Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06KHARTOUM2535
2006-10-23 10:47:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Khartoum
Cable title:  

IBOK SAYS DPA NOT WORKING, AU MUST TRANSITION TO UN

Tags:  PREL MOPS KPKO UN AU SU 
pdf how-to read a cable
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PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHKH #2535/01 2961047
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 231047Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4990
C O N F I D E N T I A L KHARTOUM 002535 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF/SE AND AF/SPG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/19/2016
TAGS: PREL MOPS KPKO UN AU SU
SUBJECT: IBOK SAYS DPA NOT WORKING, AU MUST TRANSITION TO UN


Classified By: Acting P/E Chief Michael Honigstein, Reason: Section 1.4
(b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L KHARTOUM 002535

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF/SE AND AF/SPG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/19/2016
TAGS: PREL MOPS KPKO UN AU SU
SUBJECT: IBOK SAYS DPA NOT WORKING, AU MUST TRANSITION TO UN


Classified By: Acting P/E Chief Michael Honigstein, Reason: Section 1.4
(b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY. Special Envoy Andrew Natsios met African
Union Ambassador Sam Ibok October 17 at the U.S.-funded
Darfur Peace Agreement Implementation Office in Khartoum.
Ibok asked for U.S. support for strengthening the African
Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) while planning for a future UN
re-hat. Ibok admitted the AU should reverse its position on
working with non-signatories, and find a way to implement the
Ceasefire Commission. He warned about government desperation
over military losses leading to a humanitarian crisis and
asked that the U.S. continue to engage the GNU on the
political process, supporting SPLM proposals on Darfur and
strengthening Darfurian groups. END SUMMARY.

--------------
Beef Up AMIS and Negotiate a Real Ceasefire
--------------


2. (C) Ibok admitted the Darfur Peace Agreement is not
working, saying that its support base is limited and as
hold-out groups fragment further the security situation is
deteriorating. In response Ibok called again for an increase
in AMIS troop strength. "The AU is not up to the task," he
said, "it just doesn't have the capacity." In parallel to an
increase in troop strength, Ibok called for political
pressure on the GOS. "Unless the GOS wants this to work it
won't," he said. "The AU alone can not change the attitude of
the GOS; the limitations and obstructions it imposes." Ibok
decried GOS statements supporting AMIS, pointing out that if
the GOS wanted the AU to succeed, customs wouldn't be
obstructing or denying entry to AU shipments in Port Sudan.
Ibok said a VSAT and broadcasting equipment have been blocked
for a year. This means that the GOS can cut AU
communications at will.


3. (U) Ibok called for a real ceasefire in Darfur. He
suggested that a targeted ceasefire in relatively stable
areas, such as South Darfur, could create an island of
stability. He said incentives for peace could counter the
widely held belief that the DPA has brought greater chaos to
Darfur. He also said AMIS should set priorities, including

reallocating assets and narrowing its focus to protecting IDP
camps still targeted by militants. He argued that where AMIS
has stepped up its presence near IDP camps, attacks have
decreased. When asked by Natsios about a ceasefire timeframe,
Ibok agreed it should be limited to five or six months
initially.

--------------
Bring Non-Signatories Back to the Table
--------------


4. (C) Ibok stated, "the AU must reverse itself," arguing
that the Ceasefire Commission (CFC) is not working, and
non-signatories should be brought back to the CFC. "You can't
negotiate a ceasefire without all the involved parties
present," he said. Ibok also noted that as a result of
cutting communication with non-signatory militias, AU forces'
access to rebel-controlled territory was minimal. "The AU
played into the government's hands by agreeing with the GOS
and SLM/Minni to lock out non-signatories," Ibok said.


5. (U) Ibok argued that most non-signatories want to
participate in the CFC except for the two main spoilers: the
National Redemption Front (NRF) which hasn't clarified its
position, and the JEM, which would join, not on the basis of
the DPA but on basis of the N'Djamena agreement. Ibok noted
that to reduce their profile, non-signatory representation
could be at the sector level as opposed to the HQ level.


6. (U) As a first step to increasing non-signatory
representation Ibok suggested that the issue be raised at the
Joint Commission (JC) at the end of the month. He said that
not only are many non-signatory representatives still in El
Fasher, but that many members of the JC agree with bringing
non-signatories back to the negotiating table. A JC decision
would be multilateral and couldn't be as easily spun as a
choice imposed by the AU or GOS. Ibok admitted that the GOS
is opposed to non-signatory representation but pointed out
that they were just one vote on the commission.


