Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06KHARTOUM1539
2006-06-29 10:35:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Khartoum
Cable title:  

ABDULWAHID NUR MAY BE READY TO SIGN DARFUR PEACE

Tags:  PGOV PREL KPKO SU AU UN 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO4510
OO RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1539/01 1801035
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 291035Z JUN 06
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3483
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001539 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR D, AF A/S FRAZER, AND AF/SPG
ASMARA FOR FRENCH
NSC FOR COURVILLE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/29/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO SU AU UN
SUBJECT: ABDULWAHID NUR MAY BE READY TO SIGN DARFUR PEACE
AGREEMENT

REF: KHARTOUM 1439

Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES CAMERON HUME; REASON: 1.4 (B) AND (D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001539

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR D, AF A/S FRAZER, AND AF/SPG
ASMARA FOR FRENCH
NSC FOR COURVILLE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/29/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO SU AU UN
SUBJECT: ABDULWAHID NUR MAY BE READY TO SIGN DARFUR PEACE
AGREEMENT

REF: KHARTOUM 1439

Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES CAMERON HUME; REASON: 1.4 (B) AND (D)


1. (C) Summary: SLA/M leader Abdulwahid Nur may be ready to
sign the Darfur Peace Agreement, his father-in-law,
Abdulgassem Seif al-Din, told CDA Hume on June 29.
Abdulwahid ha7
Q:"Tr U.S. support in flying to Asmara to meet Abdulwahid
as early as July 1; Post is working with USAID/OTI to make
arrangements. Abdulgassem also encouraged A/S Frazer to call
Abdulwahid as soon as possible. End Summary.

Abdulwahid Agrees to "Modality of Implementation" Proposals
-------------- --------------


2. (C) Abdulgassem Seif al-Din, father-in-law of SLA/M leader
Abdulwahid al-Nur, called PolOff late on June 28 and
requested to meet as soon as possible. At a meeting on the
morning of June 29, Abulgassem told PolOff that he and other
Fur tribal leaders had been deeply impressed by President
Bush's letter to Abdulwahid, as outlined by CDA Hume at their
last meeting (reftel). He had later spoken to Abdulwahid,
who said he had written his own letters to the President, the
UN, and the AU; however, Abdulwahid had yet to receive a
response. (Note: Post is not aware of any letters from
Abdulwahid to the President, the UN, or the AU).


3. (C) Abdulgassem urged Abdulwahid to use the five proposals
in the Fur leaders' "Vision for Implementation of Modality to
Address Deficiencies in the Darfur Peace Agreement" (MI) as
way to reconcile himself with the DPA. The proposals include
the following (the full text of the MI will be faxed to
AF/SPG):

-- A Government-subsidized compensation fund of at least USD
150 million to provide for the "immediate basic needs" of
IDPs, supplemented by funds from the international community.
This fund "does not in any way represent 'diya,' or blood
money."

-- Disarmament and demobilization of the janjaweed, with the
engagement of senior SLA/M liaison officers to verify and
confirm the process. The Government should also be
represented on the DPA Joint Commission.

-- Equal power-sharing during the transitional period, with
50 percent of government positions in Darfur to the NCP and
50 percent to the armed movements.

-- The Darfur-Darfur Dialogue should take place in an
appropriate place with a neutral secretariat including
African and non-African figures. Key decisions about the
conference should be made by an impartial international body,
not by the Government, and the AU must endorse the
conference's recommendations.

-- Deployment of a UN peacekeeping force with a full mandate
to protect civilians.

But Drops UN Peackeepers as Precondition for Agremeent
-------------- --------------


4. (C) Abdulgassem had also spoken to Government officials
about the MI proposals, particularly the deployment of
peacekeepers. He believed the Government would be more
likely to accept the MI without the proposal on UN
peackeepers. After discussing the matter with Abdulwahid on
the phone, Abdulwahid had agreed to drop this proposal from
the MI, recognizing that the deployment of peacekeepers was
an issue for the international community to decide, not the
SLA/M. Abdulwahid still supports a UN deployment, but this
is no longer a precondition for his signature of the DPA.


5. (C) Abdulgassem believed that Abdulwahid was now "willing
to come and sign the agreement" based on the proposals in the
MI. He asked PolOff for U.S. support to fly to Asmara with
other Darfuri leaders to meet with Abdulwahid, and finalize
his agreement. PolOff immediately took Abdulgassem to see
CDA Hume, and contacted USAID/OTI to arrange for funding.

Encourages A/S Frazer to Call Abdulwahid
--------------


KHARTOUM 00001539 002 OF 002



6. (C) Abdulgassem repeated his account of his conversations
with Abdulwahid, and the Charge thanked him for his efforts.
Hume added that A/S Frazer would be interested in talking to
Abdulwahid, and asked when might be a good time to call.
Abdulgassem replied that he thought a call from Frazer would
be very helpful, and encouraged her to call as soon as
possible, even before Abdulgassem's visit to Asmara. (Note:
Abulgassem provided two numbers for Abdulwahid: 291 1 711
20272 and 882 162 134 4296).


7. (C) Abdulgassem hopes to depart for Asmara as early as
Saturday, July 1. He plans to take with him two other Fur
representatives, including Abdulwahid's best friend, plus a
third non-Fur representative, possibly from an Arab tribe.
Post is working with USAID/OTI on flights and will report
progress septel.
HUME