Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06KHARTOUM2443
2006-10-04 06:38:00
UNCLASSIFIED
Embassy Khartoum
Cable title:
DARFUR - MASS DISPLACEMENT NOT ANTICIPATED
how-toVZCZCXRO9083 PP RUEHMA RUEHROV DE RUEHKH #2443/01 2770638 ZNR UUUUU ZZH P 040638Z OCT 06 FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4848 INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHRN/USMISSION UN ROME
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 002443
SIPDIS
AIDAC
SIPDIS
STATE FOR AF/SPG, PRM, AND ALSO PASS USAID/W
USAID FOR DCHA SUDAN TEAM, AFR/SP
NAIROBI FOR USAID/DCHA/OFDA, USAID/REDSO, AND FAS
GENEVA FOR NKYLOH
NAIROBI FOR SFO
NSC FOR JBRAUSE, NSC/AFRICA FOR TSHORTLEY
USUN FOR TMALY
BRUSSELS FOR PLERNER
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: EAID EAGR PREF PGOV PHUM SOCI SU
SUBJECT: DARFUR - MASS DISPLACEMENT NOT ANTICIPATED
REF: A) KHARTOUM 2254, B) KHARTOUM 2225, C) KHARTOUM 2223, D)
KHARTOUM 2167, E) KHARTOUM 2382
KHARTOUM 00002443 001.2 OF 003
-------
Summary
-------
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 002443
SIPDIS
AIDAC
SIPDIS
STATE FOR AF/SPG, PRM, AND ALSO PASS USAID/W
USAID FOR DCHA SUDAN TEAM, AFR/SP
NAIROBI FOR USAID/DCHA/OFDA, USAID/REDSO, AND FAS
GENEVA FOR NKYLOH
NAIROBI FOR SFO
NSC FOR JBRAUSE, NSC/AFRICA FOR TSHORTLEY
USUN FOR TMALY
BRUSSELS FOR PLERNER
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: EAID EAGR PREF PGOV PHUM SOCI SU
SUBJECT: DARFUR - MASS DISPLACEMENT NOT ANTICIPATED
REF: A) KHARTOUM 2254, B) KHARTOUM 2225, C) KHARTOUM 2223, D)
KHARTOUM 2167, E) KHARTOUM 2382
KHARTOUM 00002443 001.2 OF 003
--------------
Summary
--------------
1. Despite the reported fighting and reduced access for
humanitarian assistance, none of the sources available to USAID's
Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (USAID/OFDA) anticipate
massive population movements within Darfur, towards other states in
Sudan, or across the border to Chad, as of September 28. The UN
Joint Logistics Centre (UNJLC) and the UN World Food Program (WFP)
reported that as of mid-September warehouses in Darfur and other
states had stocks to assist up to 100,000 people. However, the
prevailing sentiment of the humanitarian community in Sudan is that
the current and anticipated levels of fighting will not cause
100,000 new displacements. The situation in the three Darfur states
remains unpredictable with reports of improvement followed by other
information indicating deteriorating conditions. End Summary.
--------------
Major Concerns for All Three States
--------------
2. According to the UN Humanitarian Coordinator in Sudan, 50,000
people have been displaced since the Darfur Peace Agreement was
signed in May 2006. In September, a new round of fighting erupted
between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and other armed groups,
causing many to fear that more displacements were to come. However,
the Humanitarian Aid Department of the European Commission (ECHO),
the U.K. Department for International Development (DFID),and
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Khartoum paint a picture of
general concern but do not anticipate mass displacements within
Darfur, to neighboring states within Sudan, or to Chad.
3. In USAID/OFDA led contingency planning sessions (REF D),staff
of UN agencies and NGOs in Khartoum and Darfur stated that they do
not see any indications on the ground that mass population
displacements either to Chad or to neighboring states in Sudan will
occur in the near future. Experience shows that continued localized
fighting and violence may cause populations to migrate towards urban
areas, internally displaced persons (IDP) camps, or further up into
the mountains, in the case of Jebel Marra. IDPs perceive camps as
relatively safe places because witnesses are present in the camp,
including UN agencies, NGOs, as well as other IDPs. IDPs are not
expected to move from camps to rural communities. (Comment: One NGO
representative noted that Arab groups who have taken over control of
land that previously belonged to farmers would not attack a camp
because they would rather hold on to the land they are occupying.
