DARFUR AND DPA IMPLEMENTATION ON THE EVE OF MINNI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 KHARTOUM 001716

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

BRUSSELS FOR FRAZER AND HUME, NSC FOR SHORTLEY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/18/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL SU
SUBJECT: DARFUR AND DPA IMPLEMENTATION ON THE EVE OF MINNI
MINAWI'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON

Classified By: Charge Andrew Steinfeld for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


Summary
--------------


1. (C) On the eve of Minni Minawi's visit to Washington,
the security situation in Darfur is fragile, and DPA
implementation is off to a slow start. The AU and AMIS
are showing a disturbing lack of capacity and energy
in security and political areas. The issue of transition
to UN PKO still looms unresolved, adding uncertainty as
to who will be responsible for DPA implementation in the
medium to long term. The issue of the non-signatories
has also hampered the functioning of key DPA cease-fire
mechanisms. The security environment in Darfur continues
to be tense, volatile, and unpredictable, characterized
by intra-rebel fragmentation and fighting, with negative
consequences for humanitarian work.


2. (C) In the absence of AU leadership and action, the U.S.
has taken the lead in deploying people and resources to
help shore up the AU effort and enhance SLM/A-Minawi's
capacity to function. We are in the process of setting
up offices for DPA implementation in Khartoum and North
Darfur, and have sent military officers to boost AMIS's
capacity. But much work remains, including ensuring
the effective functioning of cease-fire and verification
mechanisms in the field, and beginning the Darfur-Darfur
dialogue.


3. (C) Our message to Minni should be three-fold: stay
the course with the DPA despite all the evident political
and security problems; eschew violence to the maximum
extent possible; and, be as inclusive as possible
in embracing other forces in Darfur. We, for our part,
should reiterate the points made by the President in his
letter to Minni on the eve of the signing of the DPA:
that we will continue vigorously to support implementation
of the agreement in order to attain peace and stability in
Darfur. End Summary.

Three unresolved issues
--------------


4. (C) Three unresolved issues are currently combining
to slow down DPA implementation and exacerbate the
security situation on the ground.

-- AU/AMIS lack of capacity and energy. In both security
and political areas, the lack of capacity by the AU and
AMIS vigorously to engage on DPA implementation and
security on the ground constitute a huge drag on DPA
implementation. In Khartoum, a staff of two led by senior
advisor Sam Ibok is attempting to organize implementation,
while the official AU rep, Baba Gana Kingibe, has been
out of Khartoum for weeks. Ibok has been provided no
resources by Addis headquarters, leaving it up to donors
(particularly the U.S.) to foot the bill for setting up
offices, etc. In the field, the performance of the AMIS
commander has been extremely weak, resulting in the
non-functioning of the important Ceasefire Commission.

-- UN PKO transition. The unresolved issue of what follows
AMIS is also a serious drag on AMIS's performance now.
And although in conversations with Charge Hume, NCP leaders
have shown some signs of flexibility towards security
arrangements post-AMIS, in public and private, President
Bashir never misses an opportunity to reiterate his fierce
opposition to a UN force in Darfur. (Note: Today's meetings
in Brussels - both bilateral and multilateral -- will
shed more light on where this matter stands.)

-- Establishing broader adherence to the DPA. Minni
Minawi's group remains the only signatory, with only a
handful of others announcing their commitment to the DPA.
Attempts to woo Abdel Wahid in Asmara seem to be
flagging. Meanwhile, groups opposed to Minni and
critical of the DPA are stirring up trouble on the ground.

Security: Fragmentation, Violence, and a weak AMIS
-------------- --------------


5. (C) The security environment in Darfur continues
to be tense, volatile, and unpredictable. There have
been significant attacks against Minni's forces in an
attempt to discredit the only movement signatory and

KHARTOUM 00001716 002 OF 004


to create a security environment that makes it impossible
to implement the DPA. Although there had been a
reduction in fighting throughout most of June, an
estimated 18,000 new IDPs were created as a result of
fighting between SLM factions the first week of July.
In addition, the annual nomadic migration back to
the north has begun. Territorial conflicts between
tribes, herders, and farmers are common during the
migration and can become violent; recent fighting in
South Darfur between two Arab tribes resulted in over
240 casualties.


6. (C) The National Redemption Front (NRF),recently
created from factions that rejected the DPA, continues
attacks in northwest Darfur in order to increase its
relevance in future negotiations and expand its base
of operations. The NRF has publicly indicated its intent
to destroy the basis for the DPA. Reports of Chadian
reinforcements including possible Chadian regular
army personnel mixed into the force crossing the border
to support the NRF is a new factor. In central Darfur,
SLM/A commanders who did not sign the DPA appear to be
consolidating their positions, but may continue to
attempt to take areas under Minni's control if they
believe his forces are occupied against the NRF tied
down further north.


7. (C) Minni will be under increased pressure from
his commanders to mobilize fighters and regain lost
territory regardless of the DPA provisions. NRF
support from Chad may also provoke retaliation by his
Zaghawa clan elements living in Chad. Minni strongly
supports a UN mission replacing the African Mission
in Sudan (AMIS). He faults AMISQs ineffectiveness
and slow implementation of the DPA for much of the
present fighting.


