Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06KHARTOUM2139
2006-09-05 16:46:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Khartoum
Cable title:  

VP TAHA SENDS MESSAGE: DARFUR SOLUTION SOUGHT BY

Tags:  PGOV PHUM PREL KPKO SU UN 
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VZCZCXRO1449
PP RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #2139 2481646
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 051646Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4425
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L KHARTOUM 002139 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF/SPG, AF/RSA
NSC FOR COURVILLE AND SHORTLEY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/04/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL KPKO SU UN
SUBJECT: VP TAHA SENDS MESSAGE: DARFUR SOLUTION SOUGHT BY
SOME GNU OFFICIALS

REF: A. KHARTOUM 02104


B. KHARTOUM 02112

Classified By: CDA Cameron Hume, Reason: Section
C O N F I D E N T I A L KHARTOUM 002139

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF/SPG, AF/RSA
NSC FOR COURVILLE AND SHORTLEY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/04/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL KPKO SU UN
SUBJECT: VP TAHA SENDS MESSAGE: DARFUR SOLUTION SOUGHT BY
SOME GNU OFFICIALS

REF: A. KHARTOUM 02104


B. KHARTOUM 02112

Classified By: CDA Cameron Hume, Reason: Section 1. 4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) At the behest of Vice President Ali Osman Taha,
Minister of Cabinet Affairs Deng Alor told the CDA on
September 5 that a rump cabinet-level working group is now
working to devise a strategy for gaining support among all
non-signatories for the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) by
October 1. The goal is to pre-empt the deployment of United
Nations peacekeeping forces and avoid a confrontation with
the international community on UN Security Council Resolution
1706 by integrating non-signatories into the Government of
National Unity (GNU). Alor delivered the message while
describing a recent meeting with Taha, who had instructed him
to show that elements within the government want a
constructive way forward on Darfur.


2. (C) Through Alor, Taha signaled that some GNU officials
want to explore new options for a resolution to the crisis.
Taha suggested to Alor that the UN could finance AMIS forces
in order to strengthen their peacekeeping capability. He
also proposed that the Joint Integrated Units (JIUs) created
under the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) could restore
order in Darfur. Alor had reminded Taha that he had
previously dismissed the JIU option during the Naivasha talks
and, regardless, the units were not ready for deployment.
(Comment: At this point, it would be difficult to induce
non-signatories to join the DPA and the GNU without UN
intervention, given the distrust of the Sudanese Armed Forces
and AMIS within the SLM/A and the Darfurian population. End
comment.)


3. (C) Alor said that Taha asked for SPLM assistance in
averting a collision with the international community over
Darfur, and that the SPLM has GNU support for organizing a
conference of SLM leaders (Ref A). The divisions in the GNU,
however, are evident. Alor said that President Bashir
exploded at the suggestion of including JEM leader Ibrahim
Khalil in any SPLM-organized conference during a recent
briefing by First Vice President Salva Kiir regarding his
August 30 trip to Asmara. Alor also noted that SPLM
Parliamentary Caucus Chair Yassir Arman told the working
group on September 4 that the SPLM would support the NCP on
Darfur only if it fully implemented the CPA, particularly on
the lagging issues of North-South borders, Abyei, and oil
revenues. Alor confirmed that opposition to UN forces
emanates from President Bashir's office, as signaled by his
antagonistic comments on UN intervention over the last two
months (Ref B).


4. (C) CDA Hume urged Alor to encourage his colleagues to
focus on the two most pressing issues in Darfur: the
humanitarian situation and the practicalities of maintaining
essential stability despite the announced AU withdrawal by
September 30. He agreed to forward any working group
proposals to Washington.
HUME