SITUATION IN DARFUR CONTINUES TO DETERIORATE;

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 002100

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR A/S FRAZER, NSC FOR COURVILLE AND SHORTLEY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/30/2026
TAGS: PREL KPKO PREF SOCI US UN AU SU
SUBJECT: SITUATION IN DARFUR CONTINUES TO DETERIORATE;
SIGNIFICANTLY MORE FIGHTING ON THE HORIZON

Classified By: P/E Chief E. Whitaker, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) AND (d)


1. (C) Summary: Without political intervention, the
government offensive will continue, resulting in increased
displacement and hardship for the people of Darfur and lack
of progress in the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) over the near
to mid-term. Numerous attacks by the National Redemption
Front (NRF) and the inability of the African Union Mission in
Sudan (AMIS) to reduce the violence have made it more likely
that an emboldened Government of Sudan will continue to
execute the military elements of its plan to "stabilize"
Darfur over the next few months. Offensive military
operations by the government, in clear violation of the DPA,
have started, and additional operations appear imminent. It
is too early to tell if the offensive will affect wide swaths
of Darfur or be localized against specific NRF targets,
although reportedly government-sponsored tribal fighting has
also broken out in the south. Likewise, the NRF reaction is
unknown. The level of Chadian and Eritrean near-term support
to the NRF may well determine if it folds or has the
capability to expand the conflict. End Summary.


2. (C) The government "stability" plan appears to have been
approved for execution even before transmittal to the United
Nations (UN). It was conceived by officials in the
Ministries of Interior and Defense and sold to Bashir as a
Government of National Unity (GNU)-approved effort. It was
not coordinated with SLM leader and Senior Assistant to the
President Minnie Minawi, other factions of the GNU, or AMIS.
The government began its military buildup called for in the
plan even before delivering it to the UN and commenced combat
operations without waiting for a response, potentially in an
early effort to make UN transition impossible. In mid-July,
the SAF began building up troops and supplies in El Geneina
and El Fasher. Both Mellit and Umm Baro have since been
reinforced with SAF elements, introducing a total of six
additional SAF battalions into Darfur.


3. (C) US Embassy Khartoum continues to receive almost daily
reports of troop and munitions being moved into El Fasher and
El Geneina. They are transported to Darfur mostly at night
by air. On July 26, the SAF attacked Justice and Equality
Movement (JEM) elements of the NRF in the Jebel Moon area of
Western Darfur. Failing to dislodge the rebels from the
mountainous region, SAF and Janjaweed elements moved into the
Kulbus-Girgira-Tine area along the Sudanese-Chadian border to
cutoff reported rebel supply lines into Jebel Moon and
prepare for another assault, which appears to have begun in
the last days of August. However, they have not attempted to
cut the supply corridor north of Tine that is heavily used by
NRF forces attacking SLM/A Minawi militia throughout the
central and eastern areas of North Darfur. Significant
additional SAF forces will be needed to close this corridor.


4. (C) Since the end of July, the SAF has kept the NRF off
balance with multiple ground and air attacks near Kutum,
Korma, Kulkul, and Sayeh, most likely in an effort to prevent
the NRF from massing sufficient forces to threaten garrison
towns or vulnerable targets in South Darfur. The SAF have
also lent some support to Minawi forces in the form of air
support against NRF attacks in North Darfur. On August 28,
after a month of sporadic fighting, the SAF captured NRF
positions near Kutum, Abu Sakin, and Kulkul. Casualties are
reported to be light, which may indicate NRF repositioning to
gain better tactical advantage before seriously taking on a
major SAF force. Their repositioning will likely take them
west towards central strongholds and may open up tempting
targets north of Kulkul to the SAF that would force Minawi to
react to a Government incursion into his area of control.


5. (C) The Embassy has seen no indication that Minawi's
forces have joined SAF operations. It is unclear from the
Government plan if Minawi's forces are to fight with the SAF
or merely control their own areas. Minni has claimed that he
has laid a marker on the table with the Government that the
SAF will not move through or occupy Minawi areas of control.
However, Arab militias, which are presumed to be aligned with
the Government, began attacks against a reported twelve
Zaghawa villages in the vicinity of Graida, South Darfur, on
August 28, resulting in heavy civilian casualties and several
thousand displaced.


6. (S) The NRF's capacity to take on significant SAF forces
will depend heavily on Chadian support. Much of the NRF
success to date has been with the reported assistance of
Chadian forces, achieved with significantly increased
mobility, manpower, and firepower, to include confirmation of
the provision of SA-7 missiles. Recent announced
improvements in relations between Chad and Sudan could lead

KHARTOUM 00002100 002 OF 002


to a postponement of significant Chadian support in the
near-term. However, it is too early to determine if Chad
will permanently reduce support to the NRF or if the NRF will
attempt to fight a more conventional campaign, attempt to
pull other factions into the fighting, or reduce pressure on
the base of operations by attacking targets in South Darfur.
Minawi has sent a delegation of elders and NRF relatives to
meet previous SLM/A commanders within the NRF. If the NRF
factures, the SAF campaign could be localized and contained.
However, if the NRF gains support from Minawi or Wahid
factions, fighting could become widespread, with devastating
results for the population of Darfur.


7. (S) Embassy Khartoum continues to receive reports that the
SAF is prepared to start the next stage of buildup outlined
in its plan with an even larger offensive operation over the
next few weeks, and may use the newly gained ground as a
launching pad. The plan appears to call for additional
forces deployed to El Geneina to reinforce current border
interdiction forces and expand its presence further north
past Tine to Bahai. So far, Embassy Khartoum has not
received any credible evidence to indicate this buildup has
begun. Minawi has told the Embassy that SAF's primary effort
is to attack north and west from El Fasher to clear the NRF
from North Darfur population centers and simultaneously
attack north from El Geneina to seal the border. Embassy
Khartoum has also received unconfirmed information that the
Janjaweed could be used to attack IDP camps to draw JEM out
of its mountain strongholds.


8. (C) AMIS has no capacity to affect the situation on the
ground, nor does it have the will to challenge the Government
offensive. The Ceasefire Commission (CFC) remains
dysfunctional and does not even serve as a mechanism to
engage or leverage members. Even with a UN Security Council
resolution mandating a transition to UN command, it is
doubtful the UN would deploy any capacity without
negotiations with Sudan, and even command and control
headquarters and logistics units would not be on the ground
for a considerable period. The SAF has no constraints to its
operations other than the NRF forces and will likely continue
executing its "stabilization" plan to clear NRF elements from
North Darfur and regain control over large swaths of area
previously under the control of Minawi's forces. There are a
number of reports that the government will continue to use
tribal animosity to force the Zaghawa population out of the
south and into North Darfur.


9. (C) Comment: All indications suggest that without strong
political opposition, the SAF will press for continuation of
its offensive and the humanitarian situation in North Darfur
will continue to deteriorate. There is potential for the
fighting to spread to South Darfur either through an attempt
by the NRF to expand the fighting or through continued
attacks against southern Zaghawa elements. The GoS believes
it can militarily defeat the NRF, but it is unlikely the SAF
has the strength or capacity to regain total control of North
Darfur. Incursions into Minawi's areas of control could
bring renewed fighting between Minawi and the SAF. There is
little reason to hope that any measurable progress in DPA
implementation, absent for nearly four months, could prosper
in the above environment. Continued and potentially
increased displacement bode ill for the future. End comment.
HUME