Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06KHARTOUM1632
2006-07-11 17:12:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Khartoum
Cable title:  

AMIS INACTIVITY AND THE SECURITY CRISIS IN DARFUR

Tags:  PREL KPKO PGOV MOPS AU UN US SU 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO5686
OO RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1632/01 1921712
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 111712Z JUL 06
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3641
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001632 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/10/2016
TAGS: PREL KPKO PGOV MOPS AU UN US SU
SUBJECT: AMIS INACTIVITY AND THE SECURITY CRISIS IN DARFUR


Classified By: CDA Cameron Hume, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001632

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/10/2016
TAGS: PREL KPKO PGOV MOPS AU UN US SU
SUBJECT: AMIS INACTIVITY AND THE SECURITY CRISIS IN DARFUR


Classified By: CDA Cameron Hume, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: A security crisis is approaching in Darfur,
and the AU peacekeepers are not taking charge of the
situation. A wide variety of reporters -- civilian
contractors, BBC journalists, INGO workers, and others --
have been filing unconfirmed reports of clashes between
SLA/Minawi forces (supported by Sudanese Armed Forces) and
JEM and SLA dissident forces for control of Birmaza in North
Darfur over the past week. AMIS, which is either not
patrolling in the area or not reporting on events, has been
silent. This message proposes a number of steps needed to
activate AMIS and to bring some equilibrium to the security
situation in Darfur. See para 5. End Summary.


2. (C) Background: A variety of reporting, although
conflicting on details, confirms that fighting is taking
place in two areas of Darfur. In Birmaza, the G-19 (members
of the SLA, including Suleiman Jamous, Khamis Abdullah, and
Sharif Harir, who broke away from both Minni Minawi and Abdel
Wahid over six months ago) and JEM elements have clashed with
Minawi,s forces for control of the town over the past two
months. Most reports suggested that the initial attack was
launched by the G-19 and that Minawi now has some support
from the Sudanese Armed Forces in the area. In Tawila,
Minawi and Abdel Wahid forces have been clashing along the
north/south road that runs from El Fasher to Nyala and
separates Abdel Wahid,s area of control to the west of the
road from the Minawi-controlled area to the east. Although
fighting in both areas has been sporadic, no end to it is in
sight.


3. (C) AMIS Inactivity: AMIS has been inactive. It is not
activity patrolling in either area or submitting reports to
the ceasefire commission. In fact, due to a procedural
wrangle, the ceasefire commission has not met once this
month; in late June a meeting of the Joint Commission
adjourned without solving the procedural question of how to

deal with "parties" who did not sign the DPA. On the ground
AMIS is becoming increasingly passive, withdrawing from some
areas (e.g., Kalma IDP Camp),staying in its fixed positions
except during daylight hours, or postponing patrolling to
areas of conflict. Given the interest that spoilers
(including the JEM, the G-19, and Abdel Wahid) have in
derailing the Darfur Peace Agreement, they are testing the
new ceasefire mechanisms, and those mechanisms are failing.


4. (C) UN Sniping: Although the UN &supports8 the DPA, the
UN has adopted a neutral stance toward the fighting. SRSG
Pronk muddied the waters further in the criticism he posted
on his &personal8 webblog. Some UN personnel have taken
the position that, because JEM, the G-19, and Abdel Wahid did
not sign the DPA, they are not bound by its ceasefire
provisions and therefore not in violation even when
initiating fighting.


5. (C) The next ten weeks: If the AMIS operation ends by the
end of September, as planned, AMIS peacekeepers have only ten
weeks from the July 18 pledging conference in Brussels to
make a difference. Here are eight steps that AMIS can take
in this period that will each make a material difference in
the situation. Embassy Khartoum urges the Department to
consider using the period between now and the July 18
pledging conference to develop consensus among donors to
support these steps:

-- Get AMIS to begin 24/7 patrolling in key strategic areas,
to include the perimeter of the largest IDP camps (e.g.,
Kalma and Abu Shouk) and the key roads (e.g., the north/south
road between El Fasher and Nyala);

-- Have the AU resolve the procedural issue that has
prevented the functioning of the Ceasefire Commission and the
Joint Commission. (Note: One possible solution would be to
have all parties participate in the &information phase8 of
the work, with only adherents participating in the &decision
phase,8 but almost any solution is better to no solution.
End note);

-- Secure a clear statement from the AU, supported by the
international partners, that new adherents to the DPA should
be included as partners in implementation, including for
nomination to government positions, involvement in
development work, and participation in the Darfur-Darfur
Dialogue and Consultation process);

-- Complete the task of map preparation and verification.
The AU has responsibility for this work, but partners,
including the USG, have not yet provided the staff promised
to work on this project. This work is crucial for stopping
turf battles, such as those taking place in Birmaza and near
Tawila;

KHARTOUM 00001632 002 OF 002



-- Organize community policing in the IDP camps. AMIS and
eventually the UN would have the lead; success here would not
only improve security, but strengthen the links between the
peacekeepers and the population;

-- Launch a coordinated information campaign to explain and
support the DPA. AMIS has so far been silent; the UN has
been confused; the U.S. and UK are mobilizing their
resources; but, JEM and Abdel Wahid have flooded the IDP
camps with their critical messages. Minawi has held public
meetings, but similar efforts by the Government of Sudan are
probably counter-productive;

-- Begin the work of the Joint Humanitarian Monitoring Unit
called for in the DPA. Although the work of this unit would
duplicate the work of the UN, the AU and UN should be able to
work in tandem so that the peacekeepers' work in the security
area gives better support to work of humanitarian agencies;
and

-- Name the Chairman of the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and
Consultation. The DPA charged the AU with naming an eminent
African to lead the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation.
The failure to do prevents consultation with parties on the
ground. Cooperation with the UN would be needed to make sure
adequate institutional resources are available.
HUME