Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06KHARTOUM2489
2006-10-11 15:25:00
UNCLASSIFIED
Embassy Khartoum
Cable title:  

DARFUR: NEW AU FORCE COMMANDER: GENERAL APREZI

Tags:  PREL SU 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO5960
PP RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #2489/01 2841525
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 111525Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4921
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 002489 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT. FOR AF SPECIAL ENVOY NATSIOS, AF/SPG

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL SU
SUBJECT: DARFUR: NEW AU FORCE COMMANDER: GENERAL APREZI


UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 002489

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT. FOR AF SPECIAL ENVOY NATSIOS, AF/SPG

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL SU
SUBJECT: DARFUR: NEW AU FORCE COMMANDER: GENERAL APREZI



1. (U) Summary: New African Union Force Commander in El
Fasher, General Luke (or LKF) Aprezi, laid out his views on
major challenges to the AMIS mission in an October 9 meeting
with DCM Roberto Powers and Acting Defense Liaison officer
Richard Shirley. Aprezi is originally from the Niger River
Delta area of Nigeria. He spent time in the U.S. in the early
1980's and previously served both in Yugoslavia and Liberia.
Aprezi noted that his mission "is not peacekeeping," but
instead, "to provide a secure environment for humanitarian
efforts." He laid out the major challenges to the AU in
Darfur, focusing on a shortage of manpower and logistical
support for moving his troops the large distances required to
cover Darfur. End summary.

--------------
AMIS "Can't Dominate on the Ground"
--------------


2. (U) Aprezi strongly highlighted AMIS' lack of manpower,
noting that one battalion covers 43,000 km. Companies are
spread 200 kms apart, and effective patrolling is impossible
over such large distances. When AMIS tries to increase
coverage by dropping patrol sizes to platoon level they are
overwhelmed in the field. Aprezi said that without sufficient
checkpoints on main roads AMIS can,t monitor who is moving
what and to where, leaving the roads vulnerable to banditry.


3. (U) "AMIS has to be enhanced to do the job," Aprezi
argued. Ideally he would like another nine additional
battalions, one for each sector plus one for HQ as an escort
force. If Aprezi gets additional troops he plans to augment
checkpoints and increase observation towers to monitor the
eight sectors' areas of responsibility.


4. (U) When queried about troop morale Aprezi stated that he
had visited three sectors in his so far brief tenure in
Fasher, and although morale seemed fine he was well aware
that, "success breeds good morale." He pointed out the lack
of sufficient recreation and exercise facilities for the
troops, "the boys have to let off steam," he said.


--------------
Logistical Support
--------------


5. (U) Aprezi also noted he doesn't have the flexibility to
concentrate power or move his troops quickly due to the fixed
nature of the AMIS camps. The camps are far apart, they
always need a guard force, and can't be moved without serious
air asset support. He emphasized that with regard to this air

asset support, "PAE has to support us, nothing is possible if
the logistics are not there."


6. (U) When asked about his meetings with the GOS he said
that they would agree to an increase in AMIS forces and
support, but rejected any UNMIS support. When queried about
the proposed 105 UN advisors, he said that he had received a
letter from the GOS asking for his staffing plan. Because of
this, he believes that it was approved.


7. (U) Aprezi said he planned a strong approach to security
problems in Tawila, a town with a large IDP camp
approximately 80kms from AMIS headquarters in El Fasher.
Aprezi stated that AMIS should not be having such serious
problems ensuring security for IDP camps that are virtually
in AMIS' back yard. Aprezi suggested AMIS might have a
"command problem," and noted he was determined to exert firm
command and control of his forces. With regard to the
security situation Aprezi emphasized that AMIS must "dominate
the ground" to stop non-signatory groups from "behaving with
impunity." He said he wants to change the climate so it is
also less permissive for general banditry.

--------------
The General's Priorities
--------------


8. (U) As his first priority Aprezi again flagged his lack of
manpower, "we must have a credible force on the ground." He
said that the old CONOPS had called for another six
battalions, and although his new CONOPS calls for three more,
the priority was to get the new battalions in as soon as
possible.


9. (U) When asked, Aprezi admitted that they have no
equipment for night operations, but argued that, as such
equipment is less valuable at long range, "if you have
checkpoints you don't need it, you know who's on the road."
He said that once they have staffed observation posts they
might need increased night operations equipment. In addition,

KHARTOUM 00002489 002 OF 002


he noted that AMIS has no combat air assets, and helicopter
gunships would be a great asset for covering the eight
sectors. Aprezi commended PAE, but also pushed for greater
logistics support.

--------------
DPA: Non-Signatories
--------------


10. (U) When asked by the DCM about the impact of a
non-signatory conference in Darfur, Aprezi noted that he has
suggested the creation of a new forum to work with
non-signatories since they have been removed from the
Ceasefire Commission (CFC). He said non-signatories need to
meet once a month with the AU and international community
and, in parallel, political leaders should meet in Khartoum
once a month to resolve political issues. Aprezi noted that
he has tasked his information team to provide more briefings
on AMIS' activities to the international community.

--------------
Janjaweed and Cease Fire Violations
--------------


11. (U) With regard to disarming the Janjaweed, Aprezi stated
that he had already held two meetings of the CFC, and that
disarmament was on the last meeting's agenda. He further
stated that he was waiting for a copy of the GOS plan to
disarm the Janjaweed to be submitted to the AU for review and
then he would present it to the CFC. He argued that certain
aspects could start without the non-signatories'
participation in the CFC.


12. (U) With regard to investigating cease fire violations,
Aprezi argued that a lack of good information on the ground
means that AMIS can't clearly identify or hold accountable
the culprits. "We must be able to hold people responsible,"
he said. He mentioned that he plans to increase his
intelligence capacity, and extend a network of informants in
the IDP camps.


13. (U) COMMENT: General Aprezi appears to have a good grasp
of the challenges AMIS faces in Darfur, and a plan to address
these challenges. However, much of his plans are predicated
on an increase in troop strength, funding, and logistical
support from the international community. END COMMENT.
HUME