RICHARDSON - BASHIR MEETING

C O N F I D E N T I A L KHARTOUM 002181

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, IO A/S SILVERBERG, AND AF/SPG
NSC FOR COURVILLE AND SHORTLEY
USUN FOR E BRUNO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/09/2016
TAGS: PREL KPKO PHUM PGOV AU US UN SU
SUBJECT: RICHARDSON - BASHIR MEETING

Classified By: CDA Cameron Hume, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (U) This is an action request ) see para 8.

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President Bashir Agrees to Free Paul Salopek
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2. (C) At the outset of the 30 minute meeting between Gov.
Bill Richardson and President Bashir, Bashir agreed that, as
a humanitarian gesture, he would order the release of Chicago
Tribune journalist Paul Salopek and his two Chadian
colleagues. Bashir said Richardson could travel to Darfur on
September 9 to pick up the detainees. Richardson expressed
appreciation for Bashir,s humanitarian gesture.

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...and Raises Sudanese Detainees in Guantanamo
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3. (C) President Bashir then said he wanted to raise, as a
humanitarian matter, the continued detention of Sudanese
citizens at Guantanamo. He said some had gone to Afghanistan
as mujahideen at a time when the USG supported their actions.
Now they had been in detention for four years. Once their
families learned of Salopek,s release as a humanitarian
gesture, they would ask if the USG could reciprocate with a
similar action. He asked Richardson to use his good offices
to raise this matter with the USG, and Richardson said he
would do so.

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President Bashir Sees Agenda in UN PKO
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4. (C) Richardson asked Bashir if he had anything to say
regarding the controversy over peacekeeping in Darfur.
Bashir said that with the help of U.S. mediation, a Darfur
peace agreement was signed in early May. He had expected the
international community to focus then on implementation of
the DPA, supporting the signatories and putting pressure on
those who had rejected the DPA. Instead, the U.S. only focus
for follow-up was to insist that the African Union,s role
end and the UN take over. This action had nothing to do with
peace; it was a new agenda.

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Bashir: Press for DPA Support; UN Approach Trusteeship
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5. (C) Bashir said that some field commanders from the
non-signatory parties initially shifted to support the DPA,
but the failure of the international community to pressure
rejectionist or to condemn their attacks was wrong. Now a
rejectionist front had formed, and no one condemned their
attacks. Considering this background, Bashir thought the UN
approach was to put Sudan under trusteeship, exerting police
and judicial authority throughout Sudan. Many people in
Darfur and elsewhere in Sudan see the UN as the enemy.

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Bashir: UNSC Ignores Sudan's Plan for Darfur Security
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6. (C) Bashir recalled that at the July AU Summit he agreed
with UN Secretary General Annan that Sudan would prepare a
plan to re-establish peace and security in Darfur over six
months and to submit it to Annan. Bashir had this, but the
UNSC Resolution ignored Sudan,s plan and the need to fund AU
peacekeepers. The UN,s plan was a new colonial scheme. So,
he rejected a UN role, despite outside pressure. His own
plan was the last alternative available.

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Richardson: Sudan Should Discuss UNSCR Implementation
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7. (C) Richardson suggested that Bashir engage in discussions
with the UN on what troops might be in a UN force and on how
UN SCR 1706 might be implemented. Bashir said he had studied
the issue carefully and made up his mind.


8. (C) ACTION REQUESTED: Post would appreciate updated
information on Sudanese detainees in Guantanamo. Foreign
Minister Lam Akol may raise this issue in any upcoming
meetings with senior USG officials.
POWERS