DARFUR: CHAD AND SUDAN STILL PLAYING IN ONE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 002451

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR A/S FRAZER, NSC FOR COURVILLE AND SHORTLEY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/04/2026
TAGS: PGOV PREF PHUM KPKO SU CH AU
SUBJECT: DARFUR: CHAD AND SUDAN STILL PLAYING IN ONE
ANOTHER,S BACKYARDS


Classified By: DCM R. Powers, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: Notwithstanding the August resumption of
full diplomatic relations between Sudan and Chad, and
promises to expel rebel groups from their respective
territories, both countries appear to be continuing support
for opposition movements as a means of maintaining political
and military leverage over the other. Fighting on both sides
of the border indicates that neither government is serious in
its commitment to halt interference in the other's internal
affairs. Any viable prospects for peace in Darfur will
clearly have to take into account the regional nature of the
conflict, with particular focus on Chad's role in supporting
Sudanese rebels. End summary.


2. (C) In meetings with ARC Officer September 21-24 in El
Geneina, West Darfur state, a complex picture emerged of
ongoing Sudanese and Chadian support to opposition rebel
movements in each others' territory. The security landscape
in West Darfur is particularly complicated by the continued
presence of Chadian opposition groups. UN officials pointed
out to ARC Officer on numerous occasions Chadian rebels
congregated near El Geneina's main market. Notwithstanding
the Government's claims that it no longer harbors Chadian
opposition members, UN officials asserted that these groups'
presence is both well-known throughout West Darfur and that
they continue to receive logistical support from the Sudanese
government. UNDSS estimated that four to five thousand
Chadian opposition members remain in West Darfur, and, of
these, roughly ninety percent are Sudanese nationals. (Note:
In contrast, the head of UNMIS in El Geneina, Annamaria
Laurini, later asserted that most of the rebels were "of
Chadian origin." End Note).


3. (C) UNDSS and UNMIS officials, as well as Sudanese
Liberation Movement (SLM) Minawi representatives, affirm
continued overt Government assistance to Chadian rebels, who
receive transportation, armament, and communications support
from National Intelligence and Security Services (NISS) and
Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) officers. UNDSS described the
Chadian opposition's strategy as persistent, small-scale,
attacks into Chad with the objective of harassing Chadian
border forces and Sudanese refugees and demonstrating a
continued presence. Chadian rebels have engaged in
hit-and-run attacks, rather than seizing and holding key
terrain within Chad. Larger scale engagements, however, have
occurred, including fighting in mid-September in which
Chadian opposition groups reportedly "destroyed 4 Chadian
regular army tanks and numerous vehicles and captured 26
vehicles and 60 Chadian soldiers." Several NGO contacts
mentioned to ARC Officer that it is not uncommon to see
Chadian opposition groups, sometimes escorted by Government
police or SAF, driving west toward the Chad border in armed
convoys.


4. (C) The size and scale of Chadian opposition attacks
across the border are difficult to judge given AMIS' lack of
visibility in the area and the UN's limited access.
Nonetheless, according to UN High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) officers in El Geneina, refugees and
internally-displaced persons (IDPs) moving across the border
continue to report harassment from both Chadian opposition
groups and armed Arabs. UNDSS noted that NISS, while
remaining slightly more discreet in their association with
the Arab militia, continues to provide them arms in clear
violation of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA). One UN
security official that has served in the region for more than
two years speculated that the Government strategy is to
encourage Chadian rebels to create a buffer zone on the
Chadian side of the border, from which both Chadian rebels
and, potentially, Arab militia might be called upon to launch
proxy attacks against UN peacekeepers.


5. (C) Responding to ARC Officer's queries regarding Chadian
support to the National Redemption Front (NRF) and other
rebels inside Sudan, UNDSS held that logistical and military
assistance continued, despite SAF efforts to seal the border.
More than two Sudanese Army brigades are deployed along the
border north of Tine and have partially succeeded in
intercepting and deterring cross-border re-supply, according
to UNDSS and NGOs with contacts in the area. They added that
Sudanese rebels in West Darfur remain concentrated around
Jebel Moon, with roughly 150 Justice and Equality Movement
(JEM) fighters located in the northern portion of the
mountainous area and approximately 450 SLM/Abdel Wahid
personnel in the south. (Note: According to the UN Office
for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (UNOCHA) and
NGOs working in West Darfur IDP camps, Abdel Wahid continues
to enjoy the popular support of much of the IDP community,

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comprised primarily of Masalit and Fur. End Note.)


6. (C) COMMENT: Following significant fighting between SAF
and Sudanese rebels in early September around Jebel Moon,
Government forces succeeded in pushing JEM and SLM/Abdel
Wahid elements into defensive positions in the mountainous
terrain. There have been few large-scale attacks since
mid-September, and the SAF, which deployed a reinforced
company along with a Popular Defense Forces (PDF) unit of up
to 100 personnel and three helicopter gunships to the area in
late August, is "laying siege" to Jebel Moon. Although the
World Food Program (WFP) is delivering food in the area,
UNOCHA and UNHCR contacts noted to ARC Officer that
humanitarian access was otherwise severely limited. They
relayed IDP reports that the rebels are running low on
supplies and will increasingly be forced to leave their
mountain stronghold to procure them, facing the prospect of
confrontation with Government troops. UNDSS highlighted that
the Jebel Moon JEM ) composed of the African tribe Mesiriya
Jebel ) was most vulnerable to military defeat, given their
low levels of equipment and training. The SAF and PDF forces
in Jebel Moon have time, equipment, and troop strength on
their side, which bodes poorly for the rebels, prospects,
especially with only a trickle of re-supply from Chad. END
COMMENT.
HUME