AMIS INTEL REPORT OUTLINES RISE OF NRF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 KHARTOUM 001652

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/12/2016
TAGS: PREL KPKO PGOV PINR PHUM US AU UN SU
SUBJECT: AMIS INTEL REPORT OUTLINES RISE OF NRF

Classified By: P/E Chief E. Whitaker, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary and comment: An AMIS intelligence report
details the evolution of the National Redemption Front (NRF),
formed in May 2006 by elements of the Justice and Equality
Movement (JEM),Sudanese Liberation Movement/Abdel Wahid
faction (but not Abdel Wahid himself),and the Sudan Federal
Democratic Alliance (SFDA). The report discusses the July 3
attack by the NRF on the Kordofan town of Hamrat el-Sheikh,
and its efforts to recruit additional members. Finally, it
speculates on "most likely" and "most dangerous" courses of
action on the part of the NRF, Sudanese Government, SLM/Minni
Minawi, and SLM/Abdel Wahid. None augers well for peace and
stability in Darfur.


2. (C) The report reaches a number of sweeping judgments of
possible outcomes, particularly with respect to expected
courses by the Sudanese Government. The possibilities
discussed, however, indicate that continuing
political-military calculations by all stakeholders offer the
potential to continue destabilizing Darfur. End summary and
comment.

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AMIS Intelligence Report Outlines Emergence of NRF
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3. (C) Post recently obtained an intelligence report from the
African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) regarding the formation
of the National Redemption Front (NRF). The report reads as
follows:

(Begin text)

Intelligence Report
Emergence of the National Redemption Front (NRF)

AMIS INT/SY
July 6, 2006

Enclosures:


1. Joint Statement by National Redemption Front, June 7, 2006


2. Letter of Commitment to the DPA by JEM/SLA-AW commanders,
June 4, 2006


3. National Redemption Front Founding Declaration, June 30,
2006


4. Timeline of Events

Introduction

On June 7, 2006, a new rebel alliance appeared on the scene
of the Darfur political map. In a joint statement (Encl. 1)
the National Redemption Front (NRF) announced its existence
and goals to the people of Darfur. In the statement, the NRF
stated that it was comprised of elements of the Justice and
Equality Movement (JEM),the Sudanese Liberation Movement
(SLM/A),and the Sudan Federal Democratic Alliance (SFDA).
It was made clear that Abdul Wahid, the leader of the
SLA-Wahid faction (SLA-AW) was not a part of this alliance,
despite serious negotiations and persuasions imposed on him
previous to the formation of the party. On 3 July 2006, NRF
Forces attacked the village of Hamrat El Sheik in North
Kordofan.

Background

May 5, 2006 marked the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement
(DPA) in Abuja, Nigeria by the Government of Sudan (GOS) and
the SLA, Minni Minawi Faction (SLA MM). While JEM and SLA-AW
were present at the negotiations, there was never a deep
commitment to peace, and they refused to sign. While the JEM
was never expected to sign the DPA, Abdul Wahid was expected
to sign, but backed out at the last minute, explaining that
the DPA did not go far enough with respect to individual
compensation.

During the time period immediately following the signing of
the DPA, indications began to spring up that many of the
commanders in the field were beginning to jockey for position
with respect to the new order. The international community,
particularly the US, was propping up Minni Minawi as the
harbinger of peace, while the other factions were
marginalized as seekers of chaos. As a reaction to this new
order, SLA-AW began a campaign of demonstrations and unrest
within the IDP camps. While many of the demonstrations were
peaceful, a handful was violent and resulted in the deaths of
at least 20 people over a period of two weeks. The
demonstrations only subsided after the heavy-handed reaction

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by the GOS in the Abu Shouk IDP camp near Al Fashir. At
least one person was killed by the GOS during this
demonstration, although the GOS denies any injuries occurred
at all. This strategy of inciting the IDP population was
meant to undermine the peace process signed by the GOS and
SLA-MM, and it was largely effective.

The JEM reacted a bit differently than SLA-AW. It appeared
that the JEM was content to sit back to see if the DPA would
take hold. It is possible that the JEM began to seek
alliances in order to strengthen their political arid
military capabilities.

After violence in the IDP camps subsided, it became clear
that many of the commanders from all of the factions were
beginning to defect for the other side. Shortly after the
signing of the DPA members of JEM and SLA-AW traveled to
Addis Ababa in order to discuss their commitment to the DPA
with the African Union. The three commanders issued a
written statement to this effect on 4 June 2006 (Encl. 2).
The defections were not only from the non-signatory side of
the coin. Rumors of a number of defections from SLA-MM to
the JEM or SLA-AW were numerous.

The defection of SLA-MM commanders came to a head around 22
May 2006 when Suleiman Jamous, Minni Minawi's Humanitarian
Affairs Coordinator (HAC) for North Darfur, began to speak
out against Minawi and the DPA. Attempting to gain control
of the situation, it is alleged that Minawi used the
heavy-handed approach.