End Comment.)
4. Insecurity is the predominant apprehension expressed by
humanitarian agencies in all three Darfur states. Lack of road
access limits the ability of humanitarian organizations (REF C) to
reach remote populations and significantly increases program
expenses due to the high costs of helicopter transport. In areas
with a high concentration of beneficiaries, runway rehabilitation
for fixed wing aircraft could improve service delivery, reduce
costs, and expand air services into new areas. NGOs noted that in
the unlikely scenario of "total melt-down" in Darfur, people might
move towards Northern Kordofan State, Southern Kordofan State, and
Khartoum. The NGOs commented that contingency plans for this type
of mass population movement have not been well coordinated or
recently discussed. USAID/OFDA has taken steps internally to
develop contingency plans for this scenario by coordinating Darfur,
Southern Sudan, and northern Sudan programs. In a September 28
meeting, USAID inventoried potential NGO responders by sector and
location, and outlined a contingency plan for the scenario described
above.
5. Both UN agencies and NGOs consider the availability of
commercial ground transport as a good indicator for conditions on
the ground. Agencies noted that if private transporters are no
longer willing to take on contracts, communities will be truly
inaccessible. Another concern voiced by NGOs is that the rising
fuel prices and surcharges for deliveries to insecure areas will
affect program costs.
6. The Darfur Humanitarian Access Map that is published regularly
by the UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)
indicates an improvement in humanitarian access from August to
KHARTOUM 00002443 002.2 OF 003
September. This access has enabled NGOs, particularly in North
Darfur, to reach vulnerable populations who have not received food
for over three months.
--------------
North Darfur
--------------
7. Considerable achievements in humanitarian coverage made up to
April 2006 are currently threatened by the deterioration of
security, reduced access to target populations (REF A),and the
likelihood of reduced funding in 2007.
8. Aerial bombardments on non-SAF held territories have created an
unstable environment. Lack of access to many areas in August and
September 2006 (REF A) resulted in a lack of credible estimations of
new displacements. From September 23 to 27, German Agro Action
(GAA) negotiated with commanders from the National Redemption Front
(NRF) safe passage to Kutum and Mellit localities from El Fasher.
GAA distributed food rations to target communities on the road
between Kutum and Um Baru, and in Sayeh and Mellit towns, reaching
100 percent of the NGO's 271,000 targeted beneficiaries. GAA had
not been able to reach any of these beneficiaries for three months.
IDPs in Fata Borno and Kassab camps received the standard one month
ration, beneficiaries living in communities, not camps, received a
half-ration. NRF senior commanders assured the humanitarian
community that its workers and assets would be safe and invited them
to resume work in the areas they control, which currently include
Muzbat, Birmaza, Abu Shakur, and Um Sidir.
9. According to GAA, the communities reached did not show
infrastructure damage and the population did not appear to have
suffered visibly during the period of isolation from the
humanitarian community. Although GAA reported that humanitarian
assistance was needed, they did not see signs of malnutrition or
extreme deprivation. In the coming days, GAA will travel to Disa
and Birmaza, which are located north of Kutum town, to continue
distribution of general food rations for WFP. To access this area,
GAA will again have to negotiate with commanders of the NRF.
--------------
West Darfur
--------------
10. Save the Children/US (SC/US),a USAID partner that has operated
in West Darfur since 2004, informed USAID staff that in their
opinion the worst case scenario does not include migration out of
state or into Chad. In general, population movements as a result of
localized fighting are anticipated from small rural communities
towards urban centers or IDP camps. Attacks on IDP camps and urban
centers are not expected and mass displacement from those areas
towards rural communities or across state lines or into Chad are not
anticipated. In late 2005, UN predictions for population movements
of 50,000 to 100,000 persons in West Darfur did not materialize.