8. (C) AMIS continues to struggle with under resourced
forces including troop strength, logistics, intelligence,
mobility, and communications shortages. The AMIS ceasefire
commission has taken no action on 30 unresolved violations
over the last several months. AMISQs lack of effectiveness
is particularly telling in the IDP camps, where many camps
have warned AMIS civilian police patrols to stay out or
face attack by the IDP populations. Threats against
AMIS from the non-signatory factions continue to escalate
with more frequent hijackings and more restriction to
AMISQs freedom of movement. Most of the population in
Darfur does not believe that AMIS can achieve peace or
effectively implement the DPA.

Effects of insecurity on humanitarian aid
--------------


9. (C) The international humanitarian relief agencies
view the security situation in Darfur as having deteriorated
since the signing of the DPA in May. Sustained intra-SLA
fighting has resulted in additional IDPs (18,000 in North
Darfur in the past week) and decreased access to international
assistance. The fighting has also resulted in continued
brutal attacks on, and abuse of, women. There has been
increased banditry and attacks on humanitarian workers,
including the death of one. Operations have been
curtailed in parts of North and South Darfur. USAID
continues to be the single largest donor in Darfur, but
UN and NGO partners report that, should fighting continue
or increase, they will be forced to scale back their
relief operations.

DPA Implementation slow to start: U.S. engaged
-------------- -


10. (C) Due largely to AU's institutional weakness,
DPA implementation has not begun in earnest. Although
Minni has been appointed as senior assistant to the
President, he has yet to come to Khartoum, and no other
political issues have been tackled. The Government has
reportedly submitted its janjaweed disarmament plan,
but AMIS and the CFC have yet to evaluate it. There
has been no movement on the Darfur-Darfur dialogue.


11. (C) In this context, the international donor
community, led by the U.S., is having to kick-start
the process. We have undertaken the following:

-- A surge team of 4-5 officers from S/CRS is helping
the AU and the SLM increase their capacity and effectiveness

KHARTOUM 00001716 003 OF 004


in Khartoum and el Fasher, North Darfur.

-- One person from S/CRS is directly supporting Minni
in the field and pushing AMIS to be more effective.

-- Three military officers are being deployed to AMIS
to support headquarters activities and to assist on
verification of DPA security arrangements, including
violations of the DPA.

-- We are in the process of standing up two offices for
the joint use of the AU and the SLM in Khartoum and el Fasher.

-- USAID/OTI is supporting local organizations in the
field to hold focused discussions among academics, civil
society leaders, and IDP leaders on the DPA, and distributing
copies of the agreement to promote greater understanding
of its content. OTI also commissioned a comprehensive
summary of the DPA in Arabic, Fur, Zaghawa, Massalit, and
other tribal languages. (The UK is taking the lead on media
programming for the DPA in Darfur.)

-- We are planning on implementing some quick impact projects
using funds likely to be apportioned for Darfur from the 1207
account.

Other donors seem willing to engage and to spend money, but
the lack of organizational skills by the AU has slowed the
collective effort down.

The Darfur Joint Assessment Mission: Economic recovery
-------------- --------------


12. (C) One area where there has been some progress is in
organizing the donors for the significant economic aid and
recovery effort associated with DPA implementation. The Darfur
JAM was launched at a meeting in The Hague in June. The core
coordinating group, chaired by the Netherlands, and comprised
of the GNU, SLM/A-Minawi, the UN, the IBRD, and major donors
met to provide overall guidance to the UN and the World Bank
as they organize technical assessments of Track I (early recovery)
and II (reconstruction and development). A follow-on workshop
was held for members of the technical teams and the parties to
the agreement. The UN will begin technical assessments of early
recovery needs by late July, with teams to be based in Nyala.
USAID is contributing a field officer to the UN team as well
as sharing sector analyses already undertaken by it.

Message to Minni: Stay the course, Eschew violence, Be inclusive
-------------- --------------


13. (C) Minni arrives in Washington at a time when there is
great fragility with regard to the DPA, and continued turmoil
on the ground. Three messages will be key:

-- Stay the course. Minni should be strongly encouraged to
maintain his commitment to the agreement despite the evident
difficulties in its implementation, and instability on the
ground. He will need to show fortitude and patience, but
should be assured of the international community's support,
led by us.

-- Eschew violence. Minni should understand that he cannot
be seen to be instigating violence in the field, particularly
engaging in any activities seen to be violating the rights of
civilians, especially women. In return, we should tell him
that we will work to improve AMIS's capabilities (particularly
with regard to investigation of ceasefire violations),and
continue to push aggressively for UN transition.

-- Be inclusive. Minni fully understands the tenuous nature
of support for the agreement among many groups in Darfur.
He should be as inclusive as possible when it comes time to
fill political positions. At the same time, we should tell
him that we will work to ensure that the Darfur-Darfur dialogue
is begun as soon as possible.

Reiterate the President's commitment to our one partner
-------------- --------------


14. (C) On May 4, President Bush wrote Minni and urged that
he exert leadership so that an agreement could be reached.
Minni did so, and has continued to be resolute in the face
of enormous difficulties. We should use his Washington visit
to reconfirm that we stand by our reciprocal commitments,
which are to fully support implementation of the agreement
and to continue to work energetically for peace, reconstruction,

KHARTOUM 00001716 004 OF 004


and reconciliation in Darfur.

STEINFELD