SUDAN SEEKS DELAY IN UNSC VOTE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 002095

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR A/S FRAZER, NSC FOR COURVILLE AND SHORTLEY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/30/2026
TAGS: PGOV PREF PHUM SU AU
SUBJECT: SUDAN SEEKS DELAY IN UNSC VOTE


Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES CAMERON HUME: REASONS: 1.4 (B) AND (D)


1. (C) Summary: On August 31 Foreign Minister Lam Akol
summoned CDA Hume to ask for a delay in the Security Council
vote until September 8. Hume pointed out that only a
decision to reverse Sudan's plans for military action and
work out consent to a UN operation could justify such delay.
Akol said he wanted to travel to Washington in the next week
to convey President Bashir's response to President Bush,
which would also concern issues in the bilateral
relationship. Hume stressed that the Government of Sudan
should pledge not to launch any military offensive if it
wanted a delay; Akol would not do this. Meanwhile, senior
government spokesmen have sharply criticized the UNSC draft
resolution. End summary.


2. (C) CDA Hume met August 31 with Sudanese Foreign Minister
Lam Akol at the request of Dr. Akol. Hume asked the Foreign
Minister simply "Where do we go from here? We have a
problem." Noting Sudan's request to delay a UN Security
Council vote, Hume explained that it looked simple to the
USG. The Sudanese government's security plan for Darfur, its
military buildup, and military actions to date, all
constituted violations of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA).
The Government of Sudan now asks for a delay in the Security
Council until September 8. For what purpose? So that the
Sudanese can go ahead with their planned military offensive
in Darfur? He would need a good reason in order to ask his
government for a delay in this environment. While he
respected the sovereign right of the Government of Sudan, the
international community was also obligated to proceed with
the resolution at the UN Security Council. Ghana has agreed
to be a co-sponsor of the resolution.


3. (C) Foreign Minister Akol replied that ongoing military
operations are the response of Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) to
attacks by the National Redemption Front (NRF). The NRF are
not in the DPA, indeed, are determined to scuttle the DPA and
overthrow the government. In June the NRF attacked Hamrat
al-Sheikh, North Kordofan state, and has threatened the
Dongola Dam. The NRF has attacked AMIS forces, the Sudanese
Liberation Movement forces of Minni Minawi (SLM/MM) and SAF.
How can the army not respond to these provocations? How can
you question the right of this government to self defense?
Hume reminded Akol that the United States condemned the
attack on Hamrat al-Sheikh, while Sudan's Arab and African
brothers remained silent.


4. (C) Hume asked the reason for the Foreign Minister's
request to see him. Akol said he would go to Washington to
discuss the issues discussed in the meeting with President
Bashir (septel),specifically bilateral relations and Darfur.
There was room for the two sides to strike a deal. Akol
understood that the UN Security Council would likely vote
today, August 31. Yet there is to be a meeting on September

8. Akol asked what purpose a meeting one week after the
resolution's passage would serve. The Government of Sudan
wants the vote in the Security Council postponed until
September 8 so that he can go to Washington for meetings to
discuss the issues put on the table by A/S Frazer. Hume said
he would report this request to Washington.


5. (C) Akol said this request to postpone the vote was not
related in any way to the ongoing military build-up in
Darfur. No one could convince the SAF to hold off its
operations versus the NRF. The Government of Sudan had no
cease-fire agreement with the NRF. The NRF opposed both the
DPA and the Government. Hume replied that without an
affirmation from the Government of Sudan that there would be
no military offensive in the interim, there was no reason to
postpone the vote. Akol repeated that his request for a
delay is not related to his government's military plans.
Hume objected and said that SAF actions would worsen an
already dire humanitarian situation in Darfur. Large-scale
displacements of people would get the attention of his
government. The issue remained; would Sudan choose to
address its problems together, in concert with the
international community, or alone?


6. (C) CDA Hume cited his conversation with President Bashir,
where Bashir said that AMIS was incapable and that the UN
could not possibly get here fast enough. Yes, Sudan had the
right to self defense, but Sudan would have to live with the
consequences of resorting to force. If the Sudanese would
delay their use of force and work with the UN, a way forward
could be found. A UN Security Council vote authorizing a
transition from AU to UN command in Darfur would pass,
co-sponsored by at least seven nations, including Ghana.
Akol interrupted, citing the practical requirement for

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Sudanese consent in any UN re-hatting. Hume acknowledged
this, but pointed out the difference between a situation in
which Sudan and its international partners worked together,
vice one where Sudan isolated itself. Akol protested and
said that although President Bashir had made a decision, it
was still possible to strike a deal, but only discreetly, not
in a public manner.


7. (C) In reply, Hume asked for confirmation of the message
from the Government of Sudan. Sudan first sought a
postponement of the UNSC vote until at least September 8. In
the meantime, FM Lam Akol would travel to Washington to
deliver President Bashir,s response to the letter from
President Bush. By implication, this response would indicate
a willingness to discuss the conditions under which Sudan
would consent to a UN peace-keeping operation in Darfur.
Sudan would, throughout, retain its right to self defense.
In any case, Hume recommended Sudan exercise maximum
restraint. President Bashir's response would address issues
in the bilateral relationship, specifically a proposed
meeting between the two heads of state, an upgrade in
relations to the level of Ambassador, a change in sanctions,
and Sudan's inclusion in the List of State Sponsors of
Terrorism. Hume said he would report to Washington and reply
to the Foreign Minister later in the day on the prospects for
a delay in the Security Council vote.


8. (C) Comment: FM Lam Akol had urged President Bashir to
receive A/S Frazer and no doubt would like to make an
accommodation with the USG to arrange Sudanese consent to UN
peace-keeping in Darfur. However: 1) he could offer no
assurance that the Sudanese Armed Forces would avoid any
offensive in the coming days; 2) meanwhile, regime
heavyweights such as Nafie Al Nafie, are denouncing the UN
and threatening that the masses will rise up against the U.S.
and UK. Embassy Khartoum suggests the response to Akol's
request should be that any delay could only be justified by
commitments not to use force and to use the intervening time
to arrange Sudan,s consent. Otherwise, delay would serve no
useful purpose. End comment.
HUME