According to SC/US, only 6,000 persons were eventually displaced
during this time period.
11. The operating environment for humanitarian actors varies
significantly within the state. Despite recent access restrictions
(REF C),some NGOs are able to negotiate with local sheiks safe
passage when the sheiks want assistance for their communities.
Other NGOs, however, reported that the current tensions around the
proposed UN peacekeeping force deployment has mobilized IDPs and
communities, particularly in Zalingei, against the humanitarian
community.
12. Both NGOs and UN agencies based in El Geneina, West Darfur,
reported a high level of coordination, collaboration, and experience
in operating under the tight security restrictions of UN Phase Four.
(Note: The UN lowered West Darfur from Phase Four to Phase Three in
September. End Note.) UN and NGO partners expressed concern that
contingency plans for displacement to Zalingei are not well
understood, coordinated, or planned, and stocks have not been
pre-positioned in sufficient quantities. NGOs reported that they
will work together to address these concerns. Pending resolution on
the current 25 mile limitation on travel by U.S. Government (USG)
staff (REF E),USAID staff plans to follow-up with a site visit to
Zalingei in October.
13. In contingency planning meetings with USAID, NGOs noted that
they would consider any unilateral decision taken by the UN or the
U.S. to bring in a peacekeeping force, blockade Port Sudan, or
KHARTOUM 00002443 003.2 OF 003
establish a no-fly zone as triggers for NGOs to withdraw their staff
and scale back programs. In that context, they noted that program
implementation solely based on community volunteers (i.e. relief
committees) is a viable option for only two to three months after
which time the quality of programs would deteriorate rapidly.
--------------
South Darfur
--------------
14. Following several months of relative calm, South Darfur is
currently experiencing a renewed spate of violence against non-Arab
civilians by the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and Arab militias.
Intra-Arab violence could also resume on a larger scale, potentially
destabilizing South Darfur. Low-level conflict within the ranks of
the SLA appears to be occurring along ethnic lines, as SLA fighters
belonging to other ethnic groups attempt to reject the domination of
Zaghawa in areas under control of SLA/MM. This appears to be a
probable explanation of recent fighting in Gereida and Muhajariya.
These incidents have significantly curtailed access for humanitarian
actors but have not generated significant civilian casualties or
displacements.
15. SC/US noted that Arab ethnic groups felt betrayed by the Abuja
negotiations and have no reason to attack IDP camps. However, Arab
militia violence against villages continues, causing displacement of
civilians such as the approximately 10,000 IDPs that gathered in Al
Amud Al Akdar on August 29 as the result of Arab militia destruction
of approximately 35 villages. This population was then attacked
again and fled to a number of locations including Buram town,
Seisebana village, and Nyala town camps. Renewed intra-Arab ethnic
conflict-including the recent Habaniya/Reizegat conflict and
Habaniya/Fullata conflict-could also have a destabilizing effect in
South Darfur (REF B).
--------------
WFP Food Stocks for Darfur
--------------
16. As of September 12, 2006, WFP reported a total of 135,300
metric tons (MT) of assorted commodities for Darfur stored in
warehouses in Sudan. The most significant amounts are located in
Port Sudan with 52,617 MT, El Obeid has 14,197 MT, Khartoum has
13,091 MT, and Kosti has 11,423 MT. In Darfur, the most significant
amounts are located in Nyala with 18,783 MT, El Geneina has 11,562
MT, El Fasher has 8,528 MT, and Mornei has 2,204 MT. WFP stated
that this stock would cover an additional 100,000 persons for two to
three months.
--------------
UNJLC Non-Food Item (NFI) Stocks for Darfur
--------------
17. While the amount of NFI stocks for Darfur varies greatly among
items, UNJLC stated that up to 100,000 new displacements could be
covered with in-country stocks. Additionally, UNJLC expects to
receive 102,500 blankets, 47,000 pieces of plastic sheeting, and
68,883 sleeping mats at the end September.
