it. "He says, 'the
Government uses us in the South and in Darfur for a holy
war and then makes agreements and leaves us,'" quoted
Minawi. He said that the Arab militias were no longer
"free roaming" but did cause conflict when they moved from
one sector to another.


8. (U) Special Envoy Natsios cleared this message.
EWHITAKER