Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06KHARTOUM1918
2006-08-13 15:03:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Khartoum
Cable title:  

KHARTOUM TALK ABOUT UN REHATTING

Tags:  PREL PGOV PHUM KPKO SU AU UN 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO9142
OO RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1918 2251503
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 131503Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4123
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L KHARTOUM 001918 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/12/2026
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM KPKO SU AU UN
SUBJECT: KHARTOUM TALK ABOUT UN REHATTING


Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES CAMERON HUME; REASON: 1.4(B) AND (D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L KHARTOUM 001918

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/12/2026
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM KPKO SU AU UN
SUBJECT: KHARTOUM TALK ABOUT UN REHATTING


Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES CAMERON HUME; REASON: 1.4(B) AND (D)


1. (C) On August 13 CDA Hume met at his request with SPLM
parliamentary chief Yassir Arman to discuss Darfur Peace
Agreement (DPA) implementation and transition from AU to UN
forces in Darfur. Hume reiterated USG readiness to work with
the SPLM to bring together Minni Minawi, Abdul Wahid, and SLM
dissident Abdul Shafi with the goal of widening support for
the DPA. Hume told Arman that he had met with a number of
NCP officials over the past ten days in an effort to engage
them on the subject of UN rehatting. Although President
Bashir repeated his flat rejection of UN forces, others were
eager to know what was being negotiated among UNSC members,
and some insisted that the Government of Sudan might/might
agree to UN rehatting despite Bashir,s public statements.


2. (C) Arman said he had been in contact with Abdul Wahid and
Abdul Shafi in Asmara. He said Abdul Wahid was held in
isolated conditions, accompanied only by a Darfurian exile
from Canada who was giving bad advice on U.S. policy. Abdul
Wahid, in Arman,s view, was indecisive and unable to shift
his position tactically, and for this reason he had gradually
lost support. Arman said Abdul Shafi was reasonable and
might be convinced to support the DPA, but he needed to get
away from Eritrea to have freedom of action. Contacts were
ongoing to pursue the idea of a trip by First Vice President
Salva Kiir to Eritrea with the goal of getting both Fur
leaders out of Eritrea.


3. (C) Arman affirmed that political circles in Khartoum were
actively discussing how to shift the Sudanese government,s
position to accept UN rehatting. According to Arman, two
months ago presidential advisers Nafie Ali Nafie and Magzoub
al Khalifa convinced President Bashir it was feasible to
reject UN rehatting and to assert national responsibility for
security in Darfur. They had done so as part of an effort to
weaken the position of VP Ali Osman Taha, who was associated
with a more international approach. Since then Taha had
withdrawn from the issue, convinced that the more unilateral
approach would eventually fail. As evidence that the
internal debate was progressing, Arman cited a statement by
presidential adviser Abdalla Ali Masar in a press interview
that a mandate under Chapter VI should be acceptable.


4. (C) Arman described the decision by the NCP and SPLM to
set up a joint committee on national security. On the NCP
side members would include VP Taha, Majzoub al Khalifa, Nafie
Ali Nafie, NISS Director Salah Gosh and several others; on
the SPLM side members would include FVP Kiir, SPLM Secretary
General Pagun Amum, Minister of Cabinet Affairs Deng Alor,
Arman, and several others. The committee was set to meet
over the next two days, and UN rehatting was one of the
issues on the table.


5. (C) Arman insisted that there was a real possibility that,
depite President Bashir,s public statements, the government
could be brought around. He said all were aware that the USG
would have a crucial role to play, initially to explain that
UN rehatting was essential to DPA implementation, but perhaps
more importantly to make it palatable for Bashir to shift
from a position that he had taken so publicly.


6. (C) In a brief conversation August 12 with CDA Hume, SLM
leader Minni Minawi said he was aware that the issue of UN
rehatting was being discussed by government committees and he
intended to weigh in to urge a positive decision. Minnawi
commented that he knew the Sudanese Armed Forces could not
pacify Darfur, and the unilateral plan would fail. In an
August 13 conversation, UN chief political adviser Jack
Christofides told Hume that, while UN HQ would like robust
language in the mandate, as a practical matter the phrases
&to take necessary action8 and &to use all necessary
means8 would in the field be interpreted by UN peacekeepers
to mean the same thing. He suggested the right way forward
would be to stick to a less complicated mandate, with the
emphasis on DPA implementation.
HUME