Minawi traveled to Birmasa (N 140 39' 14" E 0240 36" 06")
where he confronted Jamous. It is alleged that Jamous was
stripped naked and paraded around town while members of his
family were tortured. This did not have the terrifying
effect that it is believed Minawi was attempting to achieve.
Instead, the village turned on Minawi and together with units
from G-19 ran his forces out of the town. The situation
became ripe for exploitation of other rebel groups, and the
splits within SLA-MM became irreparable.

Introduction of New Groups

From 30 October to 5 November 2005, the SLA held their Annual
Congress in Haskanita, South Darfur. While the purpose of
the meeting was to congeal the vision and purpose of the SLA,
it served only to congeal the fractures within the SLA.
Abdul Wahid, the overall leader of SLA, refused to attend the
meeting when he discovered that Minawi had proposed a
referendum to choose a new leader. During the congress,
Minawi was elected as Secretary General, and the fracture
became permanent.

Out of this fracture, a new group was formed. The Group of
19 (G19) was a group of commanders and politicians with
support given by Dr. Sharif Harir. It was this group's
belief that the SLA had lost its vision and they were
committed to revitalizing the original vision and goals of
the SLM/A. Immediately following the Haskanita Congress, the
G19 was vocal, and not violent. Shortly thereafter, it was
not heard from until May of 2006 when it became involved with
the tensions in Birmasa, apparently taking advantage of the
situation with the goal of strengthening itself through
alliances with other rebel groups in the area.

A group that came into existence sometime before the signing
of the DPA is the Sudan Federal Democratic Alliance (SFDA).
There is little known about this group other than it had
relatively strong links with G19, and its leader was Mr.
Ahmed Ibrahim Diraig. It is assessed that the SFDA's
intention was to bring rebel groups in Darfur together in
order to strengthen their position for success against the
GOS. Mr. Diraig, the group's Chairman, is a former governor
of Darfur. For unknown reasons, the SFDA failed to bring the
rebel groups together.

When it was clear that Minni Minawi was out of Birmasa, the
JEM was invited into the fold and allied itself loosely with
the G19. After some political wrangling on whose political
objectives should be followed, the JEM left the fold.
Apparently, Dr. Khalil was not satisfied with the idea of
SFDA leadership of the coalition, and the alliance was
abandoned.

The National Redemption Front

Although the previous attempt at forming a coalition of rebel
groups opposed to the DPA failed, some were persistant. It
is unclear who the catalyst for negotiations was, or when
exactly the effort was undertaken. During the month of May
2006, meetings were held in Asmarra, Eritrea. During the
meetings, the new coalition of rebels was formed with the

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name of National Redemption Front. Abdul Wahid was invited
into the negotiations, but declined membership, stating that
he could not align with the group because of JEM's
involvement. A new group was formed, and on 30 June 2006,
the Founding Declaration (Encl. 3) was published on the
Internet. Four political and military leaders from the JEM,
SLM/A, and SFDA signed the document. It was made clear in
the heading, however, that Abdul Wahid was not a signatory to
the declaration. The leaders that signed the agreement were:


1. Mr. Ahmed Ibrahim Diraig - Diraig is the former Governor
of Darfur and Chairman of Sudanese Federal Democratic
Alliance. He is a Fur by ethnicity, and one of the founding
members of National Redemption Front.


2. Dr. Khalil Ibrahim Mohammed - Dr. Mohamed was leader of a
Peoples Defense Forces unit and took part in all its
operations in Equatoria and Jebal Alnuba during the civil
war. He served as the Minister of Health in Darfur until
1998 when he went to Holland to study for a year. While in
Holland he met Dr. Sharif Harir. He founded the Justice and
Equality Movement, which was considered the military wing for
the People Congress Party. He is a founding member of the
National Redemption Front.


3. Mr. Khamis Abdalla Abakr - Abakr is the former Vice
Chairperson/President of SLM/A. He is Massalit by ethnicity,
and now believed to be the deputy of G19. He is a founding
member of National Redemption Front.


4. Dr. Sharif Harir - Harir is the Vice Chairman of Sudan
Federal Democratic Alliance-Darfur and former professor of
Anthropology in University of Khartoum, and Bergen
University-Norway. Former top peace talks negotiator for
SLM/A. He is Zaghawa by ethnicity, and one of the founding
members of National Redemption Front.

The NRF Takes Action

On 3 July 2006, NRF Forces mostly made up of JEM fighters and
with a significant presence of Ali Shogar a former SLA
Commander, attack the town of Hamrat El Sheik. During the
attack, buildings housing the Sudan telecom, Sudatel, and a
National Security Office were destroyed in addition to a
police station. The Government of Sudan reacted promptly
using its air arrests. The NRF have reported left the towns
to an unknown locations

Assessment

NRF

The NRF is probably attempting to establish itself as a
legitimate force not only in Darfur, but also throughout
Sudan. Attacking GOS positions outside of Darfur was
probably a calculated risk that seems to have paid off. The
attack got international press. The NRF has communicated to
its enemies that it has both the will and the ability to
attack Government Forces along a wide range at will.

