DPA PARTNERS DISCUSS WAY FORWARD

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001971

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/17/2016
TAGS: PREL KPKO PGOV PINR AU US UN SU
SUBJECT: DPA PARTNERS DISCUSS WAY FORWARD

Classified By: P/E Chief E. Whitaker, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: An August 17 meeting of DPA partners,
chaired by visiting UK Special Envoy Pullen, discussed the
need to be inclusive, broadening the base of support for the
DPA. Strategies discussed included building trust among
Darfurians, coordinating support for the DPA, rendering the
Ceasefire Commission more effective in resolving security
incidents, providing capacity building to rebel movements,
and broadening DPA outreach efforts. Charge Hume noted that
despite the DPA, the government appears to seek peace on
different terms, and is making signs of preparing to attack
non-signatory rebel movements. Discussion included the
pending UNSC resolution, and the lack of success in obtaining
Sudan's approval for a peacekeeping operation in Darfur to
take over for AMIS. The DPA partners agreed to meet
hereafter biweekly. End summary.

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UK Special Envoy Pullen: Broader Base Needed for DPA
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2. (C) On August 17, the UK hosted a meeting for DPA partners
to discuss the situation in Darfur and how best to coordinate
support for the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA). Amb. Rob
Pullen, visiting UK Special Envoy on Darfur, chaired the
90-minute meeting, which included participation by the AU,
UN, UK, EU, the Netherlands, Canada, Norway, and France. In
his opening remarks, Pullen noted that although there was
broad support among the partners for the DPA, the fact that
it had only two signatories of four negotiating parties
remained an impediment to its implementation.
Non-signatories should not be excluded, and should be
encouraged to participate in DPA-related activities, rather
than leave the DPA paralyzed, without political space for
debate on its merits. Prospects of either Abdel Wahid or
Khalil Ibrahim joining the DPA were illusory; rather than
pursuing them in Asmara, perhaps it would be more productive
to pursue DPA acceptance on the ground in Darfur.
Facilitating this should start in areas where useful
political work can be carried out, while at the same time
convincing Minni Minawi to broaden the base of support for
the DPA by reaching out to the Fur.

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DPA Partners Share Views on DPA, CFC, Coordination
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3. (C) During the ensuing discussion, DPA partners made the
following observations:

-- The Netherlands Charge noted that there were many Darfur
peace initiatives underway, but that a fundamental lack of
trust between Minawi and Abdel Wahid did not permit an
organizational reconstitution on the part of the SLM. Those
that favor peace look to the international community for
coordination and oversight for DPA-supporting activities.

-- UN Chief Political Advisor Christofides stressed the
importance of ensuring that the Ceasefire Commission operates
effectively, by dealing with problems promptly. He added
that the JEM is not as irrelevant as many had thought. He
urged support for practical aspects of the DPA, reminding
partners that they could provide non-lethal assistance to the
rebel movements. DPA commissions need to be broadly based,
he said, with a focus less on Zaghawa and more on Darfurian.


-- UN Political Advisor Rogers noted an early warning system
needed to be implemented to prevent attacks, as reports come
up daily of movements by various forces in advance of
hostilities.

-- The African Union DPA Implementation Chief Sam Ibok said
UN civil affairs work in Darfur needed to show dividends and
be coordinated with efforts of the AU to support the DPA. He
said that it was important not to become overly reliant upon
the possibility of Abdel Wahid agreeing to join the DPA; many
spoke to him, often through intermediaries, and it is
important that DPA partners coordinate outreach efforts
better, while also reaching out to other stakeholders. He
thanked the USG for providing the two DPA Implementation
Offices, which he said were concrete contributions to the DPA
process. Ibok cautioned DPA partners to be clear on the
objectives of the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation
(DDDC) Preparatory Committee, and to ensure that it deal with
both political and security issues. The process should take
advantage of the UK media team, and provide a political
message. Ibok added that the decision to exclude
non-signatories from the Ceasefire Commission and Joint
Commission came after lengthy discussion on how to hold
productive working sessions and engage a broad range of

KHARTOUM 00001971 002 OF 002


parties. He indicated that although it was a mistake for
AMIS to issue an order for non-signatories to vacate AMIS
facilities, their involvement in past meetings had not been
productive.

