Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06KHARTOUM219
2006-01-29 10:58:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Khartoum
Cable title:  

A/S FRAZER BREAKFAST WITH SPLM

Tags:  PGOV PREL PINR SU 
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VZCZCXRO5307
PP RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0219/01 0291058
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 291058Z JAN 06
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1222
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHTRO/USLO TRIPOLI 0022
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000219 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF/FO, AF/RSA, AF/SPG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/29/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR SU
SUBJECT: A/S FRAZER BREAKFAST WITH SPLM


KHARTOUM 00000219 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: POL: Michael Honigstein for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000219

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF/FO, AF/RSA, AF/SPG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/29/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR SU
SUBJECT: A/S FRAZER BREAKFAST WITH SPLM


KHARTOUM 00000219 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: POL: Michael Honigstein for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary. On January 25, Assistant Secretary Jendayi
Frazer, Roger Winter, and the Charge met with three senior
SPLM officials resident in Khartoum: Yassir Arman, Chairman
of the SPLM National Assembly Caucus; Malik Agar, Government
of National Unity (GNU) Minister of investment; and Deng
Alor, GNU Minister of Cabinet Affairs. They said that the
SPLM was drifting due to the leadership of GNU First Vice
President Salva Kiir. They explained that Kiir is the only
one who could lead the SPLM, but said he did not represent
the mainstream, and warned that the party could collapse if
Kiir did not take action. The trio also said the NCP has
attempted to divide and neuter the SPLM leadership in the
GNU. A/S Frazer responded that the U.S. interest was the
transformation of the governance of Sudan and emphasized that
SPLM officials should manage their ministries to effect this
change. On Darfur, Arman, the SPLM representative in Abuja,
said that a new dynamic is linking the rebels with Chad and
Eritrea. End summary.

--------------
SPLM Drifting Apart
--------------


2. (C) The three SPLM leaders explained the dynamics within
the SPLM and its growing lack of cohesion. Deng said that
Kiir had inherited absolute power, but seemed unable to
handle it. A number of SPLM leaders from Garang's inner
circle -- which includes Arman, Deng and Agar - discussed
this drift with Kiir on January 9 in Juba.


3. (C) Deng described the January 9 meeting as positive.
The Ganrangists allayed Kiir's fears that they were trying to
remove him, and Kiir had agreed to create an interim body to
manage the SPLM. According to Deng, Kiir had been getting
bad advice from Bona Malwal and Lam Akol, which has caused
chaos in the SPLM and risked splitting the movement. The
three requested U.S. assistance in sensitizing Kiir to the
need for greater SPLM coherence, a request they have also
made to influential African heads of state.


4. (C) Arman referenced the 2004 struggle between Garang and

Kiir factions, the latter supported by Malwal and Akol, and
acknowledged that Kiir had inherited an SPLM/A dominated by
Garang supporters. Kiir had chosen to move his own people
into various sensitive positions, including the GNU Foreign
Minister. Unfortunately, this played into the hands of the
NCP and northern security forces. Arman acknowledged that
Kiir was the only logical leader of the SPLM, and the Garang
loyalists were prepared to follow Kiir if he started to lead
the mainstream.

--------------
NCP Seizes Opportunity
--------------


5. (C) Arman said that the NCP had wasted no time in
exploiting the change of leadership in the SPLM. NISS Chief
Salah Ghosh had passed Kiir a report on an internal SPLM
conspiracy to replace Kiir. It was the tested NCP tactic of
dividing opposition. Kiir was also told that the Americans
did not want him. However, Arman said their goal was to
reform the SPLM and keep Kiir, and they have made headway
toward this goal. Kiir had agreed to establish a leadership
convention that would establish clear policies, including a
position on Darfur. The interim working group that Kiir
agreed to establish would set policy until the SPLM
convention, which had been moved from March until June.


