AU PREPARING TO END DARFUR PKO ON SEPTEMBER 30

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 002022

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER
NSC FOR COURVILLE AND SHORTLEY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/24/2026
TAGS: PGOV PREF PHUM SU AU
SUBJECT: AU PREPARING TO END DARFUR PKO ON SEPTEMBER 30


Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES CAMERON HUME; REASONS: 1.4 (B) AND (D)


1. (C) Summary. The African Union,s Ambassador Kingibe has
advised AU headquarters that the AU,s only viable option is
to end the peacekeeping operation by September 30. At a
meeting of AU and international partners on August 24,
Kingibe asked the partners to assist the AU in finding a
solution to the dysfunctional Ceasefire Commission (CFC),
provided a plea for AMIS funding, and announced that
President Bashir had asked AU President Konare to a meeting
on August 26 to discuss Darfur. The UN Deputy Special
Representative of the Secretary General (D/SRSG) gave a
brief, negative assessment of the Sudanese government,s
unilateral plan for Darfur. End summary.

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Ceasefire Commission
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2. (C) Ambassador Kingibe raised the problems caused by the
decision to exclude DPA non-signatories from meetings of the
cease-fire commission. Kingibe reviewed the July meeting and
international partners consent to exclude non-signatories
from the CFC, despite some mechanisms to maintain
non-signatories inclusion in sector sub-commissions. In
response to a message from the Sudanese government that it
considered DPA non-signatories to be terrorists and outlaws
and could no longer assure their security, the AU had asked
non-signatory representatives to depart AMIS bases. He asked
if the partners thought we should stick to this decision or
find a new approach.


3. (C) CDA Hume said it was important that all armed factions
support the CFC and that non-signatories be engaged. The GoS
appeared to be taking a different and dangerous tack by
pressing forward with its own plan. DPA implementation was
possible only with the government,s (GoS) commitment; its
own security plan seemed to point in a different direction.
Kingibe announced that President Konare was arriving the
evening of August 26, in response to a request by President
Bashir to discuss Darfur. After debate, partners agreed to a
joint demarche asking the GoS to address the CFC shortcomings
and to play a constructive part in making the CFC effective.

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DPA Implementation
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4. (C) Kingibe was disappointed at the lack of DPA
implementation. AMIS was working within its means and
capabilities to show progress. He was optimistic that AMIS
could put into affect the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and
Consultation (DDDC) soon. (Other sources indicate the AU may
appoint Abdul Rahman Swar Addahab, a former interim Sudanese
head of state, to head the dialogue; Embassy Khartoum
questions how such an appointment would be received in
Darfur.) However, Ambassador Ibok reminded the partners that
even the DDDC would require over 17 million dollars to
establish and execute. Kingibe acknowledged: there was no
funding stream for AMIS beyond September 30; there was no
approval by the AU of the AMIS concept of operations; there
would be no &enhancement8 of AMIS operations, as assumed as
a basis for transition to a UN force; there was no UNSC
decision to replace AMIS; and, there was no consent by the
Government of Sudan. Given these conditions, he had advised
AU headquarters to plan to end the AMIS operation by
September 30. In response to a question by CDA Hume, he said
he had not discussed this advice with the Sudanese
government.

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UN Transition or GoS peace and Stability Plan
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5. (C) UN Deputy SRSG bluntly stated that planning for the UN
transition was in transition. The current plan was for the
UN first to strengthen AMIS throughout the balance of the
year. He noted that Bashir,s rejection of a UN transition
was NCP policy, but the SPLM was now supporting a UN mission.
A joint NCP-SPLM committee had been formed to review the
issue. He doubted that the committee would change the policy
soon.


6. (C) Ambassador Hume recalled that the GoS had put its plan
on the table as an alternative and asked for a UN assessment.
D/SRSG said, &The plan is to make the AU mission irrelevant
and to make a UN mission impossible.8 He also commented,
with regard to DPA signatories, that &those who have signed
this agreement have no capacity to implement it.8

KHARTOUM 00002022 002 OF 002



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Non-military Logistic Support for the Movements
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7. (C) Kingibe asked the partners if any of the signatories
or DOC factions had approached them for non-military support
to assist their transition to political parties and to
maintain their forces through DPA implementation. He
emphasized that SLM expectations were not being met. Without
supplies of food and other support, there was significant
further danger to the DPA implementation. If other partners
did not step forward, the GoS would be the only potential
benefactor.


8. (C) Comment: Kingibe wants to recover from AMIS,s
non-signatory expulsion blunder earlier in the week and to
rally partners around a common position. However, in the end
he set a marker on the table that the international partners
could not expect the AU to implement the DPA without
providing the means to succeed. End Comment.
HUME