-- Canadian Charge Bones recalled that implementation of the
DPA was a means to re-establish security, and not a goal in
of itself. Although a key principle of what partners seek to
accomplish in Darfur, the DPA is a tool to engage
stakeholders.

-- Charge Hume agreed with the notions of gaining DPA support
by Abdel Wahid, expanding DPA outreach, and making the
Ceasefire Commission work effectively. He observed that we
cannot want peace more than the Sudanese do. It would be
fine if the Sudanese acted as if they had confidence in the
DPA as a mechanism to bring peace; there are signs, however,
that the Sudanese government wants peace on different terms
than those provided for in the DPA. Those calling for a
unilateral approach were on the ascendancy, and it is likely
that the military plans of three years ago are being
resurrected, with the same untoward consequences likely.
Even as vehicles are being stolen and humanitarian killings
are on the rise, the government's attitude reflects a belief
that since it signed the DPA, those who did not who cause
trouble are fair game.

-- Amb. Pullen agreed, and said that his conversations with
DPA GNU lead negotiator and President Advisor Magzoub
al-Khalifa led him to the same conclusion. The government's
actions will not bring peace to Darfur; they did not last
time and they will not this time, either.

-- UK Charge Evans said a second option was a UN transition,
although the consensus among DPA partners was that this did
not appear likely. Perhaps newly nominated DDDC Preparatory
Commission Chair Abdel Mohamed could talk with the DPA
partners and address accelerating its acceptance by the
Sudanese government.

-- The AU's Sam Ibok differed, stating that doing so would be
to put the cart before the horse, as the Prep Comm is not in
office yet. He agreed that coordination and a systematic
approach by DPA partners was good, and that both the DDDC and
the Darfur Joint Assessment Mission were key to anchoring
peace in Darfur. That said, the government is making its own
plans, and is negotiating its own position. Partners,
however, can influence the DPA implementation process, and
assist the rebel movements in participating. While the
government has capacities and resources, the movements can
barely arrange transportation and coordinate meetings.

-- A UK advisor said the government was enforcing security,
as it said it would do. The government is re-supplying
Darfur operations nightly, and seems committed to a military
solution. The DPA partners should consider meeting every two
weeks, and allow both the AU and the UN to present security
problems, and then decide whether or not to lobby parties.
The AU, however, is seen as partial in Darfur, and the
Ceasefire Commission has only two partners.

-- Charge Hume added that there was a palpable risk of rising
violence over the next two months, and that coordination
among DPA partners was thus essential.

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DPA Partners Agree to Meet Again; UNSCR Raised
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4. (C) The UK Embassy will circulate action points from the
meeting, and will make arrangements for the DDDC Prep Comm
Chair to meet with the partners in September. Other topics
for further discussion include non-lethal support for rebel
movements, resources from the international community, and
unilateral DPA implementation on the part of the Sudanese
government. Pullen raised the matter of a transition to a UN
peacekeeping operation and AMIS capacity. Christofides said
that the UNSC would be briefed later the same day regarding
the draft resolution on Darfur; partners need to discuss what
to do if AMIS ends, particularly as a UN peacekeeping
operation will take time to implement. He cited a need for
interim support and for practical coordination during a
transition. Evans raised the matter of an eventual Darfur
Assessment and Evaluation Commission; he circulated a
non-paper on it and mentioned that the AU was undertaking
preliminary discussions with CPA AEC Chair Vraalsen. Ibok
also noted the August 22 DPA stakeholders meeting, slated to
take place in El Fasher.
HUME