SITUATION IN SUDAN DURING REAR ADMIRAL HUNT VISIT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001633

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/10/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM KPKO MOPS SU AU UN
SUBJECT: SITUATION IN SUDAN DURING REAR ADMIRAL HUNT VISIT

Classified By: CDA Cameron Hume, Reason: Section 1.4 (b ) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: CJTF-HOA Commander, Rear Admiral Richard
Hunt, visited Khartoum and El Fasher, Sudan, from 9-10 July

2006. During the visit, Charge d'Affaires Cameron Hume and
Admiral Hunt met with UNMIS Force Commander Lieutenant
General Jasbir Lidder and discussed the deteriorating
situation in Darfur and the support Joint Integrated Units
(JIUs) need in Southern Sudan. CDA Hume and Admiral Hunt
also traveled to El Fasher, where they met with Acting Force
Commander Brigadier General F.M. Kamanzi and received a
briefing on AMIS operations. End Summary.

Meeting with UNMIS FC LTG Lidder
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2. (C) Darfur: LTG Lidder said the situation in Darfur was
taking a turn for the worse and could spiral out of control
in the next two months. Lidder was concerned about the
recent fighting in the Birmaza area (Vicinity of GEOCOORD:
144000N/0243000E.) The town is Minni Minawi,s home village.
He said the UN has received reports of fighting in the
village between SLA (Minawi) and SLA (Wahid),and that
Sudanese Armed Forces, (SAF) helicopters and Antonov
airplanes have been seen flying in the area of Birmaza.


3. (C) Lidder also expressed concern about what he sees as
AMIS favoritism towards SLA (M) and SAF because they are
signatories to the DPA. The UN believes this has led SLA (W)
and JEM to see AMIS as supporting SLA (M) and SAF. Lidder
said AMIS must remain neutral. He also complained that AMIS
had started resisting UNMIS help; although e gave no details.
He also called the GoS disarmament of the janjaweed a farce,
but again gave no details. To strengthen AMIS capabilities
and efficiencies, Lidder recommended giving night vision
goggles, thermal sights, and ground surveillance radars to
AMIS. He also recommended that AMIS receive staff training
of an unspecified nature. Furthermore, Lidder expressed
concern about the politicization of the IDPs along tribal
lines in support or non-support of the DPA.


4. (C) Southern Sudan: Lidder said there had been no major
violations of the CPA except in Abyei. He gave no further
details. (Note: The incident, in February 2006, involved a
night ambush on SPLM-associated Southern militia by
SAF-affiliated Southern militias, and is not regarded
universally by the international community to have
constituted a CPA violation, as neither party is a CPA
signatory. End note.) He also stated the Joint Integrated
Units (JIUs) exist in name only. The former warring parties
are suspicious of each other in the integrated units. The
units need accommodations, equipment, and training. The UN
wants a formal request for the support needed. He also said
the indiscipline of the SPLA was a problem. The redeployment
of SPLA forces from Kassala southward had been completed, and
UNMIS forces in the area had started redeploying southward
following the SPLA withdrawal, as they no longer had a
mandate to stay in the area. UNMIS was also repositioning
some of its forces into areas where they anticipated LRA
attacks might occur in the future. He praised the GoSS, and
Government of Uganda,s efforts to end the fighting with the
LRA.

AMIS Meetings in El Fasher
--------------


5. (C) Operations Brief: During an operations briefing, AMIS
told CDA Hume and Admiral Hunt that AMIS only had about 30
percent of the forces it needs to conduct operations in
support of the DPA and its still unapproved new CONOPs. The
DPA gave AMIS more tasks than under its previous mandate; to
be able to support the DPA, AMIS needs more troops. Under
their new CONOPs, AMIS wants to establish buffer zones around
IDP camps and along the main north-south road from El Fasher
toward Nyala, and along the main east-west road from El
Fasher towards El Geneina. AMIS said it had a lack of
tactical and long-range communications equipment. It should
be noted AMIS did not mention any reports of recent fighting
in Darfur. When CDA Hume asked about recent reports of
fighting in the Birmaza area, Acting Force Commander
Brigadier Kamanzi did not answer the question.


6. (C) Meeting with Acting AMIS Force Commander: Acting
Force Commander Brigadier General Kamanzi told CDA Hume and
Admiral Hunt that AMIS needed medical supplies. Kamanzi
never mentioned the recent fighting. Hunt asked Kamanzi if
AMIS had seen any radicalization of the Muslim population,
and Kamanzi responded no.


7. (C) Comment: Embassy officials talked to other UNMIS and
AMIS officials about the situation in Birmaza and pieced
together the following account. Reportedly the SLA (Minni)

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Commander in the village started bad-mouthing the DPA. Minni
came back to the village and tortured the commander. We have
no way to verify the torture claim. The village elders then
forced Minni to leave. The villagers decided to join the
G-19 faction. Minni,s force started an offensive operation
to regain the town on 05 July. As of 10 July, SLA (M) has
been unable to retake the town.) The UN does not believe the
SAF and SLA (M) are conducting joint operations, but they are
concerned that since Minni,s forces have been unable to
re-take the village, the SAF may support a future attack with
aviation assets. The UN fears this could then lead to
further military cooperation between SLA (M) and SAF. UNMIS
believes since AMIS has issued SLA (M) and SAF members of the
Ceasefire Commission vehicles, identification cards, and AU
armbands, the DPA non-signatories view AMIS as favoring SLA
(M) and the SAF.
HUME