SUDAN: KEY ISSUES FACING SALVA KIIR ON THE EVE OF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001712

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

BRUSSELS FOR FRAZER AND HUME, NSC FOR SHORTLEY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/18/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL SU
SUBJECT: SUDAN: KEY ISSUES FACING SALVA KIIR ON THE EVE OF
HIS U.S. VISIT


Classified By: Charge Andrew Steinfeld, reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (
d)


1. (C) The following summarizes some key issues currently
facing Government of National Unity (GNU) First Vice
President and Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) President
Salva Kiir on the eve of his Washington visit:

-- Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) Implementation
-- Darfur Involvement/UN PKO Transition
-- Consolidating Political Power
-- Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) Negotiations
-- Development and Corruption

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CPA Implementation
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2. (C) The first year and a half of the CPA has shown some
solid gains for the South: freedom of the press has taken
hold; people are practicing their religions without
harassment; the GoSS governs its region without interference;
the northern and southern armies are beginning to cooperate
and have formed joint integrated units; and the pull-out of
northern troops from the south is ahead of schedule.
However, problems with certain key issues -- notably the
status of the oil-rich border area of Abyei, the demarcation
of the north-south border, and oil management -- threaten the
progress made in other areas. These are key issues on which
we and other donors are focusing, inter alia, through the
mechanism of the Assessment and Evaluation Commission.

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Darfur Involvement/UN PKO Transition
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3. (C) Kiir has responded to calls from the international
community to become more involved in Darfur mainly by
reaching out to SLM/Minni Minawi and attempting to bring
Abdel Wahid Nur into the Darfur Peace Agreement. That said,
his failed attempt several weeks back in Yei to reconcile the
two factions of the SLM has no doubt diminished his interest
in pursuing AW further. He has never shown significant
energy on the Darfur front, largely, no doubt, because he is
already stretched extremely thin in his dual-hatted roles.
Notably, however, Kiir recently announced his support for UN
peacekeeping operations in Darfur, boldly contradicting what
GNU President Bashir sought to portray as united opposition
on the part of the GNU. This was the first time Kiir
strongly asserted his position as First Vice President on a
national security issue. To date, it is not clear what
eventual impact his view on UN transition may have on moving
Bashir, but his visit to Washington does provide him the
bullhorn to make his differences with Bashir loud and clear
on this point -- should he choose to do so.

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Consolidating Political Power
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4. (C) Salva Kiir took power in August 2005 with a weak
mandate, divisions within the SPLM, and significant southern
political and military power outside his party. Through
careful consensus building and a flexible,
non-confrontational approach to leadership, Kiir has unified
the SPLM and other political groups behind his leadership.
The main rival faction, the inner circle of the late John
Garang, now stands behind Kiir after a series of closed-door
deals that included elevating Garangist leader Pagan Amum to
the number two position in the SPLM, and Rebecca Garang
assuming a less active political role. Kiir has also brought
the majority of the South Sudan Defense Force (SDDF),a
potentially dangerous militia coalition, into the SPLM. All
of his maneuvers are incremental, and his resistance to
dramatic action has prevented him from dealing with some
serious issues in his party, including the tenure and
performance of Foreign Minister Lam Akol, who frequently goes
against SPLM positions.

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Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) Negotiations
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5. (C) Raids from the LRA have been a significant threat to
peace in Southern Sudan. Initially, GoSS Vice President Riek
Machar opened contacts with the LRA without Kiir's knowledge.
Many in the south, including Kiir, doubted the sincerity of

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the LRA and suspected it was only buying time to regroup and
reorganize after an end of the significant support once
received from its chief benefactor, the Khartoum government.
Now that the talks are underway, Kiir is willing to give the
LRA a chance and appears to be involved more directly, with
Machar continuing to take the lead.

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Development and Corruption
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6. (C) Through a largely U.S.-funded World Food Program roads
project, trade routes have opened with Uganda and Kenya,
greatly increasing the availability and reducing the price of
goods throughout Southern Sudan. Markets have sprung up, the
construction industry is booming, and refugees and IDPs are
eager to return home. However, there is no reliable
electricity, even in the capital of Juba. There is little
availability of potable water; access to health care and
education, while growing, is still among the lowest in the
world.


7. (C) As the population puts more pressure on the
government, Kiir has started to shift blame toward the
international community, which seriously underestimated the
difficulties of working in Southern Sudan, for over-promising
and under-delivering. This was highlighted by a recent
dispute with the World Bank-managed Multi-Donor Trust Fund
(MDTF),which cancelled a roads contract because the tender
lacked transparency and accountability. The GoSS accused the
World Bank of being overly bureaucratic, and said it did not
understand the Bank's complicated regulations, but MDTF
officials privately worried that the problem was rooted in
corruption. Although Kiir appears to understand the huge
problems corruption can cause, he faces increasing charges of
wrongdoing within his administration. Kiir has preferred to
deal with corruption charges internally, fearing the
embarrassment of public hearings for his young government.
STEINFELD