Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06KHARTOUM2240
2006-09-14 16:20:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Khartoum
Cable title:  

UN SRSYG PRONK BRIEFS DARFUR PARTNERS

Tags:  PREL KPKO PGOV PINR AU US UN SU 
pdf how-to read a cable
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DE RUEHKH #2240/01 2571620
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O 141620Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4558
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 002240 

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DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER AND IO A/S SILVERBERG
DEPT ALSO FOR AF/SPG, AF/RSA, AND IO
NSC FOR COURVILLE AND SHORTLEY
USUN FOR E BRUNO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/13/2016
TAGS: PREL KPKO PGOV PINR AU US UN SU
SUBJECT: UN SRSYG PRONK BRIEFS DARFUR PARTNERS

Classified By: P/E Chief E. Whitaker, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 002240

SIPDIS

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DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER AND IO A/S SILVERBERG
DEPT ALSO FOR AF/SPG, AF/RSA, AND IO
NSC FOR COURVILLE AND SHORTLEY
USUN FOR E BRUNO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/13/2016
TAGS: PREL KPKO PGOV PINR AU US UN SU
SUBJECT: UN SRSYG PRONK BRIEFS DARFUR PARTNERS

Classified By: P/E Chief E. Whitaker, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: During a Sept. 14 briefing of Darfur
Partners, UN SRSYG Pronk said little progress had been made
on broadening support for the DPA, the Government is pressing
military campaigns in North Darfur, the Ceasefire Commission
does not work well, and the Sudanese Government remains
unaltered in its rejection of a UN PKO. UN DSRSYG Taye
described preparations underway for the Sept. 18 UNSC/AU P&SC
meeting in New York and AU interest in extending AMIS to
permit an eventual transition to a UN PKO. FM Lam Akol's
visit to Washington was a lost opportunity, as it did not
result in new options to address the Darfur conflict
constructively. The SPLM continues to press for broader DPA
acceptance, and is willing to host a conference to encourage
non-signatories to come on board. The DPA needs to be made
more attractive to broaden its base of support. Pronk's Plan
A is to add incentives for Sudan to accept a UN PKO, such as
easing sanctions and relieving debt; Plan B is to consider
other options, including a Chapter VIII PKO. He urged
participants to remain in consultation and to deliver a
common message. End summary.

-------------- --------------
UN SRSYG Pronk: No Progress on UN PKO, Security Poor
-------------- --------------


2. (C) During a September 13 briefing of the Contact
Group/Darfur Partners (UK, Canada, France, Norway,
Netherlands, and U.S.),UN Special Representative Jan Pronk
made the following points:

-- UNSG Annan had made a strong statement to the UNSC on
Darfur, condemning ongoing violence and noting the deployment
of Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) there was in violation of the
Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) and previous UNSCRs. The SG
called on the partners of AMIS to continue supporting it in
anticipation of an eventual UN peacekeeping operation (PKO);

he noted that Sudan would be held accountable in the event
consent is not given to a UN PKO and needless deaths occur
for having failed in its responsibility to protect its own
citizens;

-- while talks continue regarding broadening the DPA, no
success has been reached yet, despite involvement of FVP
Salva Kiir;

-- fighting continues in North Darfur, with the SAF launching
new attacks on rebel-held villages. The SAF is using SLM
leader Minni Minawi's troops in a back-up/support role. Many
of Minni's rebels and new SAF recruits appear reluctant to
fight. The Government maintains that it has a right to
attack DPA non-signatories;

-- the National Redemption Front (NRF),including G-19
elements, appears to be pressing southward, and the quiet of
South Darfur may be temporary;

-- while West Darfur does not have outright combat at
present, it is hard-hit by banditry, with many areas
designated "no go" areas by the UN;

-- although Ceasefire Commission (CFC) meetings are taking
place, there is a backlog of 70-80 items, with only 15 or so
items being brought to conclusion in each meeting. Many
items are referred repeatedly to the CFC, and both the UN and
the U.S. Observers have not been permitted to raise incidents
for investigation by the African Union Chair. Strangely, the
EU Observer has agreed with the AU's silencing of the UN and
U.S. Observers. In conclusion, the CFC process does not
work;

-- the AMIS Force Commander role is changing hands this week,
with the incoming FC in Addis Ababa for consultations. The
AU is preparing in Addis Ababa for the September 18 Peace and
Security Council (P&SC) meeting with the UNSC in New York on
September 18. UN Principal Deputy Sp. Rep Taye-Brook
Zerihoun and AU P&SC Commission Said Djinnit will also hold a
preparatory meeting; and

-- the Sudanese Government still has not accepted a
transition to a UN PKO. A UN PKO "cannot be deployed without
consent." President Bashir has consistently voiced his
opposition, and few in Sudan are taking a stand in favor of a
UN PKO. There are no hints of a u-turn by the Government, no
statements that keep the door open, and no evidence of
efforts to prepare the public for a change in its views. The

KHARTOUM 00002240 002 OF 003


current security situation is unacceptable; if AMIS withdraws
from Darfur, the security situation will deteriorate further,
rendering implementation of the DPA impossible.

