UN WARNING THAT SECURITY IN NORTH DARFUR IS

C O N F I D E N T I A L KHARTOUM 001958

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF/FO, AF/RSA, AF/SPG, AND RPM/AF

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/15/2016
TAGS: PHUM PREF EAID MOPS PREL PGOV PINS UN SU
SUBJECT: UN WARNING THAT SECURITY IN NORTH DARFUR IS
COLLAPSING

Classified By: CDA Cameron Hume, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (U) This is an action message - see para 5.


2. (C) After a briefing on Sudanese government-forced
resettlement of IDPs from a camp south of Khartoum, UN Deputy
Special Representative Manuel Da Silva described the dire
situation that was developing in North Darfur. Da Silva said
that increased violence in the field was starting to scare
away humanitarian workers, with violent vehicle theft being
the fastest growing risk. He said that SLA/Abdul Wahid and
JEM commanders were the worst offenders; SLA/Minawi had been
behaving more correctly. He added that the Sudanese Armed
Forces (SAF) had undertaken a &significant8 buildup of
troops and armored vehicles, staging some of the units near
to the El Fasher airport. He had no doubt that the
government had already made its decision to use unilateral
force to &implement8 the Darfur Peace Agreement. The issue
was decided, and the troops were now &on the move.8


3. (C) Da Silva said the situation was more dangerous for
international humanitarian operations than it had been since
early 2004 (the height of the genocide). At that time the
ongoing military operations were similar, with SAF units and
janjaweed auxiliaries &clearing out terrorists8 from rural
communities by the destruction of entire villages. He
expected the same tactics to be used again. In 2004,
however, the humanitarian organizations often came in after
attacks to provide assistance. This time around these
organizations, because of attacks on their staff, were
already thinking about departing Sudan, and he warned that,
if they left, the Sudanese authorities would prevent their
return. The AU peacekeepers were no longer patrolling in
North Darfur. He foresaw the possible collapse of
humanitarian action, with dire consequences for civilians.
Finally, he said the situation in the camps was worse than
before -- no police, no AMIS, no sense of authority, weapons
in the hands of young men, and rising ethic tensions.


4. (C) CDA Hume stated that the information available to the
USG confirmed the dire picture painted by Da Silva. In line
with its own security plan, the Government had given orders
&to stop and destroy8 forces opposed to the Darfur Peace
Agreement, and if the SAF used the same methods it had
previously, it would destroy entire communities. The
Government was willing to see NGOs depart to reduce the
number of witnesses to the use of force. The USG had issued
a strong press statement on the risks just several days ago,
and it was convinced that the Sudanese government,s
insistence to implement the DPA on its own would bring
disaster to the people of Darfur. There should be no
illusions: in the short term there was no way to provide
humanitarian services throughout Darfur if the Government
unleashed the army. It was time for the international
community to step up its insistence on early entry of UN
forces into Darfur.


5. (C) Action Requested: Da Silva mentioned that UN SYG
Annan is scheduled to brief the Security Council on Thursday
regarding Sudan, a good opportunity to follow up on this
information. With the scaring away of humanitarian workers
and the restriction to base of AMIS peacekeepers and UN
staff, USG overhead assets may be the only reliable way to
track this situation. To the extent feasible, Embassy
Khartoum requests support from the intelligence community for
this mission.
HUME