The main goal of the NRF is to join the rebel forces of
Darfur and across Sudan. Since the signing of the DPA, the
rebel groups in Darfur have been dividing and weakening. The
NRF is the first group that has been able to congeal support
for a common cause. Given that Dafurians are generally
disappointed with the parties who represented them at the
Abuja Talks and disillusioned by the inability of the DPA to
transcend into tangible peace on the ground, the NRF seems a
likely candidate for the furtherance of the rebel cause. This
new alliance is likely to attract followers as long as it
plays its political cards well.

The military strength of NRF is unknown. What is know, is
that there is military strength, as demonstrated by the
attack on Hamrat EI Sheik. Because Dr. Khalil is a founding
member of the group, it is assumed that a large portion of
the JEM has signed on with the NRF, which would give them
relatively decent military capabilities.

Additionally, it has been discovered that some 39 vehicles
with heavy machine guns has been provided to the G19, a group
with apparently strong ties with the NRF. It is suspected
that these vehicles were provided by a Chadian source, but
confirmation is yet to be obtained. There is potential for
this group to expand its military component through
recruitment and pressure on leaders of other rebel groups in
Darfur.

NRF Most Likely Course of Action

The NRF will continue to recruit members and pressure Abdul
Wahid to join their ranks. Militarily, they will probably

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conduct small raids on unsuspecting villages in order to
maintain media and international attention. A destruction
raid on a large garrison could be on the horizon.

NRF Most Dangerous Course of Action

If the NRF is able to bring Abdul Wahid into the alliance,
they will have gained sufficient military power to challenge
Minni Minawi and the GOS, thus crippling the DPA.
Additionally, if the NRF targeted Minni Minawi for
assassination, it could disintegrate the DPA with a single
blow.

GOS

The GOS is now in the uncomfortable position of dealing with
anew group with in ties to other theaters, particularly JEM
East along the Ethiopian border, and very influential
leaders. The GOS military response to the attack on Hamrat
EI Sheik was standard, and it's unclear what they intend to
do about the new alliance of opposition. It is clear,
however, that the DPA, which the GOS has cited numerous times
in order to keep the UN out of Darfur, is on very shaky
ground. The treaty with Minawi still stands, but with the
added pressure of this new group placed on SLA-MM, it is
possible for the treaty to fall apart.

GOS Most Likely Course of Action

The GOS is likely to continue operations and empty efforts to
implement the DPA. Also, its current strategy to divide and
conquer the rebel groups through the fostering of dissention
within the rebel groups will continue. The emergence of the
NRF is an unwelcome event, and the GOS is hoping it will not
take hold.

GOS Most Dangerous Course of Action

The most dangerous thing the GOS could do is to seek
vengeance on the NRF and call on the Janjaweed for
assistance. This would mean a replay of the 2002/2003 crisis
and mass killings.

SLA-MM

Currently, Minni Minawi is attempting to gain control of his
area. As was expected, Minawi has attempted to keep his
commanders close and prevent dissention. This has failed to
some degree because Minawi attempts to lead through fear, not
ideas and mutual respect.

Minawi is also attempting to gain control of the village of
Korma, a small town located along an important MSR (Main
Supply Route). Because of this, we have seen clashes between
SLA-MM and SLA-AW in the Tawilla-Korma area of AMIS Sector 1.
In addition to gaining control ofthe supply route, Minawi is
attempting to force SLA-AW forces into submission to the DPA.
In much the same way he has attempted to rein his commanders
in with fear, he is attempting to absorb SLA-AW through force.

SLA-MM Most Likely Course of Action

Minawi will most likely continue with his current military
campaign along the border of AMIS Sectors 1 & 4.

SLA-MM Most Dangerous Course of Action

The most dangerous thing Minawi could do at this point would
be to become careless and loose a major battle with SLA-AW.
Even more concerning, however, is if
Minawi becomes careless and is assassinated. In either of
these events, the DPA, which is generally useless right now,
will collapse completely.

SLA-AW

Abdul Wahid has not signed on with the NRF yet. It is
unknown whether or not he will sign, but it is clear that the
NRF has attempted to bring him into the alliance and is
continuing pressure. SLA-AW is currently fighting for
existence against SLA-MM in the border area of AMIS Sectors 1
& 4. If they loose their MSR through Korma, they will have
great difficulty getting re-supplied, and their cause will be
lost.

SLA-AW Most Likely Course of Action

SLA-AW will most likely continue on its current path of
fighting off SLA-MM, considered a government surrogate.
SLA-AW will most likely loose control of the Korma area for
good, and their MSR will be cut off. If Wahid refuses to
sign on with the NRF, it is likely that large portions of his

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commanders will.

SLA-AW Most Dangerous Course of Action

Abdul Wahid's most dangerous course of action would be to
join forces with the NRF immediately. Through this action,
the NRF will have the military and political strength to
marginalize Minni Minawi and his forces. In this event, it
is likely that many A-MM commanders will defect to the NRF,
and the DPA will disintegrate.

(End text)
HUME