STILL A CHANCE TO NEGOTIATE ON PEACEKEEPING IN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001562

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR D, AF A/S FRAZER, AND AF/SPG
NSC FOR COURVILLE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/03/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM KPKO UN AU SU
SUBJECT: STILL A CHANCE TO NEGOTIATE ON PEACEKEEPING IN
DARFUR, SAYS MAGZOUB AL-KHALIFA


Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES CAMERON HUME; REASON: 1.4 (B) AND (D)


1. (C) SUMMARY: There is still a chance for negotiations
with the UN on peacekeeping in Darfur, Presidential Advisor
Magzoub al-Khalifa told CDA Hume on July 3, though the
objective should be peace, not the deployment of UN
peackeepers. Conditions on the ground had improved since the
signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA),but
implementation should not be rushed, he advised. The
Government was working to create a partnership with Minni
Minawi and other DPA supporters, and was making efforts to
bring Abdulwahid Nur into the peace process. But the UN
Security Council had not handled peacekeeping talks in a
"proper manner." The best option now was an "AU plus" force,
with the UN providing logistical, financial, and other
administrative help, Magzoub suggested. Hume countered that
the AU's deficiencies were more fundamental, and that this
peacekeeping issue was bound to have a strong impact on
Sudan's relations with the United States. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) Conditions across North and South Darfur had improved
since the singing of the DPA, Magzoub told Hume. All rebel
commanders in South Darfur, including those from the SLA
(Abdulwahid) and the JEM, supported the agreement, and many
of the tribal chiefs in West Darfur had joined, too. But the
Chad-Sudan border was still a problem, especially in West
Darfur. In North Darfur, Chadian militiamen continued to
attack Minawi's forces, though some Zagahwa fighters had
defected to join Minawi. The situation in the IDP camps had
also calmed down. Only three out of the eleven major camps,
including Kalma and Abu Shouk, still faced problems. Magzoub
cautioned about implementing the agreement too fast, noting
that the Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs was still not ready
for IDPs to return home. "There needs to be water,
protection, and basic services in place," he said, predicting
that no movements would begin before the end of September.


3. (C) The Government was reaching out to the rebels,
including those who had not signed the DPA. "I speak to
Minni Minawi every other day," Magzoub said. The Government
is working with Minawi to bring his group into the
Government, and Magzoub expects Minawi to come to Khartoum
within the next three or four days. Minawi may soon be named
Assistant to the President, Magzoub hinted. In addition,
Magzoub had recently met with leaders of other SLA and JEM
groups who supported the DPA, in an effort to bring them into
the Government of National Unity (GNU).


4. (C) A group of Fur tribal leaders had even approached
Magzoub several days ago to ask him to support their visit to
Asmara, to visit Abdulwahid Nur. "They said Abdulwahid just
needed an explanation of what was in the DPA for him," he
recounted, repeating his offer of a national fund to provide
food and supplies for Darfur IDPs. But Magzoub suspected
Abdulwahid's real interest was not money, but power.
"Abdulwahid told Minni that if Minni let him become the
Assistant to the President, he'd sign the agreement," Magzoub
reported. Magzoub had also met recently with Abdulrahman
Dousa -- leader of the "Group of 19" that left Adulwahid's
faction to support the DPA. (In a separate meeting with the
Charge, Dousa confided that Magzoub had asked what positions
the SLA might want within the GNU. Dousa told Hume he plans
to hold a conference in Nyala to discuss the future of the
SLA).


5. (C) Hume outlined U.S. efforts to support Minawi, and
added that the United States was also supporting Fur efforts
to bring Abdulwahid into the peace process. But there should
be no changes to the text of the DPA, Hume emphasized, much
to Magzoub's agreement. The key issue now was not internal,
but external. Sudan had asked the United States to help it
reach an agreement with the rebels because the AU could not
deliver. But the AU could not deliver on implementation,
either. The UN Security Council was currently writing a
draft resolution for peacekeeping in Darfur and the United
States had provided a moderate draft.


6. (C) Magzoub replied that Sudan appreciated the United
States' help, including the efforts of the Deputy Secretary
and Assistant Secretary Frazer. However, the UN Security
Council had not handled the peacekeeping issue in a "proper
manner." The UNSC had passed a resolution on May 15, and
then rushed to begin negotiations with the Government.
Instead, they should have had negotiations with the
Government first "in a calm manner," and then made a
decision. The issue now was to strengthen the current AU
mission, "with the support of the UN." Even the SPLM's

KHARTOUM 00001562 002 OF 002


support for a UN deployment did not carry weight with
stakeholders in the North. Magzoub admitted that the AU's
problems were not limited to logistics -- they also needed
help with administration and finances -- but rejected any
move that undermined Sudan's sovereignty, or created the
impression that Africa was still a "colony." There was still
a chance for political negotiations between Sudan and the UN,
but the objective should be peace, not the deployment of UN
peackeepers. "We need the AU plus the UN," he emphasized.


7. (C) Hume countered that the AU's problems were not only
logistical or administrative, and warned that donors might
not support the AU without a transition to the UN. Moreover,
Hume pointed out, many people in Darfur simply did not trust
the AU. Magzoub replied that the UN also had many problems,
and that simply changing the color of the AU's hats from
green to blue would not solve the AU's problems. Still,
Magzoub believed that if the UN and Sudan continued a
"political dialogue," they could reach an agreement. The
conflict between Chad and Sudan should also be included in
any discussions with the UN, Magzoub added, noting that this
issue "should be left to the AU or Tripoli."


8. (C) The next two to three weeks would be difficult for the
bilateral relationship, Hume predicted. Annan would soon
report to the UNSC and the Donors Consortium would meet on
July 18 in Brussels. Peacekeeping in Darfur was now a major
issue in the broader relationship. Magzoub noted that
improving relations with the United States was in Sudan's
national -- and cultural -- interests. He said Sudan should
use instruments like the DPA and the CPA to send a positive
message. More dialogue was needed to address differences
over such issues as any UN role in Darfur.


9. (C) COMMENT: Magzoub held to Bashir's line that the AU,
not the UN, had to be in charge of peacekeeping, but he
acknowledged serious AU capacity problems. MFA
Under-secretary Mutriff Saddiq has said the same. Both
suggest, however, that it will be up to someone else to break
the impasse. END COMMENT.
HUME