IN SUDAN, EGYPT PREFERS THE DEVIL IT KNOWS

C O N F I D E N T I A L KHARTOUM 002277

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT ALSO FOR AF/SPG, NEA/ELA
NSC FOR COURVILLE AND SHORTLEY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/17/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER SU EG US
SUBJECT: IN SUDAN, EGYPT PREFERS THE DEVIL IT KNOWS

REF: A. KHARTOUM 02157


B. KHARTOUM 01976

Classified By: P/E CHIEF E. WHITAKER, REASON: SECTIONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)


1. (C) In a September 16 meeting with Poloff, Egyptian DCM
Osama Shaltout expressed his government's concern for Sudan's
political stability in light of recent public unrest, the
looming collision between the Sudanese government and the
international community on Darfur, and the beheading of
journalist Mohammed Taha (Ref A). Echoing comments made by
Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmed Aboul Gheit earlier in the
week, he said that the Government of Egypt (GoE) feared the
erosion of the National Congress Party-dominated regime and
the development of a "security vacuum" on its southern
borders. He indicated that the alternative to the current
regime would be less desirable to both the USG and the GoE
and insinuated that incidents like the beheading of
journalist Mohammed Taha, allegedly at the hands of Islamic
extremists, could increase in frequency as the regime's
strength declines.


2. (C) Shaltout attributed Taha's assassination to the
extremist group Takfir wal Hijra, and underscored the utility
of the current Sudanese government by asking if there were
any truth to reports that it had ceased to cooperate with the
USG on counter-terrorism. Shaltout said that past fears of
regime instability in Sudan had prompted Egyptian
reconciliation efforts, despite links between the NCP and its
predecessor, the National Islamic Front (NIF),to terrorist
acts against the GoE--most notably the 1995 assassination
attempt on President Hosni Mubarak. The implication was that
the USG should adopt a similarly pragmatic approach based on
it security interests and in an effort to find peace in
Darfur.


3. (C) According to Shaltout, the GoE is privately
encouraging Sudan to accept UN Security Council Resolution
(UNSCR) 1706 in order to forestall a collision with the
international community, which would only yield to greater
isolation and undermine the Sudanese government's ability to
maintain order. He predicated that the Sudanese leadership
would permit UN intervention within three months. Shaltout
reacted positively to rumors of the imminent replacement of
Foreign Minister Lam Akol, as it would shore up regime
stability and open a more constructive dialogue with the
international community. (Comment: Rumors of a cabinet
re-shuffle are widespread in Khartoum, and the most
often-mentioned replacement for Akol is Minister of Cabinet
Affairs Deng Alor. End comment.)


4. (C) COMMENT: Shaltout's analysis of the current situation
in Sudan indicates the continued potential for prominent Arab
buy-in to bring Sudan back from the brink (Ref B). Recent
Arab League support for a rejection of UNSCR 1706 may be due
less to pan-Arab solidarity than to a desire to avoid
undermining Sudan's current regime. Egyptian fears of a
security vacuum on its southern border could be used to
induce the GoE to exert more pressure on the Sudanese
government to accept UN re-hatting in the interest of
long-term stability. END COMMENT
HUME