SE NATSIOS MEETING WITH SALAH GHOSH: WILLINGNESS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 002531

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR A/S AF FRAZER AND AF/SPG
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/21/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR PTER SU UN
SUBJECT: SE NATSIOS MEETING WITH SALAH GHOSH: WILLINGNESS
TO ENGAGE BUT NO TO UN FORCE


Classified By: A/Pol Chief M. Honigstein, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and
(d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: In a meeting with Special Envoy Andrew
Natsios, Sudanese intelligence chief Salah Ghosh said that
the Sudanese government would never accept a UN force but was
willing to work with the USG to find a solution to the Darfur
crisis. He indicated that such discussions could include
enhancing the size of an African Union (AU) force, altering
the force's composition, and accepting advisors and
logistical support from the UN and Western countries. Ghosh
also suggested a coordinated approach to engage the Darfur
Peace Agreement (DPA) non-signatories, stabilize security in
the internally displaced persons camps through community
policing, and resolve inter-tribal conflicts in South Darfur
as a basis for peace in other parts of the region. In an
effort to underline his willingness to negotiate with the
USG, Ghosh granted SE Natsios permission to travel to
Southern Sudan and to Darfur, which had been revoked on the
previous day. END SUMMARY

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SUDAN FRUSTRATED BUT CAN COOPERATE
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2. (C) During an October 16 meeting with SE Natsios, Director
General of the National Intelligence and Security Service
(NISS) Salah Ghosh restated the Sudanese government's
opposition to UN intervention in Darfur. Ghosh expressed his
government's frustration at the slow progress made to
normalize bilateral relations despite Sudanese cooperation on
counter-terrorism and its signing of the Comprehensive Peace
Agreement (CPA) and the DPA and said that some now called it
a "funny joke." However, Ghosh emphasized that the American
and Sudanese governments have been able to resolve issues
when they have worked together. "We need to focus on solving
this issue rather than fighting over UN forces," he said.

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NO UN, BUT STRONGER AU
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3. (C) Though he said the Sudanese government would never
accept UN force intervention, he noted his government's
willingness to discuss options for strengthening the AU force
in Darfur. Denying that troops from South Asia would be more
capable than those from Africa, he said the Sudanese
government would be willing to accept forces from Egypt,
Tunisia, Algeria and other African countries. He also stated
that the force's size could be doubled and that there would
be no restrictions on outside advisors or the source of
equipment, "even from NATO."


4. (C) SE Natsios said the UN's experience in peacekeeping
and disarmament, particularly among troops from Pakistan,
India and Bangladesh, surpassed that of African countries
such as Algeria and Egypt, which have rarely if ever
participated in such operations. He also emphasized that the
use of Western troops had not been proposed and that the West
was focused on the humanitarian situation in Sudan, not on
obtaining oil or military bases. "A peaceful, stable, and
just Sudan is in the interests of the US," he said. After SE
Natsios explained the utility of the UN's automatic financing
mechanism for an international force, Ghosh re-iterated that
direct UN intervention was impossible and said that financing
was the USG's "problem."

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DIALOGUE WITH NON-SIGNATORIES
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5. (C) Ghosh highlighted Sudanese efforts to garner support
for the DPA from the non-signatories, saying that he had
personally traveled to Tripoli and Eritrea on several
occasions for talks. "We are not convinced that the problems
of Darfur will be solved militarily, but we need to keep a
military balance to get people to come to a political
discussion...We are running after them (the
non-signatories)." Ghosh said that there was room for
dialogue with the non-signatories, that a coordinated
approach with the USG would be helpful, and that his
government was meeting with them in Jebel Marra to develop an
annex to the DPA. Ghosh criticized Chadian support for rebel
groups and indicated that it was exploiting tribal divisions
along the border. He also noted that the Justice and
Equality Movement (JEM) was focused on overthrowing the
Sudanese government and that it was "a waste of time" to
negotiate with them. "The JEM needs to be restrained around

KHARTOUM 00002531 002 OF 002


the world," he said, suggesting that the JEM could be
isolated through dialogue with other rebel groups.

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BASIS FOR PEACE IN SOUTH SUDAN
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6. (C) Ghosh explained that South Darfur, home to 60 percent
of the region's population, could serve as the basis for
peace in other parts of Darfur. He said that inter-tribal
conflicts in the area could be addressed and that there has
already been some reconciliation between tribes. He also
showed a willingness to strengthen the cease-fire mechanism
in cooperation with the USG and suggested that a community
police force could be established from the local population
to increase security. He said that the American and Sudanese
governments could establish a joint technical team to discuss
this issue.

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WARNING ON VIOLENCE
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7. (C) As a gesture of his willingness to negotiate with the
USG, Ghosh announced that SE Natsios could travel to Juba and
to Darfur as previously planned, despite the Sudanese
government's October 15 decision to deny him permission to
travel. SE Natsios said that Ghosh's pragmatism was
constructive but emphasized that the Sudanese government must
prevent any action that would exacerbate the tense security
situation in Darfur. He warned Ghosh that a massacre of
civilians in the region, either by the Sudanese military or
by rebel groups, would elicit a "severe" response in the U.S.


8. (C) NOTE: In a subsequent conversation with Embassy staff,
Ghosh said that he felt the meeting was extremely positive
and represented the first step to finding a way forward on
the Darfur crisis. He planned to brief President Omer
Bashir, First Vice President Salva Kiir, and Foreign Minister
Lam Akol on the discussion within days. END NOTE


9. (U) Special Envoy Natsios cleared this cable.
POWERS