Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06KHARTOUM1650
2006-07-12 15:59:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Khartoum
Cable title:  

SOUTHERN SUDAN: APPROXIMATE TROOP STRENGTH AND

Tags:  MCAP PREL SU 
pdf how-to read a cable
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P 121559Z JUL 06
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3674
INFO RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC 0108
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J2/J5-EUR//
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 0189
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL//CCJ2-JCH/HSE//
C O N F I D E N T I A L KHARTOUM 001650 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/11/2016
TAGS: MCAP PREL SU
SUBJECT: SOUTHERN SUDAN: APPROXIMATE TROOP STRENGTH AND
EQUIPMENT INVENTORY OF SUDAN PEOPLE,S LIBERATION ARMY

Classified By: CGJ R. Whitehead, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L KHARTOUM 001650

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/11/2016
TAGS: MCAP PREL SU
SUBJECT: SOUTHERN SUDAN: APPROXIMATE TROOP STRENGTH AND
EQUIPMENT INVENTORY OF SUDAN PEOPLE,S LIBERATION ARMY

Classified By: CGJ R. Whitehead, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: We have obtained from a contractor (strictly
protect) involved in the Sudan People,s Liberation Army
Transformation (SPLAT) Project the troop strength and heavy
weapons inventory of the SPLA. As long suspected, SPLA
numbers are far below those previously claimed by senior SPLM
officials. The new numbers should provide a more rational
approach to downsizing the SPLA and designing an appropriate
DDR plan. The number of armed civilians that supported the
SPLA during the conflict and still consider themselves to be
members of the SPLA remains a more elusive figure. End
summary.

--------------
SPLA Troop Strength
--------------


2. (C) The document we have obtained breaks down the number
of officers and other ranks by location. The following table
indicates current numbers under arms that the SPLA considers
a part of its forces.

Officers Other Ranks

General Headquarters 915 1,934

SPLA Air Force 196 420

SPLA Nile Patrol 66 600

Infantry Division (GHQ reserve)1,130 12,488

Mechanized Infantry Brigade 135 2,110

Airborne 294 3,354

SPLA JIU Forces 1,484 18,395

(Training Units)

NCO Infantry School 60 200

Unified Training Center 64 400

Institute for Strategic Studies 155 175

Military College 65 360

Infantry Institute 35 360

Total 4,599 40,796

Grand Total 45,395

Troop numbers are broken down by the following directorates:
inspectorate, research, political and moral orientation,
procurement, logistics, intelligence, external relations,
operations, military justice, war heroes, military
production, finance, officers, affairs, training,
organization, and administration. Embassy Khartoum will send
these figures to SPG.

--------------
SPLA Weapons Inventory
--------------


3. (C) We have also obtained a chart of heavy weapons in the
SPLA inventory, as follows.

Main Battle Tank -- 51

APC/IFV -- 6

Field Guns -- 6

Howitzers -- 36

Mortars -- 468

RR/RPG -- 184

Missiles -- 6

AA Guns (towed) -- 0

AA Guns (SP) -- 262

HM SAM -- 3

There was no inventory for pistols, machine pistols, rifles,
light and heavy machineguns, or MANPAD SAMs. The weapons
inventory is broken down between the five military fronts and
the General Headquarters Unit. These figures will be
transmitted to SPG.

--------------
Analysis
--------------


4. (C) There are still questions about effective SPLA troop
strength that require answers. GoSS Minister of Police and
Security Awet recently told CG that the SPLA had transferred
18,000 troops to Awet,s ministry for training as policemen,
prison guards, and game wardens. We assume that the global
figure above does not include these forces. In addition,
there are certainly large numbers of armed civilians who
fought in militia support of the SPLA during various periods
of the conflict and who still consider themselves to be
&military8 whether or not the SPLA has officially counted
them among SPLA ranks.


5. (C) In the past, both during and after the Naivasha
negotiations, various SPLA/SPLM leaders have bandied about
troop figures ranging from 200,000-320,000, numbers that were
always in serious doubt. The current number ) if accurate
sounds more reasonable and is a good starting place for
transforming the SPLA into an effective professional force
large and capable enough to assure Southern Sudan,s
legitimate defense interests. The large number of armed
civilians who may or may not consider themselves to be
soldiers in the SPLA remains problematic; however, this
phenomenon is more of a DDR than a SPLAT issue.


6. (C) The number of fighters claimed by other armed groups
(OAGs) and tribal militias is probably inflated as well.
Claims that now-SPLA Chief of Staff Paolino Matiep brought
40,000 SSDF troops with him into the SPLA are certainly not
credible. We suspect that force numbers claimed by other
armed groups are equally unreliable.

HUME