DARFUR: CHARGE AND MFA MINISTER OF STATE DISCUSS

C O N F I D E N T I A L KHARTOUM 001899

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT AND AF A/S FRAZER AND IO A/S SILVERBERG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/10/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL KPKO SU AU UN
SUBJECT: DARFUR: CHARGE AND MFA MINISTER OF STATE DISCUSS
AMIS/UN REHATTING

Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES CAMERON HUME; REASON: 1.4(B) AND (D)


1. (C) On August 10 CDA Hume, at his request, met with MFA
Minister of State Wasiila Samani to discuss UN rehatting of
AU peacekeepers in Darfur and the state of bilateral
relations. Hume noted that the morning newspapers reported
an interview in which Samani expressed hope for an
improvement in U.S./Sudanese relations in the near future.
Hume expressed appreciation for that hope, but he said it was
important for Samani to be aware that, unless the Government
of Sudan agreed to an early transition to UN forces in
Darfur, the bilateral relationship would go into a nosedive.
Hume provided Samani with an advance copy of the statement on
situation in Darfur to be released by the Department
spokesman.


2. (C) Samani shifted the subject of discussion from what
could happen in the next two weeks to complain that the U.S.
and other Security Council members had not fully consulted
Sudan before adoption of a resolution on Darfur last May.
Hume disputed whether the extent of consultation before an
earlier decision was a meaningful issue. The challenge was
how to confront squarely and honestly the problem of the
deteriorating situation in Darfur, to arrange for early
transition to a UN force, and to put the implementation of
the peace process back on track. Hume had given the Sudanese
side the current negotiating text over a week ago, but he
still had no comment from the Sudanese side. Presumably the
Sudanese were going to stick with President Bashir's flat
refusal to discuss the issue, and further attempts to discuss
it would be a waste of time.


3. (C) Samani protested that a group of high level officials
were indeed working to produce a detailed position on the
current draft. Hume welcomed that information but reminded
Samani that negotiations were nevertheless going forward,
first among the P-5 and then with all Council members.
Whatever the problems of entering negotiations due to the
adamant opposition of President Bashir to a UN force, it
would soon become more difficult to respond to Sudanese
concerns. The bottom line would have to remain an agreement
on a UN force to take over from AMIS. If such an agreement
could not be reached quickly, it would be impossible to take
any steps to improve bilateral relations in the near term.


4. (C) Samani asserted that the government would present its
position no later than Sunday. Hume responded that he would
welcome receiving such a position, but it would be important
for the Sudanese to engage in New York with delegations to
the Security Council. While Hume wanted to encourage the
Sudanese to develop a position on the text, any actual
negotiations should take place in New York.


5. (C) Comment: Given the position of President Bashir,
Sudanese officialdom is in some agony to come up with a
negotiating position. Most Sudanese want better bilateral
relations, but the UN plan for Darfur peacekeeping still has
to be sold on its own merits. Unlike Bashir, a number of key
officials doubt the wisdom of a unilateral process to bring
peace to Darfur, and they want to engage. Now they have to
get the permission or courage to do so. End comment.
HUME