DARFUR POLITICS IN FLUX SAYS MUDAWI; AU

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001928

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER
NSC FOR COURVILLE AND SHORTLEY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/10/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREF PHUM SU AU
SUBJECT: DARFUR POLITICS IN FLUX SAYS MUDAWI; AU
LEADERSHIP, DARFUR DIALOGUE ESSENTIAL

Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES CAMERON HUME; REASONS: 1.4 (B) AND (D)


1. (C) Summary: The Darfur peace process is approaching an
inflection point, prominent Sudan human rights activist
Mudawi Adam Ibrahim told Embassy officials on August 10. The
DPA has become the predominant issue in the region's
politics, as various factions begin to define themselves
through their support or rejection of the agreement. The
Government's refusal to allow a UN force means the
international community must act to strengthen the AU -- not
militarily, but politically. AU leadership is essential, and
the time for action is now. End Summary.

"Wahid" Means "One" in Arabic
--------------


2. (C) Darfur politics remains highly fluid, as various
factions divide and maneuver for advantage, Sudan Social
Development Organization (SUDO) Chairman Dr. Mudawi Adam
Ibrahim told Poloffs and USAID/OTI representatives on August

10. The Darfur Peace Agreement was designed to bring all
parties in the conflict together, but has now itself become
the predominant issue in Darfur politics. Within the SLM/A,
Minni Minawi's decision to sign the agreement only confirmed
Abdulwahid Nur's decision not to support it, Mudawi
suggested, and led to Abdulwahid's June 8 public criticism of
the international community for "forcing" an agreement on
Darfur. But Abdulwahid had also refused to join the anti-DPA
National Redemption Front (NRF),much to the displeasure of
his Eritrean hosts. Abdulwahid was now completely isolated,
Mudawi believed. Just as some within Abdulwahid's wing of
SLM/A now sought to replace Abdulwahid with Abdel Ahmed
Shafi, or another leader who would support the DPA, Eritrea
now sought to replace Abdulwahid with a new leader
(Abdulliatif Ibrahim) who would join the NRF. Abulwahid Nur
no longer had any support in Darfur, or in Eritrea, Mudawi
said.


3. (C) The DPA has not only realigned Darfur politics, but
political shifts for and against the DPA have revealed the
agreement's weaknesses, Mudawi argued. The agreement was
made not by the whole people of Darfur, but by a small group
of people in Abuja; the real concerns of the people were
largely ignored, he charged. Even those people who
ostensibly support the agreement were not served by it, and
supported it only because their leaders told them to do so.
A lasting peace had to come from the bottom up, not from the
top down, Mudawi believed, which is why the Darfur-Darfur
Dialogue and Consultation (DDDC) was so important.

AMIS Needs Stronger Leadership, not Just Greater Capacity
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4. (C) Mudawi did not/not think that the Government of Sudan
would reverse its decision to allow a United Nations
peacekeeping force in Darfur. Instead, the current AU
Mission in Sudan must be strengthened, not militarily but
politically. AMIS did not need more money; it needed
leadership. The current AU mission was not coherent, and
though the AU was supposed to lead the peace process
proactively, it was actually just reacting to political
maneuvering on the ground. It had to engage with local
communities. The international community could help, by
making it clear to Sudan that the success of the AU mission
rested entirely on the Government's shoulders. Moreover, the
international community could appoint a special envoy to
galvanize AMIS into action. But when Poloffs asked Mudawi
whom he would recommend as a special envoy, or as the
chairman of the AU preparatory committee for the DDDC, Mudawi
drew a blank. "Perhaps Colin Powell?" he suggested
half-jokingly.

Jump Start the DDDC--Now
--------------


5. (C) The way forward was not to focus on signing the DPA or
convening the Ceasefire Commission, but on starting the DDDC,
Mudawi argued. "This has to be a process, not an event," he
said plainly. The DDDC could help create political consensus
on the ground among all the peoples and factions of the
region, and allow a reintegration of the people of Darfur,
not just those that supported the DPA. But the international
community had to help, too, by including all factions in the
peace process. Condemning groups for not signing the DPA had
failed to gain their support, and had only polarized Darfur
politics, Mudawi charged; Minawi's appointment as Senior
Assistant to the President had further complicated things.
"Everyone in Darfur is sick of fighting -- even the

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Janjaweed," he observed. But things could still get worse.
If the Government decides to send the Arabs against the NRF,
Mudawi predicted, the Arabs would instead join the NRF
against the Government and Minawi. The NRF had already fired
on one SAF Antonov AN-24 -- something the SLA had never done
in two years of fighting. Darfur politics was already
divided between those for and against the DPA, but if these
forces went to war, the humanitarian crisis would be worse
than 2003. "We have to act now to stop this, not in two
weeks," Mudawi said.


6. (C) Comment: Mudawi remains one of the most articulate,
and most thoughtful, observers of the crisis in Darfur. He
is also one of the most listened to: though he has turned
down an invitation to speak at "Darfur Day" in New York in
September, he does plan to attend a Darfur conference at
Harvard in November. Much of what he says makes good sense.
No one disputes his analysis of his AMIS' political
leadership -- or lack therof -- though his critique of the
DPA sounds a bit like Monday morning quarterbacking. He is
also surely right that the DDDC must be started as soon as
possible, but he may be wrong about an Arab-NRF alliance. We
certainly hope so.
HUME