DARFUR: GRIM PROGNOSIS FOR THE COMING WEEKS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001903

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/09/2016
TAGS: PREL KPKO PGOV PINR AU CH ER US UN SU
SUBJECT: DARFUR: GRIM PROGNOSIS FOR THE COMING WEEKS

Classified By: E. Whitaker, Pol/Econ Chief, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) an
d (d)


1. (C) Summary: Over the next few weeks, increased military
action in Darfur is likely to continue, as the SAF, perhaps
in cooperation with SLM/A Minawi, seek to destroy National
Redemption Front (NRF) rebels while recapturing traditional
SLM/A Minawi-held areas. The GNU may seek to prosecute a
military victory over rebels opposed to the DPA. AMIS will
be increasingly unable to carry out its limited mandate, as
GNU acceptance of a UN peacekeeping operation remains
unlikely. Humanitarian access, at its lowest point in the
past three years, will continue to suffer the consequences of
local fighting, and render delivery of basic human needs to
affected IDP camps difficult. The GNU will continue to seek
rebel support for the DPA, despite limited public
understanding of its promises. End summary.

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Security Environment: SAF, SLM Minawi Poised for Attack
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2. (C) The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) are engaged in ongoing
combat with the NRF in North Darfur. Hostilities will
continue, with the SAF likely attacking NRF targets of
opportunity and conducting major combat operations if the NRF
moves towards South Darfur. SAF operations may be in
cooperation and/or coordination with the Sudanese Liberation
Movement (SLM) forces of Minni Minawi to re-take areas of
North Darfur lost in July to NRF forces. Conflict will
probably include defensive efforts to protect major towns
from attacks, such as the July 3 attack by the NRF on Hamrat
el Sheikh in Western Kordofan, and subsequently attacks
against SLM/A Minawi forces in the Korma, Birmaza, and Muzbat
corridor. The Weekly AMIS Security Assessment for July 27 )
August 2 states that the apparent SAF offensive in the Jebel
Moon and Kulkul and the follow-on military action are likely
to produce "killings on a scale not seen since 2003"
(Comment: this might be an exaggeration. End comment.)
However, Minawi believes that the SAF will pick and choose
opportunities based on threats to strategic hubs. For
example, both El Fasher and Melit have been heavily
reinforced with SAF forces, while NRF attacks against Minawi
forces in Sayeh (30 kms from Melit) have not been assisted by
the three battalions of SAF troops in Melit.


3. (C) Targets of the SAF and SLM Minawi are likely to
include NRF components ) Justice and Equality Movement
(JEM),G-19, and Chadian reinforcements. However, in the
near-term both Minawi and SPLM are trying to engage with both
SLM Abdel Wahid and the recent breakaway group under Ahmed
Abdul Shafi. A key SAF objective will likely be to prevent
non-Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) signatory rebels from
further impacting the DPA or moving into South Darfur
(Comment: a point recently made by President Bashir to
Charge Hume. End comment.) Given that at least some NCP
hardliners believed a military victory possible in Darfur
until earlier this year, it is also possible that the SAF and
SLM Minawi may seek to eradicate them altogether. Recent
Sudanese negotiations with Chad and Eritrea may have achieved
agreements to cease support for Darfur rebels, adding to the
GNU's military resolve. However, there are reports of two
recent Eritrean aircraft landing in Abeche with military
weapons and munitions for the NRF. Other complicating
factors include widespread banditry and car-jacking and
continued fractionalization of rebel movements.



4. (C) Without immediate, significant support, the African
Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS),will become increasingly
irrelevant, as even its limited ability to monitor (but not
prevent or stop) a largely unobserved ceasefire decreases.
Even if kept on life-support by a late cash infusion, AMIS
will remain a weak player in Darfur. Without promise of a UN
peacekeeping operation, parties will become increasingly risk
averse, further limiting the provision of basic human
services and relief access to the hundreds of thousands of
IDPs throughout Darfur. GNU officials state that the
government has a plan to restore stability and security in
Darfur by means other than a UN force. (Note: we have
received the plan in Arabic from the MFA, and are
translating. End note.)

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Humanitarian Access: From Bad to Worse
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5. (C) According to AMIS and some NGOs, humanitarian access
is at its worst status in the three plus years of the Darfur
conflict. The Weekly AMIS Security Assessment for July 27 )
August 2 lists the threat to NGOs in Darfur as elevated,
which is defined as "probable attack, abduction, or

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hijacking." As the rainy season progresses, it will become
more and more difficult for humanitarian goods and services
to be delivered to remote areas, where many of the IDPs live.
Attacks on humanitarian and government workers, as well as
banditry and car-jacking, will continue to weaken the ability
to reliably deliver essential food and medical supplies by
ground. On August 7, UN Humanitarian Coordinator and Deputy
Special Representative Manuel da Silva reported that the
level of violence being faced by humanitarian workers in
Darfur is now unprecedented, with eight workers dying in the
line of duty during the month of July, more that in the
previous two years combined.


6. (C) OCHA says many Sudanese humanitarian workers are
afraid to enter the internally displaced persons (IDP) camps,
and humanitarian access has thus fallen to its lowest level
since the Darfur relief operation began. Many of the
hard-fought gains of the past two years will slowly erode,
leaving behind a populace perhaps even less likely to be able
to return home. The brief rainy season in Darfur is closing;
an inability of IDPS to plant this season's crop will see the
marginally productive region slip into a fourth year of food
dependency. It is ironic that the railroad terminus in
Nyala, South Darfur, was once a point of export shipment of
live animals, sorghum and millet, and oil seeds.


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Political Dynamics: Stalling, Stiffing
a UN PKO
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7. (C) Although some rebels breaking off mainstream movements
are aligning with the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA),many
Darfurians remain unaware of its vision for a stable Darfur.
Continued hostilities and limited humanitarian access loom
larger, and deny space for a political message offering
prospects for stability and economic development. The GNU's
calculation might include providing incentives to Darfur
rebels to agree to the DPA, combined with plans to liquidate
remaining opponents.
HUME