6. (C) Deng said that the NCP was also unhappy that other
African leaders were talking to the SPLM. Ghosh had
personally entered one of Kiir's meetings during the AU
summit to see who was there. The NCP believed that the SPLM
had helped frustrate Bashir's quest for the AU Chairmanship
(all three expressed satisfaction at Bashir's failure). Deng
concluded that the NCP wanted the South to separate so the
NCP could rule without constraints in the North. Arman asked
A/S Frazer to help convince Kiir that Garang's vision of
Sudanese unity should prevail, in spite of Kiir's known
position on separation. Arman said that Uganda, South
Africa, and Ethiopia could also help in this manner,
especially Obasanjo and Mbeki.

--------------
SPLM Challenges
--------------


7. (C) The trio described some current problems facing the

KHARTOUM 00000219 002 OF 002


SPLM/A, most seriously the fact that the SPLA soldiers had
not been paid, including the southern JIU forces to be paid
by the GNU. Deng said the problem was now resolved and the
SPLA would be paid three months' back salaries.


8. (C) Another problem was the viability of the SPLM as a
national party. In the North, the SPLM had started
registering large numbers, which alarmed the NCP. However,
Kiir had refused to release funds to Abdel Aziz, SPLM
organizer in the North. Six months earlier, Deng said the
party was gaining strength, but the failure to take clear
positions and meet overly high expectations had undercut its
appeal, which could jeopardize the entire movement.


9. (C) Arman believed that clarity was the paramount issue.
The NCP had taken advantage of SPLM policy drift to counter
SPLM growth in the North. The group around Kiir has played
into NCP hands by eschewing national issues. Arman stressed
that the SPLM could not meet its stated goals unless it
remained a formidable source in the center. Arman said that
even the choice for succession would only be possible if the
SPLM was strong in the GNU.

--------------
The USG Position
--------------


10. (C) A/S Frazer responded that many in the U.S. believed
Garang's vision of national unity was not widely supported in
the South and Kiir was seeking to consolidate his position
with his constituency. While a leadership vacuum was
inevitable considering Garang's strength, the party should be
strong enough to continue, and party development was
therefore critically important. Frazer pointed out that
every member of the Politburo in South Africa was qualified
to assume the top position, if this were necessary.


11. (C) Frazer continued that while friendship between the
SPLM and USG officials was important, the interests of the
U.S. were her first priority. State transformation and the
weakening of the NCP are jeopardized by an ineffective SPLM.
She noted that those who produced, not those who complained,
would help keep the SPLM united and assist Kiir's leadership.
Good results were the test, and it was essential that the
SPLM leadership in the GNU not be, in Charge's words, "me
too" partners. The SPLM must take control of their portfolios
and strengthen their place in government.

--------------
SPLM on Darfur
--------------

12. (C) On Darfur, Yassir Arman described an emerging
dynamic that had created an Eritrean, Chadian, and rebel
axis, with Turabi playing a supporting role in Khartoum. All
were united by their opposition to the NCP. Arman described
the Abuja talks as a "bazaar" with too many negotiators that
would "take us nowhere." Nonetheless, negotiations were
strengthened by the NCP's fear of a UN military force being
deployed. Arman felt that the priority should be disarming
the militias and the jinjaweed. He believed that the 7,000
SPLA troops still in the East could be integrated into Joint
Integrated Units (JIUs) and sent to Darfur for this purpose,
a concept that Garang had repeatedly espoused. The Charge
noted that it would take six months to stand up the JIUs, at
the rate of a battalion a month. By this calculation they
could be in place by the end of the year, which would be an
affirmative step to resolving the crisis.


13. Deng interjected that Obasanjo had advised Kiir to brief
Sassou-Nguesso on the SPLM view of Darfur. Obasanjo told
Kiir that "someone" from the NCP indicated that the South was
only focused on separation and therefore not interested in
Darfur. Arman, the SPLM representative in Abuja, felt that
the SPLM could do more on Darfur but said he was only
empowered to act on direct orders from Kiir.


13. A/S Frazer has cleared on this cable.


14. Tripoli minimize considered.
HUME