DARFUR DPA SUPPORT TEAM FIRST IMPRESSIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001538

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR D, AF/SPG, AND S/CRS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/29/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV KPKO SOCI US UN AU SU
SUBJECT: DARFUR DPA SUPPORT TEAM FIRST IMPRESSIONS

REF: KHARTOUM 1490

Classified By: DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION ANDREW STEINFELD; REASON: 1.4 (B
) AND (D)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Initial impressions from an orientation tour
for the DPA Support Team to El Fasher confirmed the DPA
implementation faces many challenges. There is no visible
sign of DPA implementation taking place on the ground. The
most significant contributing factors are a lack of AMIS
capacity and political will and a non-proactive GNU. The
local population's view towards the DPA is that it is either
an incomplete solution, or simply un-implementable unless all
the parties sign. Meanwhile, security has improved over the
past few weeks, though continued divisions of both the SLA
factions bode poorly for continued improvement. Actions to
turn this situation around are needed, started as early as
the July 1-2 AU Summit in Banjul. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) Embassy and S/CRS TDY officers completed an
orientation tour in El Fasher June 25-27 in order to lay the
groundwork for the DPA Implementation Support Team presence
over the next three months. The group met with AMIS Acting
Force Commander BG FM Kamanzi and his political officer
Elizabeth Mgaya, UN Field Security Coordination Officer
William Harrison and UNMIS civil affairs officer Amin
Balchsh, GNU and SPLM representatives, HOA Officer MAJ Robert
Williams, the SLM Secretary General, and representatives of
NGOs active in IDP camps.

NO VISIBLE SIGN OF DPA IMPLEMENTATION
--------------


3. (C) Briefings with AMIS and the UN, and personal
observations, revealed no signs of either local attempts at
DPA implementation, or GNU activities or guidance coming from
Khartoum. None of the DPA commissions have been started, nor
has there been any attempt to organize support for the
Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation (DDDC) process.
Beyond printing Arabic copies of the DPA and distributing
them to those that inquire, neither AMIS nor the government
has started or planned a DPA information dissemination
campaign (though all sides recognize the need). On the
security side, a GNU disarmament plan for the Janjaweed has
yet to be presented to the AU (although we have been told
that one is prepared),nor is there any AMIS planning or open
discussion of a verification process.


4. (C) Per discussions with BG Kamanzi, Harrison, and MAJ
Williams, AMIS' inaction is based on a lack of political
direction, lack of resources, and poor military leadership at
the top. The delay on a decision on the status of the
parties that have not signed the DPA has hamstrung AMIS
implementation, especially since the current AMIS ConOps is
based on full participation of all parties and cannot be
implemented without revision. Furthermore, any AMIS
implementation will require a significant increase in
resources that are not forthcoming. Even if they were, there
is a general impression that a lack of competence and risk
acceptance would still prevent AMIS from carrying out its
mission. DPA implementation requires flexible command with
initiative and decision making pushed as low as possible.
However, AMIS' command climate discourages initiative and
constrains decision making to the top. Even Acting Force
Commander Kamanzi was seemingly in the dark about issues that
had reportedly been discussed with Commander MG Ihekire,
currently on leave.

IDP VIEWS ON DPA TWO-SIDED, NEITHER FULLY APPROVE
-------------- --------------


5. (SBU) A meeting with fifteen omdas and sheikhs
representing the el-Salaam IDP camp offered a snapshot view
of IDP opinions towards the DPA (detailed septel). Among
those community leaders that had (albeit limited) knowledge
of the DPA's provisions, they either viewed the DPA as far
short of a complete solution, or that as basically a good
document, but nevertheless un-implementable until all parties
sign and therefore moot.


6. (SBU) The SLA-Wahid faction is reportedly threatening AMIS
and the IC not to discuss the DPA with IDPs in the areas
under its control. Meanwhile, the G-19 group (a group of
nineteen SLA-Minawi breakaway commanders) appears bent on
increasing its power base at the expense of the DPA. Minawi
continues to exercise tenuous control over his other
commanders, but may be weakened without signs of DPA
implementation. The JEM, while exerting influence, is not a
major obstruction -- yet.


KHARTOUM 00001538 002 OF 002


THREE WEEKS OF IMPROVED SECURITY
--------------


7. (C) The UN and AMIS agreed that the security situation
over the past three weeks was significantly calmer. However,
as the factions continue to splinter, it becomes increasingly
difficult for the UN to coordinate operations (receive
security assurances) with the parties around the region.
There have been no known clashes between SLA-Minawi and the
GNU. There have been some GNU action against SLA-Wahid and
limited Janjaweed raids. Inter-factional fighting is
localized and may not be authorized by senior leaders.
However, tensions along the Chad border in the NW and SW
continues. Also, UN Security Coordinator Harrison and local
contacts relayed multiple reports of foreign fighters from
Algeria, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia, entering Sudan over the
past three to four months from the south to travel to Darfur
to prepare for attacks on foreign peacekeepers. He mentioned
Kenya, Chad, and Libya as possible entry points, noting that
Sudan's borders were porous.

FOUR STRIKES AGAINST DPA PROGRESS
--------------


8. (C) COMMENT: There are four problems currently impeding
progress on DPA implementation:

-- Lack of AMIS capacity and political will;

-- Non-proactive GNU;

-- The unresolved issue of a UNPKO transition; and,

-- Lack of capacity to organize DPA participation by SLA-M
and splinter groups.


9. (C) COMMENT CONT: Capacity building efforts to address the
above problems are not likely to save the DPA by themselves.
The issues of non-signatories and transition to UNPKO need
resolution. We need to continue to press on implementation
of key DPA issues such as a plan for disarmament, nomination
for the Transitional Darfur Regional Authority (TDRA),and
movement on the DDDC. Finally, we should jumpstart the DPA
strategic communications campaign. While ground actions are
the best way to convey the right story, the international
community nevertheless has a significant capacity to
broadcast information using both civilian and military means.
END COMMENT.
HUME