DARFUR: MINAWI DESCRIBES PRIORITIES, NCP

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 002388

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF/SPG AND AF/SE
NSC FOR COURVILLE AND SHORTLEY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/27/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO PINR SU UN
SUBJECT: DARFUR: MINAWI DESCRIBES PRIORITIES, NCP
MACHINATIONS

REF: KHARTOUM 02381

Classified By: A/MGT Counselor Louis Nelli, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) an
d (d)


1. (C) Summary: In separate meetings with USG officials and
the Darfur Partners Group on September 27, Senior Assistant
to the President Minni Minawi outlined five priorities for
constructing a peaceful solution to the Darfur conflict in
the next 90 days, discussed the role of the international
community in solving the crisis, and described the recent
machinations of National Congress Party (NCP) leaders on the
establishment of the Transitional Darfur Regional Authority
(TDRA). End summary.

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PRIORITIES FOR THE NEXT 90 DAYS
--------------


2. (SBU) In a September 27 briefing for Chief of
Mission-level representatives of the Darfur Partners Group,
Minawi underscored his commitment to the DPA. "We will
maintain this agreement forever and will implement it," said
Minawi. "The problem is that we're alone." He then outlined
a set of five priorities for advancing a peaceful solution to
the Darfur crisis within the next 90 days:

-- Intensify efforts to bring non-signatories to the Darfur
Peace Agreement (DPA)
-- Prevent the collapse of the DPA through more robust
support from the international community.
-- Facilitate stronger implementation of the AMIS mandate in
Darfur. (Note: According to Minawi, the DPA empowers the AU
to disarm combatants, protect internally-displaced persons
(IDPs) and civilians, and ensure the safety of its own
forces. End note.)
-- Neutralize the support of neighboring countries for the
National Redemption Front (NRF) to encourage their
participation in the cease-fire and ensure the safety of
humanitarian operations. (Note: Minawi claimed that arms
imports have increased since the DPA was signed. End note.)
-- Affect a reconciliation within the local population of
Darfur through dialogue and development programs,
particularly in North Darfur.


3. (SBU) Minawi said that the non-signatories must drop their
demand that the Janjaweed be disarmed as a pre-requisite to
accession to the DPA. He reported that Janjaweed have been
transferred among the military, security services, and
police, making them more difficult to identify and bogging
down peace efforts.


4. (C) In a later meeting on September 27 with the CDA,
visiting AF/SPG Director Landis, and AID Mission Director
Almquist, Minawi said that he had sent an SLM military
delegation to meet with the NRF in North Darfur. The mission
stalled, however, following UNSYG Special Representative Jan
Pronk's September 18 statement that the DPA was "comatose."
Minawi said that the delegation would proceed on September 28
to discuss the humanitarian and security situation as well as
inter-tribal relations. (Note: In a September 25 discussion
with the Embassy Security Advisor, Minawi blamed the military
delegation's delay on Suleiman Jamous and Justice and
Equality Movement (JEM) manipulation that has caused NRF
internal bickering, not Pronk's statement (reftel). End
note.)

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ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
--------------


5. (C) Minawi called on the Darfur Partners Group and the
international community to publicize NRF attacks in stronger
terms and said that this would encourage the Cease-fire
Commission to act. He also indicated that a decrease in NRF
attacks would undermine the Sudanese government's
justification for a military campaign. "We need your voice,"
he said, referring to the international community. Minawi
emphasized the importance of showing his constituents and the
non-signatories the tangible benefits of his participation in
the DPA to shore-up support for it. He elaborated on this
point during his meeting with USG officials and said that the
best method to bring in non-signatories was to address the
humanitarian situation and the issue of IDPs through
development aid and the TDRA's compensation fund. "Without
money, without support, no one will hear what I'm saying."
Almquist urged Minawi to conduct a realistic needs assessment
as a basis for discussion with the international community

KHARTOUM 00002388 002 OF 002


and the USG.

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NCP MACHINATIONS ON THE TDRA
--------------


6. (C) Minawi told the USG officials that he was frustrated
with the lack of progress on the TDRA. "Everything is in the
President's hands--not the TDRA, not traditional powers in
Darfur," he said. He had presented a proposal to Bashir
several weeks ago on the structure of the TDRA. In response,
Presidential Advisor Maghzoub Al Khalifa gave Minawi a
counter-proposal that was "unacceptable." When Minawi
objected, he was told to wait until after Bashir returned
from the UN General Assembly (UNGA) on September 23. The day
after his return, however, Bashir announced that he would
promulgate the presidential decrees to establish the TDRA on
September 25. According to Minawi, the structure of the TDRA
mandated under these decrees was more flawed than the NCP's
original proposal and should have included the signers of the
Declaration of Commitment.


7. (C) Presidential Advisor Nafie Ali Nafie told him that
private negotiations could be held if Minawi did not voice
his objections in public. Minawi said that Nafie and Al
Khalifa are "feeding Bashir things to say under the table."
He observed that Bashir is initially open to compromise but
changes course after incitement from hard-liners. He said
that these members of the ruling clique were also negotiating
secretly with the NRF's Khalil Ibrahim and communicating with

SIPDIS
the NRF through Cairo.


8. (C) Nonetheless, Minawi said that President Bashir seemed
more "relaxed" after his return from UNGA and had agreed to
double the original compensation fund to 60 million dollars.
Though Minawi said this was still less than half of the
amount needed, he deemed it promising. He also said there
was room to negotiate on the number of government posts for
Darfurians. Minawi characterized Vice President Ali Osman
Taha as a more reasonable interlocutor than Nafie or Al
Khalifa. "Ali Osman likes logic and will tell you logic," he
said.
HUME