SUDAN'S DARFUR CRISIS: MEETING WITH VICE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 002294

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR AF A/S FRAZER
NSC FOR COURVILLE AND SHORTLEY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/19/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREF SU AU
SUBJECT: SUDAN'S DARFUR CRISIS: MEETING WITH VICE
PRESIDENT TAHA


Classified By: CDA Cameron Hume. Reason 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. Summary. In a meeting with CDA Hume Vice President Taha
insisted that he agreed with President Bashir's rejection of
UN peace-keeping in Darfur. Although he is concerned that
U.S./Sudanese relations may be about to worsen as a result,
he did not offer any ideas for resolving the impasse. He did
respond favorably to a suggestion that President Bashir
consider declaring a military moritorium during the upcoming
month of Ramadan, during which renewed efforts could be made
to broaden support for the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA). End
Summary.


2. On September 19 CDA Hume, at his request, met with Vice
President Taha. The meeting was one-on-one and lasted for 45
minutes. Hume asked if Taha had any ideas for overcoming the
impasse over peace-keeping in Darfur. Taha said the meeting
took place at a bad moment in U.S./Sudanese relations. The
Sudanese government was unified in its rejection of UN
peace-keeping in Darfur, and it did not accept that foreign
governments knew best how to deal with the situation. Taha
regretted the clash with the equally strong U.S. position in
favor of UN peace-keeping, but he warned that the Sudanese
position was firm. He did not offer any ideas for breaking
the impasse.


3. Taha then reviewed his own position over previous months.
He said he had been misunderstood during his March meeting
in Brussels with Deputy Secretary Zoellich; although he had
not ruled out UN peace-keeping, he had not suggested it was
the right course. After the DPA was signed, the Sudanese
government was taken aback when the international community
rushed to insist on a UN peace-keeping operation, rather than
work to consolidate support for the DPA. The Sudanese
government was left on its own to confront non-signatories
who stepped up armed attacks. In those circumstances it was
natural for the Sudanese government to develop its own plan
for security in Darfur and to put it into effect. Taha
insisted he supported that plan fully.


4. Taha expanded on this position. He asserted that "all"
Sudanese political forces were gradually coming around to the
same position, and he cited a recent statement of former
President Saddiq Al Mahdi qualifying his earlier support for
UN peace-keeping. (Taha ignored contrary positions taken by
Vice President Salva Kiir, by Minni Minawi, and by others.)
He recalled the threat by Usama Bin Laden earlier in the year
warning of jihad should UN peace-keepers go to Darfur, and he
was sure that Al Qaeda would attack UN peace-keepers if they
were deployed. He was confident that the Sudanese
government's own plan was the best for Darfur.


5. CDA Hume said that the USG was equally firm in its own
support of transition from AU peace-keeping to a UN
operation. As the Secretary had said to FM Lam Akol a week
earlier, the USG called on the Sudanese government to accept
a UN peace-keeping mission in Darfur; should it reject such a
mission there could be no development of the bilateral
relationship, which was likely to deteriorate. Hume
explained that the USG position was hardening on this point,
as was likely to be soon evident. Despite this direct
disagreement, both sides wanted peace and security for
Darfur.


6. Hume said that after the DPA was signed, the two main
problems were the decision by Abdul Wahid and others not to
sign the agreement and the weakness of the AU peace-keeping
operation. The USG had worked, albeit with little success,
to get additional adherants to the DPA, and it was still
active in this direction. The need for broader support for
the DPA was something that the USG and the Sudanese
government agreed on, despite their disagreement on
peace-keeping. Without ignoring their deadlock on the
peace-keeping question, perhaps the two sides could still
work on securing support from DPA non-signatories. As for
peace-keeping, the Sudanese government position, including
offensive military operations, precluded compliance with the
DPA and any active peacekeeping, even by the African Union.
Moreover, the Sudanese government had blocked capacity of the
kind recommended in the UN SYG's report to bolster AMIS (e.g.
better communications, air mobility, and logistics). Simply
extending AMIS would not solve those problems.


7. Noting that Ramadan would soon start, Hume asked if it
might be possible for President Bashir to declare a
moritorium on any offensive military action, creating an
opportunity for renewed effort to secure support in Darfur
for the DPA. Some non-signatory groups were interested in

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supporting the DPA, but they would not do so when confronted
by an offensive. The Sudanese military might well suffer
setbacks, and its plan might fail. A moritorium could
provide an opportunity for the USG and other international
partners to encourage broader support for the DPA. Should
this effort be successful, the circumstances might be more
favorable for solving the disagreement over UN peace-keeping.


8. Taha said this idea was attractive and that he would
raise it with President Bashir as soon as he returned from
New York. CDA Hume suggested that, in light of Bashir's
upcoming speech to the UNGA and meetings in New York, perhaps
Taha could raise it with Bashir before his return.


9. Comment: Taha is worried about the state of
U.S./Sudanese relations, but he signalled that he does not
want to be used as a conduit for messages challenging
Bashir's rejection of UN peace-keeping. He wants a way out
of the impasse, however, and, as a first step, he may well
raise with Bashir the merits of declaring a Ramadan
moritorium as a means to challenge the international
community to address the problems raised by DPA
non-signatories. End comment.
HUME