--------------
Comments
--------------
18. The recent success of GAA in Kutum and Mellit in reaching all
targeted beneficiaries with food rations for October illustrates
that some improvements in humanitarian deliveries are possible
despite the unpredictability of the security situation. USAID will
closely monitor to see if this improved access in North Darfur
holds.
19. UN agencies and NGOs have made substantial progress in their
contingency planning in all three states.
20. Air assets continue to be critical for assessments and service
delivery in West and North Darfur and are becoming increasingly
important in South Darfur.
21. South Darfur is considered stable relative to the other two
states with no likely substantial displacements in the near future.
HUME
SIPDIS
AIDAC
SIPDIS
STATE FOR AF/SPG, PRM, AND ALSO PASS USAID/W
USAID FOR DCHA SUDAN TEAM, AFR/SP
NAIROBI FOR USAID/DCHA/OFDA, USAID/REDSO, AND FAS
GENEVA FOR NKYLOH
NAIROBI FOR SFO
NSC FOR JBRAUSE, NSC/AFRICA FOR TSHORTLEY
USUN FOR TMALY
BRUSSELS FOR PLERNER
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: EAID EAGR PREF PGOV PHUM SOCI SU
SUBJECT: DARFUR - MASS DISPLACEMENT NOT ANTICIPATED
REF: A) KHARTOUM 2254, B) KHARTOUM 2225, C) KHARTOUM 2223, D)
KHARTOUM 2167, E) KHARTOUM 2382
KHARTOUM 00002443 001.2 OF 003
--------------
Summary
--------------
1. Despite the reported fighting and reduced access for
humanitarian assistance, none of the sources available to USAID's
Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (USAID/OFDA) anticipate
massive population movements within Darfur, towards other states in
Sudan, or across the border to Chad, as of September 28. The UN
Joint Logistics Centre (UNJLC) and the UN World Food Program (WFP)
reported that as of mid-September warehouses in Darfur and other
states had stocks to assist up to 100,000 people. However, the
prevailing sentiment of the humanitarian community in Sudan is that
the current and anticipated levels of fighting will not cause
100,000 new displacements. The situation in the three Darfur states
remains unpredictable with reports of improvement followed by other
information indicating deteriorating conditions. End Summary.
--------------
Major Concerns for All Three States
--------------
2. According to the UN Humanitarian Coordinator in Sudan, 50,000
people have been displaced since the Darfur Peace Agreement was
signed in May 2006. In September, a new round of fighting erupted
between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and other armed groups,
causing many to fear that more displacements were to come. However,
the Humanitarian Aid Department of the European Commission (ECHO),
the U.K. Department for International Development (DFID),and
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Khartoum paint a picture of
general concern but do not anticipate mass displacements within
Darfur, to neighboring states within Sudan, or to Chad.
3. In USAID/OFDA led contingency planning sessions (REF D),staff
of UN agencies and NGOs in Khartoum and Darfur stated that they do
not see any indications on the ground that mass population
displacements either to Chad or to neighboring states in Sudan will
occur in the near future. Experience shows that continued localized
fighting and violence may cause populations to migrate towards urban
areas, internally displaced persons (IDP) camps, or further up into
the mountains, in the case of Jebel Marra. IDPs perceive camps as
relatively safe places because witnesses are present in the camp,
including UN agencies, NGOs, as well as other IDPs. IDPs are not
expected to move from camps to rural communities. (Comment: One NGO
representative noted that Arab groups who have taken over control of
land that previously belonged to farmers would not attack a camp
because they would rather hold on to the land they are occupying.
End Comment.)
