Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06KHARTOUM2513
2006-10-16 15:32:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Khartoum
Cable title:  

TAHA ASKS NATSIOS FOR HELP WITH NON-SIGNATORIES

Tags:  PREL KPKO UN SU 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO0980
PP RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #2513 2891532
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 161532Z OCT 06 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4963
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L KHARTOUM 002513 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF/SPG
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/16/2016
TAGS: PREL KPKO UN SU
SUBJECT: TAHA ASKS NATSIOS FOR HELP WITH NON-SIGNATORIES


Classified By: Acting P/E Chief Michael Honigstein, Reason: Section 1.4
(b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L KHARTOUM 002513

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF/SPG
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/16/2016
TAGS: PREL KPKO UN SU
SUBJECT: TAHA ASKS NATSIOS FOR HELP WITH NON-SIGNATORIES


Classified By: Acting P/E Chief Michael Honigstein, Reason: Section 1.4
(b) and (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY. The only way to reinforce the Darfur Peace
Agreement (DPA) is by getting acceptance from
non-signatories, Vice President Ali Osman Taha told Special
Presidential Envoy (SPE) Andrew Natsios on October 15.
Natsios underlined the importance of improving the
humanitarian situation, maintaining security with a credible
force, establishing a ceasefire, and beginning the
Darfur-Darfur dialogue. Taha agreed that there was no
military solution, but explained that diplomacy must come
first, or the ceasefire would not last. Natsios also warned
that if the Sudanese broke their agreement and barred him
from travel to Juba and Darfur, he would leave immediately.
END SUMMARY.

-------------- --------------
Natsios: Humanitarian situation Must Improve, UN Can Help
-------------- --------------


2. (C) SPE Natsios began by telling VP Taha that he had no
ultimatums to deliver and wanted to have a real dialogue.
Natsios pointed out that bilateral relations could get worse
because all sides in the U.S., from the far right to the far
left, were unanimous on Darfur. However, Natsios said a
conversation on what international forces were acceptable--
size, composition, mandate, structure, and funding-- is
necessary. Natsios outlined the U.S.'s long-term goals,
including acceptance of transition to the UN, but right now
the emphasis is on a ceasefire and protection of
non-combatants. Natsios said that he is concerned that the
Janjaweed could start massacres in the camps if the chaos
continued, and emphasized that the UN is good at this type of
stabilization and disarmament mission and could really help
the government.

-------------- --------------
Taha: Ceasefire will only work if non-Signatories Join DPA
-------------- --------------


3. (C) Taha agreed that protecting civilians was the
priority, but said efforts to get the non-signatories into
the DPA must be done first, or else a ceasefire would only
help the rebels regroup. Natsios responded that negotiations
are difficult during an offensive, but Taha reemphasized that
security comes from diplomacy and not the other way around.
Even if the UN came, Taha said, it could not maintain
security without a political resolution.


4. (C) Taha pointed out that bilateral relations were good
in Abuja, and that we should go back to that. Taha said the
DPA failed because the U.S. and the Europeans abandoned the
agreement immediately after signature, welcoming
non-signatories, not condemning the attack in Kordofan, and
shifting all blame to the GoS. He also said he was
disappointed there was no offer of help with compensation.
The Dafurian concept of compensation, Natsios said, meant it
had to come from the government. Natsios then added that
there may be room to increase development aid and allow the
GoS to shift more money to compensation.


5. (C) Taha said that many non-signatories, like Abdel Wahid
al Nur, were respecting the ceasefire and did not present as
urgent a problem as the National Redemption Front (NRF).
Taha agreed to develop a plan for the U.S. and Sudan to work
together on recruiting non-signatories, which could be
discussed this week. Charge D'Affairs Hume added that it was
important in planning to distinguish between non-signatories
who respect the ceasefire and those that don't, but in the
current chaotic environment that was impossible. Hume
suggested the GoS consider a plan to begin a ceasefire in
South Darfur, where there are fewer spoilers, which would be
more manageable.


6. (C) COMMENT: In a one-on-one at the end of the meeting,
Natsios warned Taha that the mood in western capitals,
particularly Washington, was growing more impatient and that
if non-combatants were massacred in the camps, that would
provoke a serious response from the United States. Natsios
was disappointed by Taha's lack of candor in the meeting and
fixation on a revisionist description of the past. END
COMMENT.


7. (U) Special Presidential Envoy Andrew Natsios has cleared
this cable.
HUME