Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06KHARTOUM2038
2006-08-28 09:12:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Khartoum
Cable title:  

LRA Talks: Cessation of Hostilities

Tags:  PREL PGOV MOPS UN UG SU 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO2527
PP RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #2038/01 2400912
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 280912Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4309
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 0058
RUEHGI/AMEMBASSY BANGUI 0030
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 002038 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS
SENSITIVE

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS UN UG SU
SUBJECT: LRA Talks: Cessation of Hostilities

Ref: Khartoum 2036 and previous

KHARTOUM 00002038 001.2 OF 002


UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 002038

SIPDIS

SIPDIS
SENSITIVE

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS UN UG SU
SUBJECT: LRA Talks: Cessation of Hostilities

Ref: Khartoum 2036 and previous

KHARTOUM 00002038 001.2 OF 002



1. (SBU) SUMMARY. Using guidelines from their ceasefire workshop
(reftel),intense negotiations between the Ugandan Government and
the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) on a cessation of hostilities
continued through the night of August 25 and into the morning of
August 26. Once an agreement was reached at 3:30 a.m., talks were
adjourned waiting for approval from LRA leader Joseph Kony. His
approval came later that same day. The first phase of the cessation
of hostilities will take place at 0600Z on August 29, following
planned public announcements from both sides. After that time, all
LRA troops must surface and they then have three weeks to proceed to
one of two rally sites in Southern Sudan. If successful, this will
be the first time Kony and the LRA must take action based upon
commitments made by the negotiating team at the talks. END
SUMMARY.

--------------
Details of the Agreement
--------------


2. (U) Earlier discussions on a ceasefire stalled on Uganda's
demand that only a full ceasefire was acceptable as part of a final
package, while the LRA insisted that all fighting stop during the
negotiations. The compromise was a cessation of hostilities--
participants were very careful not to call it a ceasefire--that
includes many of Uganda's monitoring and cantonment requirements for
a ceasefire. Starting on Tuesday, August 26, members of the LRA
must publicly declare themselves and begin moving to one of two
sites in southern Sudan, Ri-Kwangba, near Congo in western
Equatoria, and Owiny-ki-Bul, near the Ugandan border on the east
side of the Nile. Residents in the two areas reportedly accepted
the LRA's presence reluctantly and under pressure from the
Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS).


3. (U) While at the rally points, the LRA fighters will remain
armed and will be guarded by the SPLA. There will be a joint
monitoring team to investigate violations of the cessation of
hostilities made up of representatives from the Ugandan army, the
LRA, the SPLA and international monitors. No organizations have
been asked to provide monitors at this point, but the mediation team

hopes the African Union will accept that role. While at the rally
points, the GoSS will provide food and humanitarian supplies to the
LRA.


4. (U) It will be considered a ceasefire violation if any LRA
members do not surface or are found outside the rally areas after
the three-week period. If the Ugandan army finds members of the LRA
outside the rally points after the deadline, or if there are raids
that are attributed to the LRA, the incident will be referred to the
monitoring team to investigate the facts and determine a course of
action.


5. (U) The agreement stipulates that if talks fail, the LRA will be
allowed to peacefully leave the rally points. Observers also feel
it is significant that the preamble to the three-week timeframe
moves beyond Uganda's previous September 12 deadline and that the
cessation of hostilities includes a reference to a process of
national reconciliation, something the Ugandans had previously
refused to discuss.

--------------
Observers Put it into Perspective
--------------


6. (SBU) The day after agreement was reached, the Acting Consul
General (A/CG) met with three observers to the talks including a UN
OCHA rep; the UN's Welile Nhlapo, Director of the Africa I Division;
and the UNMIS-provided expert on ceasefires, Anton Baare from
Denmark. The observers note that this is the first time that Kony
must take real action during the talks and must follow through with
an agreement made by his delegation. These actions, therefore, not
only build confidence with the Ugandan Government, but also boost
confidence in the LRA delegation to the talks, which many worry do
not represent LRA leadership. Most observers also feel, however,
that while many LRA fighters will proceed to the rally points, the
five ICC indictees will not, and will most likely keep a small group
of the LRA elite as insurance against the Ugandan Government
breaking the agreement.


7. (SBU) The A/CG reiterated the United States' concern that
impunity for LRA leaders would only encourage other rebel movements.
Baare pointed out that in some ways this was already happening as
the previous amnesty law passed in Uganda was too broad and allowed
people to request forgiveness for any act of rebellion after 1986,
with few other specifics. As a result, he says, several small
rebellions were started because they thought they could always ask
for amnesty if they failed. In fact, he explained, there were a few
cases where amnesty was not requested until after a person was
arrested and just before he was sent to trial. One of the main

KHARTOUM 00002038 002.2 OF 002


motivations for the initial request for ICC involvement, Baare
explained, was to help close this loophole. Baare and the two UN
representatives again said that impunity was not a goal of the talks
and emphasized that justice would eventually be served, one way or
the other.


8. (SBU) With regard to humanitarian aid, the A/CG cautioned that
no support paid for by the USG should go to the LRA, an organization
on the Terrorist Exclusion List of the USA-PATRIOT Act. The
observers said all parties to the talks were aware of this problem.
In fact, it is against most countries' laws and general humanitarian
practice to provide support to armed soldiers. They expressed hope
that once the LRA was in the rally points, vulnerables could be
separated out, disarmed, and demobilized, which would make giving
them support much easier.


9. (SBU) Nhalpo commented that the talks were still slowed by a
lack of sophistication from the LRA negotiation team. He said that
they are unwilling to make a non-binding agreement on one point in
order to move to another, insisting on a full agreement in one area
before moving on. He also pointed out that after the agreement was
made, Kony's approval was in no way assured. Although most of the
points of the cessation of hostilities were announced two days
prior, the delegation had received no instructions from Kony and
just had to hope Kony would support them.


10. (SBU) Nhalpo also said that he was not sure where the story of
amnesty in the Central African Republic (CAR) originated as the LRA
completely denied it. The observers speculated that the rumor may
have grown out of a recent interview with Kony in which he said he
may consider going to a third country, including the CAR. They said
that this rumor probably took hold because the chronic instability
in the CAR would make it hospitable to a guerilla like Kony, and
that Kony most likely has some bases, or at least connections, in
the CAR.

HUME