DARFUR SECURITY UPDATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 002237

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT OR AF/SPG, S/CRS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/14/2016
TAGS: PGOV KPKO SU
SUBJECT: DARFUR SECURITY UPDATE

REF: REFTEL:

Classified By: P/E CHIEF E. WHITAKER, REASON SECTION 1.4 (b) AND (d)


1. (U) Summary: The fractured relationship between the
Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) non-signatories continues to
blur and shift with reports of fracturing, changing alliances
and continued NRF attacks against Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF)
targets of opportunity. The Government offensive switches
direction to disrupt a growing threat to South Darfur.
Tensions continue to rise in the Fur-dominated IDP camps in
South Darfur. End summary.

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Rumors of Changing Alliances Rampant in Darfur
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2. (C) DPA non-signatory commanders are spreading conflicting
rumors of competing commanders signing the DPA, joining the
Government or SLM/A Minawi, and forming new National
Redemption Front (NRF) elements in the Jebel Marra. In a
matter of days, our Senior Security Advisor was told
contradictory information by normally reliable sources,
indicating an uncertain climate for the non-signatories and a
volatile security environment. General Terada, deputy senior
commander in the SLM/A-Wahid camp, has reportedly joined
forces with G-19 leader Osman Bushara, who has moved forces
south into the foothills of Jebal Marra and formed a new NRF
element. Hussein Al Nabi, brother of Jar Al Nabi, and
Youssef Garang have also reportedly moved some forces to
Jebal Marra. Adam Bekheit claims there are no new NRF
forces. General Garuda, senior commander for SLM/A-W, claims
that Abu Basit, Abu Ghasim Iman, and several other commanders
have joined the Government and are leading the fighting in
east Jebal Marra. Minni Minawi reports that seven commanders
have joined him from the Abdul Shafi faction of the SLM. A
Minawi delegation met with NRF/G-19 commanders in Umm Mahraih
from Sept 10-12 with reportedly a positive outcome, but no
promises. The majority of JEM forces have withdrawn to the
west, but other elements of the NRF continue to attack SAF
targets of opportunity.

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Gov't Offensive Continues; Emphasis Shifts Towards Jebel Marra
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3. (C) Government forces continued their offensive with
widespread bombing on the periphery of Jebal Marra on
September 9. SAF bombed the villages of Tabarat, Marif,
Mariti, Katur, Sadingo, Safablah, and Turba, all of which are
areas under nominal control by General Terada,s forces.
Over 20 SAF vehicles and troops followed up with a ground
attack on Tabarat on Sept 10. Bombing targeted on Tabarat,
Sabun, and Saby continued on Sept. 12 with reported massing
of SAF forces in Menawashi and Tawila. Senior Security
Advisor witnessed a small battalion-sized element moving
towards the southwest from El Fasher on the morning of Sept.

12. Some of these were in the same vehicles returning from
the north that were witnessed on Sept 6. Two additional
attack helicopters were observed at El Fasher airfield on
Sept. 12, bringing the total to five. UN analysis concludes
that SAF forces are massing for a five prong attack on the
area from Tawila, Shangil Tobiya, Kabkabiya, Menawashi, and
Nertiti. SAF may be initiating the attacks into General
Terada,s stronghold to counter the reported new NRF alliance
before it can organize and threaten South Darfur.


4. (C) Comment: A clearer picture of the nature of the SAF
offensive is emerging. Even with the significant build-up of
forces, the SAF does not have the manpower or the logistic
capacity to sustain a major offensive. Continued fighting
will be localized and based on SAF,s ability to mass forces
on prioritized threats. These offensives will likely be
followed with a lull of one to two weeks in the area taken by
SAF. This allows the SAF to pull forces back to garrison
towns to refit, facilitate logistics and position forces for
the next offensive. This keeps significant forces in
garrison towns to defer rebel attacks, but weakens the
positions that they have recently taken, such as Umm Sidr.
The SAF reportedly left less than a battalion in the vicinity
of Umm Sidr, which was easily scattered by an NRF attack on
Sept. 11. The effort to reinforce SAF elements at Umm Sidr
with Antonov air support was predictably ineffective against
a mobile NRF force. There is no reporting on the
effectiveness of the attack helicopters used by SAF to cover
its withdrawal. End comment.


5. (C) Meanwhile, UN and international NGOs reported a
continued buildup of SAF forces in South Darfur. In the
northern areas, SAF has reinforced its garrisons in Nyala,

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Kass, and Menawashi. These forces could be quickly mobilized
to support operations in the outskirts of Jebel Marra.
However, successfully attacking the interior of Jebel Marra
would require considerably more forces than are currently
available in South Darfur. In the east, there are reports of
SAF reinforcement in the garrison of Ed Daein. West Darfur
reinforcements include reports of another battalion in the
vicinity of Jebel Moon and increased SAF forces in Nertiti.
SAF forces in Nertiti are unlikely to traverse Jebal Marra,
but could be used to threaten SLM/A-W forces in the west and
keep them from reinforcing General Terada,s positions.

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Tensions Rising in Fur-Dominated IDP Camps
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6. (C) Reports from Nyala indicate that the Government is
concerned about the increasingly active and more vocal Fur
population in the South Darfur IDP camps. Lack of Government
response to Arab and Janjaweed harassment has raised tensions
in several camps, but particularly Kalma camp, where 90,000
IDPs are less than 12 kms from Nyala. The SAF has
reinforced its checkpoint between Kalma camp and Nyala with
an additional platoon. According to the UNOCHA South Darfur
regional director, Fur leaders and SLM/A-W representatives in
the camps are actively agitating, and appear to be refocusing
their rhetoric away from their disappointment with the DPA
and towards advocating for Fur rights and justice. Youths
are becoming more radicalized and less under the control of
traditional sheiks. The Government is actively attempting to
suppress political opposition. The increased tension will
keep a number of SAF forces near these camps and reduce the
number of forces for offensive operations.


7. (C) Comment. While there is little likelihood that there
will be a major offensive across the breadth of North Darfur,
it is evident that the Government will continue to conduct
offensive operations against perceived threats from the NRF
and SLM/A-W forces. Unless the Government brings
significantly more forces into Darfur, the SAF is incapable
of providing sufficient force to protect garrison towns and
sustain forces on the front lines that can maintain tactical
superiority or impose security. Thus, this will likely
result in a continued series of attacks and counterattacks.
Adam Bekheit,s attack on UMM Sidr is a classic example of
rebel forces picking their targets of opportunity to capture
key munitions and supplies, yet declining engagement in
conventional combat against superior forces. To date, the
Government attacks have been in the sparsely settled north
and south of Tawila, where earlier fighting forced much of
the population from the area this past July. However,
fighting will likely spread to more populated areas, and
there is growing potential for discontent in the IDP camps to
boil over. End comment.
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