4. Insecurity is the predominant apprehension expressed by
humanitarian agencies in all three Darfur states. Lack of road
access limits the ability of humanitarian organizations (REF C) to
reach remote populations and significantly increases program
expenses due to the high costs of helicopter transport. In areas
with a high concentration of beneficiaries, runway rehabilitation
for fixed wing aircraft could improve service delivery, reduce
costs, and expand air services into new areas. NGOs noted that in
the unlikely scenario of "total melt-down" in Darfur, people might
move towards Northern Kordofan State, Southern Kordofan State, and
Khartoum. The NGOs commented that contingency plans for this type
of mass population movement have not been well coordinated or
recently discussed. USAID/OFDA has taken steps internally to
develop contingency plans for this scenario by coordinating Darfur,
Southern Sudan, and northern Sudan programs. In a September 28
meeting, USAID inventoried potential NGO responders by sector and
location, and outlined a contingency plan for the scenario described
above.
5. Both UN agencies and NGOs consider the availability of
commercial ground transport as a good indicator for conditions on
the ground. Agencies noted that if private transporters are no
longer willing to take on contracts, communities will be truly
inaccessible. Another concern voiced by NGOs is that the rising
fuel prices and surcharges for deliveries to insecure areas will
affect program costs.
6. The Darfur Humanitarian Access Map that is published regularly
by the UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)
indicates an improvement in humanitarian access from August to
KHARTOUM 00002443 002.2 OF 003
September. This access has enabled NGOs, particularly in North
Darfur, to reach vulnerable populations who have not received food
for over three months.
--------------
North Darfur
--------------
7. Considerable achievements in humanitarian coverage made up to
April 2006 are currently threatened by the deterioration of
security, reduced access to target populations (REF A),and the
likelihood of reduced funding in 2007.
8. Aerial bombardments on non-SAF held territories have created an
unstable environment. Lack of access to many areas in August and
September 2006 (REF A) resulted in a lack of credible estimations of
new displacements. From September 23 to 27, German Agro Action
(GAA) negotiated with commanders from the National Redemption Front
(NRF) safe passage to Kutum and Mellit localities from El Fasher.
GAA distributed food rations to target communities on the road
between Kutum and Um Baru, and in Sayeh and Mellit towns, reaching
100 percent of the NGO's 271,000 targeted beneficiaries. GAA had
not been able to reach any of these beneficiaries for three months.
IDPs in Fata Borno and Kassab camps received the standard one month
ration, beneficiaries living in communities, not camps, received a
half-ration. NRF senior commanders assured the humanitarian
community that its workers and assets would be safe and invited them
to resume work in the areas they control, which currently include
Muzbat, Birmaza, Abu Shakur, and Um Sidir.
9. According to GAA, the communities reached did not show
infrastructure damage and the population did not appear to have
suffered visibly during the period of isolation from the
humanitarian community. Although GAA reported that humanitarian
assistance was needed, they did not see signs of malnutrition or
extreme deprivation. In the coming days, GAA will travel to Disa
and Birmaza, which are located north of Kutum town, to continue
distribution of general food rations for WFP. To access this area,
GAA will again have to negotiate with commanders of the NRF.
--------------
West Darfur
--------------
10. Save the Children/US (SC/US),a USAID partner that has operated
in West Darfur since 2004, informed USAID staff that in their
opinion the worst case scenario does not include migration out of
state or into Chad. In general, population movements as a result of
localized fighting are anticipated from small rural communities
towards urban centers or IDP camps. Attacks on IDP camps and urban
centers are not expected and mass displacement from those areas
towards rural communities or across state lines or into Chad are not
anticipated. In late 2005, UN predictions for population movements
of 50,000 to 100,000 persons in West Darfur did not materialize.
According to SC/US, only 6,000 persons were eventually displaced
during this time period.
11. The operating environment for humanitarian actors varies
significantly within the state. Despite recent access restrictions
(REF C),some NGOs are able to negotiate with local sheiks safe
passage when the sheiks want assistance for their communities.
Other NGOs, however, reported that the current tensions around the
proposed UN peacekeeping force deployment has mobilized IDPs and
communities, particularly in Zalingei, against the humanitarian
community.
12. Both NGOs and UN agencies based in El Geneina, West Darfur,
reported a high level of coordination, collaboration, and experience
in operating under the tight security restrictions of UN Phase Four.
