DARFUR: BROADENING THE BASE OF DPA SUPPORT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 002010

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF/SPG, AND AF/RSA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/23/2016
TAGS: PREL KPKO PGOV US EU SU
SUBJECT: DARFUR: BROADENING THE BASE OF DPA SUPPORT

Classified By: P/E Chief E. Whitaker, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: Embassy Khartoum has spoken with numerous
SLM dissidents who favor international support for a meeting
with a focus on sorting out leadership issues. EU and UK
Special Envoys for Darfur and UK Embassy officials have told
us that support for an SLM/Shafi conference should be tied to
support for the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA). There are
differences regarding timing and venue; it will be impossible
to collect a substantial number of SLM leaders without
agreement of Sudanese government and help from the UN.
Individual SLM/Shafi representatives want to meet USG
officials to discuss how to make the DPA relevant to the
needs of the people they claim to represent. Unmet SLM
objectives include individual compensation and janjaweed
disarmament. End summary.

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EU Special Envoy for Darfur Haavisto Talks to Shafi
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2. (C) During Charge Hume's August 24 meeting with Pekka
Haavisto, EU Special Envoy for Darfur, Haavisto said that he
had spoken with SLM leader Ahmed Abdel Shafi twice during the
past week. Haavisto said he had solicited Shafi's support
for the DPA. Shafi outlined SLM plans for a conference at
which the movement would discuss its leadership; Haavisto
responded that the EU could support a conference provided it
focused on support for the DPA. Shafi told Haavisto that
perhaps the G-19 rebel faction's decision not to support the
DPA could be shifted in the context of a general meeting with
other SLM leaders. Haavisto told Hume that Abdel Shafi's
friends had been seeking support from several European
governments for a conference, but EU governments did not want
to support a conference that might simply increase opposition
to the DPA.

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UK Consults on an SLM/Shafi Conference
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3. (C) In an August 25 meeting of Charge Hume, USAID Mission
Director, and Pol/Econ Chief with UK Special Envoy for Darfur
Amb. Rod Pullen, Charge, and Political Officer, discussion
focused on strategies for engaging the SLM to support the
DPA. UK Embassy officers have traveled to Darfur to assess
prospects for broadening support for the DPA among the Fur in
particular; their meetings also involved discussions with NRF
rebels. The Fur are anxious about their political exclusion,
and are increasingly factionalized. To address this, several
Fur leaders want support for SLM/Shafi organizing meetings.
Their priority is to discuss intra-SLM structure and clarify
in its leadership.


4. (C) Amb. Pullen counseled against a conference now. The
immediate focus of those he spoke with was to determine SLM
leadership and broad objectives before taking a position on
the DPA. The best place for such a meeting would be in
Darfur, where delegates could arrive on their own. A meeting
elsewhere, whether in southern Sudan or Nairobi (a site
mentioned by some of our contacts) would require the
involvement of the UN and the government of Sudan. He
thought it essential to have further contacts with potential
participants before bringing them together; it was important
to stress to them that the international community was firm
behind a position of no more fighting and support for the
DPA. Even so, such a meeting offered the risks of discussion
whether to join the NRF in rejecting the DPA. Remaining
question marks included the role of the AU, UN, and Minni
Minawi, now the Senior Assistant to the President. Pullen
suggested the need for the USG to undertake its own contacts
with leaders in the field.

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SLM: Interested in Talks with USG, Way Forward on DPA
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5. (C) Post has engaged a number of prominent SLM/Shafi
representatives to get a sounding on their receptiveness to
discussions with USG officials on the DPA. Consensus
emerged, with the following points made consistently by
interlocutors, who come from the Fur, Berti, Masalit, Midob,
and Zaghawa communities, as follows:

-- A critical mass has formed behind Ahmed Abdel Shafi
following a lengthy period of disengagement by former SLM
leader Abdel Wahid Mohamed al-Nour. He is blamed by
followers for the failure of his faction to achieve its
objectives in the Abuja peace negotiations and his inability
to articulate the way forward for the SLM. SLM patience with

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Abdel Wahid has run out;

-- The SLM representatives do not want war, and seek avenues
for peace. Those we spoke with told us they do not intend to
join the NRF;

-- SLM representatives are willing and even eager to meet
with USG officials to discuss the DPA and how to render it
attractive to the SLM;

-- Areas of DPA interest include, first and foremost,
individual compensation. Of secondary importance is
participation in janjaweed disarmament and incorporation of
SLM rebels in the police and military. These elements
address the sense of humiliation felt by the IDPs. Of lesser
significance is the naming of SLM/Shafi representatives to
political positions. Many said they felt they could install
those who could speak for them through future elections;

-- Although some felt the Jebel Marra area of central Darfur
would be the best location for discussions, others supported
eventually holding a conference in Southern Sudan. Various
representatives mentioned the need to engage the SPLM and
GoSS President Salva Kiir. Solidarity with the SPLM would be
of strategic significance, as the South had negotiated the
CPA and sympathized with other marginalized peoples of Sudan.


-- Minni Minawi's ascendancy complicated the situation in
Darfur, particularly among the Fur, who see themselves
isolated and left out of the political process.

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Comment
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6. (C) Getting these SLM leaders together in a conference is
a good idea, but in what conference? At the outset it is
important that these leaders recognize that the USG position
is to support peace and the DPA, including a process that can
produce benefits in terms of compensation, disarmament, and
representation. However they sort out their leadership
issues, the USG will not support a rejectionist/back to war
position. Embassy Khartoum is examining whether it would be
feasible for an embassy officer to accompany UK colleague on
a trip to the field to get across this message and to start
laying a solid basis for such a conference. End comment.
HUME