SUDAN ADMITS AU PEACKEEPING COLLAPSING, BUT NOT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001667

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF/SPG
USEU PLEASE PASS A/S FRAZER
NSC FOR COURVILLE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/16/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV KPKO PHUM SU AU UN
SUBJECT: SUDAN ADMITS AU PEACKEEPING COLLAPSING, BUT NOT
YET READY FOR UN

REF: A. KHARTOUM 1659

B. KHARTOUM 1588

C. KHARTOUM 1565

D. KHARTOUM 1562

Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES CAMERON HUME; REASON: 1.4(B) AND (D)


1. (C) Summary: Sudan fully recognizes that the African
Union is not meeting its responsibilities in Darfur,
Presidential Advisor Magzoub Al-Khalifa told CDA Hume on July

15. The AU is not acting to implement the Darfur Peace
Agreement, and the Government has pushed the AU to make basic
decisions about the membership of the Ceasefire Commission
(CFC),the leadership of the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue, and
arrangements for wealth and power sharing. The situation on
the ground was now "very serious," Magzoub said. But Sudan
was still not prepared to allow a UN peacekeeping force,
instead urging that both Sudan and the United States "move to
the middle and find a common position" to bring peace to the
region. A meeting between President Bashir and his top
advisors -- scheduled later on the afternoon of July 15 --
could open a way forward, Magzoub suggested. The Government
looks forward to preparing its own plan, and discussing it
with A/S Frazer in Brussels. End Summary.

U.S., Sudan Agree: AU Not Implementing DPA
--------------


2. (C) CDA Hume recounted for Magzoub a July 13 meeting
between AU Special Advisor Sam Ibok and key donor
representatives (Ref A). The AU was doing nothing to
implement the DPA, and had not given Ibok a single dinar to
support the agreement. The CFC had done nothing to
investigate fighting between the SLA's Minawi and Abdulwahid
factions near Korma, and neither the AMIS Force Commander nor
his deputy had even attended the July 12 CFC meeting. Most
recently, Chadian-backed militias had attacked Minawi's
forces several times near Muzbat within the past 24 hours,
and AMIS had done nothing to respond. (Post will report on
the most recent attacks septel). The AU peacekeeping force
was collapsing, Hume argued, and Sudan's opposition to UN
force was no longer tenable.


3. (C) Magzoub "fully agreed" that the AU was not meeting its
responsibilities, and told Hume that he had had his own "very
tough meeting" with Ibok. Magzoub had pressed Ibok to
clarify the membership of the CFC, and had urged the AU to
hold a second Joint Commission meeting. He had pushed the AU
to launch the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue, and make arrangements
for the wealth and power sharing provisions of the DPA.
Sudan had even offered money to support the AU's efforts,
Magzoub revealed, but this seemed to have no effect. AMIS
intentionally was dragging its feet because Nigerian
President Obasango wanted to wait for an AU/UN transition, he
believed. But even if Sudan were to agree to a transition in
six months, how could there be any transition if AMIS could
not maintain peace in the interim, Magzoub wondered aloud.


4. (C) President Omer al-Bashir had called a meeting of his
top advisors for the afternoon of July 15, Magzoub said, to
make a full evaluation of the situation in the field.
Mazgoub hoped it would point a way forward. Sudan and the
United States must push the AU to start moving, especially on
the Joint Commission. But the Joint Commission also includes
the UN, Hume interjected, and Sudan must re-assess its
position towards the UN. "Let us speak about the AU Plus, if
only for the sake of the Government," Magzoub pleaded. "We
have to strike a balance to avoid political problems."

Preparing for Brussels, Searching for Middle Ground
-------------- --------------


5. (C) The Government was looking forward to talks in
Brussels with A/S Frazer, Magzoub said. Sudan was preparing
its plan on empowering AMIS to implement the DPA, but also
wanted to leave the door open to dialogue, he said. As for
the need for UN forces, there can always be another
evaluation down the road. In the meantime, Sudan and the
United States had to agree on a new formula to overcome
weaknesses in AMIS, like expanding the ceasefire verification
team.


6. (C) But Hume reminded Magzoub that AMIS needed more than
just incremental changes. A few foreign verifiers or NATO
staff officers would not help; neither would new commanders
or new battalions. President Bush had already asked African

KHARTOUM 00001667 002 OF 002


leaders to send more troops, but even if the AU was able to
muster 8800 troops, it would still have only 100 civilians to
help support its operations -- compared to the 4000 civilians
the UN envisages for force just twice the size. AMIS was
failing, and the international community would not support
expanding it. Sudan, however, had rejected any UN deployment
outright. The United States was not a party to the
International Criminal Court; unlike some of its allies, it
favors a UN mandate in Darfur that focuses solely on
peacekeeping. UN troops could not come without Sudan's
approval, Hume acknowledged, but if Sudan sticks to its
current position, the Government will face a huge risk. "If
the situation deteriorates, who will be seen as responsible?"
Hume asked pointedly.


7. (C) Sudan's position would be better defined by Monday
afternoon's meetings with A/S Frazer, Magzoub said. Sudan
and the United States must find a way forward together and
not go forth in confrontation, he emphasized. Both sides
should move to the middle and find a common position, he
urged.

Comment
--------------


8. (C) Magzoub focused less on sovereignty, neo-colonialism,
and popular opposition to UN forces -- and more on seeking
middle ground -- than in previous meetings (Refs B, C, and
D). The Government understands that AMIS is collapsing, but
it is not yet intellectually or politically ready to agree to
a UN deployment. Bashir's July 15 meeting with his advisors
may help, but more must likely be done in Brussels to show
the Sudanese a way out of their self-made dilemma.
HUME