7. (U) In response to queries on European efforts to convene
a non-signatory conference, Ibok said he had told EU
representatives that, "big conferences are an absolute waste
of time." He said "We have taken people all over the world
for no reason and no result. The rebels will gladly take the
money, and more will rise in their place to demand
recognition and support." Ibok asked that the U.S. back Salva
Kiir and SPLM initiatives on Darfur. He suggested that Salva
Kiir push an effort to address the concerns of hold-out
groups, perhaps through an addendum or annex to the DPA.


8. (C) Ibok said the GOS is pushing an agreement for Darfur
similar to the Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement recently signed
in Asmara. He said Maqhzoub al Khalifa told him, "Look, we
found an African solution to African problems in four months,
you took two years. We did it without the US, UN, EU and your
western friends." Ibok said while the international community
argued about non-signatory conferences, the GOS was active
paying off militants, and these financial rewards mean that
"everyone wants to come to Khartoum and sign an agreement."

-------------- --
GOS Desperation vs. International Determination
-------------- --


9. (C) Ibok argued that recent military defeats for the SAF
in North Darfur could lead to a humanitarian catastrophe if
the GOS retaliates against civilian populations. In response
SE Natsios emphasized the growing Darfur lobby in Washington,
and the determination that if there are further massacres in
Darfur the U.S. will respond strongly. Ibok recognized the
impatience of the international community for change in
Darfur, but cautioned that the solution "can't be military."


10. (C) Ibok promoted constructive engagement with all
parties, but noted that the majority of Darfurian groups need
better organization. "We need interlocutors to work with and
these groups aren't yet in the position to provide that," he
said, noting that SLM Minni Minawi particularly needs
structure and support. "The governors and commanders come to
see Khalifa, not Minni Minawi," he said. "Minni is losing
support, he needs to get back to Darfur and work with other
Darfurian leaders on the ground."


11. (U) Ibok also called for focus on the Transitional Darfur
Regional Authority (TDRA). He said that international donors
have to get the TDRA started and create a real political
structure. Recognizing the current sensitivities towards
allocating positions, Ibok suggested beginning with
bureaucratic infrastructure, offices and technical support.


12. (C) Ibok praised President Bush's engagement with African
and Arab leaders, and the resulting increase in voices
criticizing Sudan's actions in Darfur. He noted that it would
be constructive to shift the media focus from "Bashir vs.
President Bush." Ibok related the recent visit of the
Nigerian and Senegalese FMs who met with Bashir and offered
to work together with the GOS on Darfur. According to Ibok,
the Nigerian and Senegalese FM's stated openly, "although
troops came to Darfur under AU auspices they will leave under
UN auspices."


13. (C) SE Natsios noted that small steps have not been
effective in influencing GOS behavior; he asked Ibok's
position on a possible embargo on Sudanese oil exports. Ibok
noted that any measures taken need to be credible. He pointed
out that the NCP is isolated within the government on their
Darfur position, and it would be useful to strengthen the
other coalition partners.

--------------
Create a Credible, Less Extreme UN Discussion
--------------


14. (C) In discussing a future UN re-hat, Ibok called for
pressuring the UN while cautioning that the GOS uses the UN
debate as a platform for "scare tactics and extreme
rhetoric." While avoiding this trap, he felt a credible
discussion was needed on the nature and composition of a UN
mission. At the same time he noted that certain clauses of UN
resolution 1706, such as remodeling the entire police and
judiciary, will continue to be untenable to the GOS as
written, and should be sidelined.


15. (C) Ibok was dismissive of UNSRG Jan Pronk's optimism
that UN observers would be soon deployed to augment AMIS in
Darfur. Ibok thought that despite GOS public acceptance of
deploying advisors, the GOS would delay negotiations on the
Status of Forces Agreement as long as possible. On his part,
Ibok said the AU is willing to accept UN assistance, and was
confident that all administrative details will be resolved.
SE Natsios flagged the power vacuum likely to occur at the UN
with the SYG's departure, and warned that this could
negatively affect the UN's current engagement with the GOS.


16. (U) SE Natsios cleared this message.
POWERS