-------------- --
AU P&SC Commission Djinnit Seeks AMIS Extension
-------------- --


3. (C) Taye stated that AU Special Representative Kingibe and
he had met with acting Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmed Ali
Karti, and probed regarding the Government's intentions.
Preparations are underway for the September 18 meeting in New
York, at which AU P&SC Commissioner will discuss a "lite
package" to help AMIS continue in Darfur. The AU is
reviewing resources available, and hopes to continue the
effort one or two months. This, however, needs to be a
priority of the international community. Djinnit says AMIS
seeks to stay, and all measures need to be done to ensure
that its mandate not be concluded. An extension, however,
will be in the context of a transition to a UN PKO.

-------------- ---
FM Lam Akol in Washington: A Missed Opportunity
-------------- ---


4. (C) USAID Director and Pol/Econ Chief noted Minister of
Foreign Affairs Lam Akol's visit to the Department of State
on September 11 had not gone well, with Akol not able or
willing to provide Secretary Rice with the hand-carried
letter from President Bashir to President Bush. Secretary
Rice advised Akol that a transition to a UN PKO in Darfur was
necessary for improvement in bilateral relations, and that
the Sudanese Government had not as of yet offered any
indication of new thinking on the issue, but rather sought to
push its own security plan for Darfur.

--------------
Norway: SPLM Views on Process
--------------


5. (C) The Norwegian ambassador discussed a recent meeting
with SPLM National Assembly Chair Yassir Arman, wherein
Yassir said the SPLM sought to get DPA non-signatories on
common ground, including through hosting a conference in Yei.
Support for this effort included FVP Kiir and VP Taha, who
have formed a high committee to press for broader acceptance
of the DPA. Failure to implement the DPA is a cancer on the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement, the ambassador added.

-------------- --------------
UK: DPA Needs to be Made Attractive, Not Pressure Point
-------------- --------------


6. (C) The British ambassador said that Minni Minawi had no
power, and was not able to see either the president or vice
president. Neither the SLM nor the SPLM carries much
political clout, and the strategy of the national Congress
Party (NCP) has been to bolster its hardline position. The
NCP seeks to stay in power, and is afraid that introducing
foreign troops will attract violent opposition by
fundamentalists. The DPA has to be made attractive, he
added, and not a pressure point. He questioned whether the
DPA could not be re-opened to add value to it. The Sudanese
Government is using the DPA to attack, and is not working to
bring other parties on board. Arguments against the DPA
center on two issues: the amount of compensation and
janjaweed disarmament. Both needed to be addressed to broaden
support for the DPA.

--------------
UN SRSYG Pronk Discussed Darfur Plans A and B
--------------


7. (C) Pronk mentioned that the international community
should evaluate the possibilities of a Chapter VIII
peacekeeping operation, wherein the UN would assign
peacekeeping to a regional body, and would both direct it and
finance it. The African Union force cannot do it, although a
different AU deployment might be able to do so. Pronk noted
that Presidential Advisor al-Khalifa had mentioned the
concept to UN U/S Guehenno earlier.


8. (C) Pronk added that the process needed an outcome that is
face saving, and in which the use of force is constrained.
This would be Plan A, wherein possibly dropping sanctions,
assisting with debt relief, and supporting AU presidency in
the coming year for Sudan might sway the Government's views

KHARTOUM 00002240 003 OF 003


on a UN PKO. The international community should continue to
outline the real purpose of a transition to a UN PKO, which
would include implementing the DPA and strengthening the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Plan B, he said, would be to
re-visit other concepts, such as a Chapter VIII PKO.


9. (C) In the absence of a transition to a UN PKO, Pronk
concluded, AMIS must continue in its mandate to avoid a
humanitarian catastrophe. It is important for the
international community to continue generating additional
ideas and exchanging views on ways by which DPA support can
be broadened. He also suggested participants continue to
consult with their capitals to agree on common messages.
POWERS