(Note: The UN lowered West Darfur from Phase Four to Phase Three in
September. End Note.) UN and NGO partners expressed concern that
contingency plans for displacement to Zalingei are not well
understood, coordinated, or planned, and stocks have not been
pre-positioned in sufficient quantities. NGOs reported that they
will work together to address these concerns. Pending resolution on
the current 25 mile limitation on travel by U.S. Government (USG)
staff (REF E),USAID staff plans to follow-up with a site visit to
Zalingei in October.
13. In contingency planning meetings with USAID, NGOs noted that
they would consider any unilateral decision taken by the UN or the
U.S. to bring in a peacekeeping force, blockade Port Sudan, or
KHARTOUM 00002443 003.2 OF 003
establish a no-fly zone as triggers for NGOs to withdraw their staff
and scale back programs. In that context, they noted that program
implementation solely based on community volunteers (i.e. relief
committees) is a viable option for only two to three months after
which time the quality of programs would deteriorate rapidly.
--------------
South Darfur
--------------
14. Following several months of relative calm, South Darfur is
currently experiencing a renewed spate of violence against non-Arab
civilians by the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and Arab militias.
Intra-Arab violence could also resume on a larger scale, potentially
destabilizing South Darfur. Low-level conflict within the ranks of
the SLA appears to be occurring along ethnic lines, as SLA fighters
belonging to other ethnic groups attempt to reject the domination of
Zaghawa in areas under control of SLA/MM. This appears to be a
probable explanation of recent fighting in Gereida and Muhajariya.
These incidents have significantly curtailed access for humanitarian
actors but have not generated significant civilian casualties or
displacements.
15. SC/US noted that Arab ethnic groups felt betrayed by the Abuja
negotiations and have no reason to attack IDP camps. However, Arab
militia violence against villages continues, causing displacement of
civilians such as the approximately 10,000 IDPs that gathered in Al
Amud Al Akdar on August 29 as the result of Arab militia destruction
of approximately 35 villages. This population was then attacked
again and fled to a number of locations including Buram town,
Seisebana village, and Nyala town camps. Renewed intra-Arab ethnic
conflict-including the recent Habaniya/Reizegat conflict and
Habaniya/Fullata conflict-could also have a destabilizing effect in
South Darfur (REF B).
--------------
WFP Food Stocks for Darfur
--------------
16. As of September 12, 2006, WFP reported a total of 135,300
metric tons (MT) of assorted commodities for Darfur stored in
warehouses in Sudan. The most significant amounts are located in
Port Sudan with 52,617 MT, El Obeid has 14,197 MT, Khartoum has
13,091 MT, and Kosti has 11,423 MT. In Darfur, the most significant
amounts are located in Nyala with 18,783 MT, El Geneina has 11,562
MT, El Fasher has 8,528 MT, and Mornei has 2,204 MT. WFP stated
that this stock would cover an additional 100,000 persons for two to
three months.
--------------
UNJLC Non-Food Item (NFI) Stocks for Darfur
--------------
17. While the amount of NFI stocks for Darfur varies greatly among
items, UNJLC stated that up to 100,000 new displacements could be
covered with in-country stocks. Additionally, UNJLC expects to
receive 102,500 blankets, 47,000 pieces of plastic sheeting, and
68,883 sleeping mats at the end September.
--------------
Comments
--------------
18. The recent success of GAA in Kutum and Mellit in reaching all
targeted beneficiaries with food rations for October illustrates
that some improvements in humanitarian deliveries are possible
despite the unpredictability of the security situation. USAID will
closely monitor to see if this improved access in North Darfur
holds.
19. UN agencies and NGOs have made substantial progress in their
contingency planning in all three states.
20. Air assets continue to be critical for assessments and service
delivery in West and North Darfur and are becoming increasingly
important in South Darfur.
21. South Darfur is considered stable relative to the other two
states with no likely substantial displacements in the near future.
HUME