Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06KHARTOUM1474
2006-06-22 15:44:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Khartoum
Cable title:
PRESIDENT BASHIR TELLS UN AND AU THAT NO TO UN PKO
how-toVZCZCXYZ0003 OO RUEHWEB DE RUEHKH #1474 1731544 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 221544Z JUN 06 FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3371 INFO RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA IMMEDIATE 0123 RUEHDJ/AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI IMMEDIATE 0027 RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0028 RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0051 RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 0004 RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0026 RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0058
C O N F I D E N T I A L KHARTOUM 001474
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR D, AND AF/SPG
ADDIS AND DJIBOUTI FOR A/S FRAZER
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/07/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNSC KPKO MOPS AU SU
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT BASHIR TELLS UN AND AU THAT NO TO UN PKO
IS "FINAL"
REF: A. KHARTOUM 1459
B. KHARTOUM 1458
Classified By: DCM Andrew Steinfeld for reasons 1.5 (B) and (D)
C O N F I D E N T I A L KHARTOUM 001474
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR D, AND AF/SPG
ADDIS AND DJIBOUTI FOR A/S FRAZER
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/07/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNSC KPKO MOPS AU SU
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT BASHIR TELLS UN AND AU THAT NO TO UN PKO
IS "FINAL"
REF: A. KHARTOUM 1459
B. KHARTOUM 1458
Classified By: DCM Andrew Steinfeld for reasons 1.5 (B) and (D)
1. (C) Immediately after UN Guehenno's and AU Djinnit's
carefully worded, but not entirely forthcoming, briefing to
30 or so diplomats afternoon of June 22 on the AU/UN
assessment mission, DCM pulled SRSG Pronk aside and asked him
what had actually transpired at the meeting among the AU, UN,
and President Bashir the previous evening (June 21).
2. (C) Pronk reported that Bashir's, and the government's,
position had hardened considerably (as reflected in Bashir's
public comments). Pronk said that Bashir could have said,
let's see how AMIS strengthening goes, and then we'll see.
He did not, said Pronk. He could have dwelled on Chapter 6
vs. 7; he did not, said Pronk. Rather, in polite, but firm
tones, Bashir, according to Pronk, repeated three times: We
have looked at possible UN peacekeeping, and we do not want
it in Darfur. The decision is final. Pronk emphasized the
Bashir used the word final three times.
3. (C) Bashir told his AU and UN interlocutors that the
decision had nothing to do with Sudan's view of the UN.
Rather, he pointed to the U.S. and other Western countries as
having other agendas in Sudan, that they would attempt to
carry out through a UN PKO in Darfur.
4. (C) All the meetings this time around were tough,
according to Pronk. In a separate meeting with FM Akol and
Interior minister Taha, Pronk reported that the latter was
simply insulting. He accused Guehenno of having written his
report in NYC, before ever arriving in Khartoum.
5. (C) In discussing next steps, Pronk indicated that the AU
as an institution was weak on this issue. Konare, he said,
continued to repeat that the U.S. was behind a move earlier
in the year to undermine AMIS, by having argued that funding
AMIS was difficult. Even Djinnit, he said, while a strong
voice on AMIS strengthening, never spoke directly about UN
transition to Sudanese interlocutors. Thus, further AU peace
and security council meetings, and the Banjul summit (at
which Kofi Annan's participation was confirmed),would be
unlikely to move Bashir.
6. (C) Pronk reported that there will be a UNSC meeting on
Sudan on Tuesday. He will urge Kofi Annan to consult further
not with the entire Council, but rather, with the P-5, who
have a real interest in peace and security in Africa.
Picking up a theme discussed between Charge Hume and Guehenno
the day before, Pronk agreed that working with the Chinese
would be critical. China matters to Sudan. And the Russians
will follow China on issues related to Sudan.
HUME
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR D, AND AF/SPG
ADDIS AND DJIBOUTI FOR A/S FRAZER
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/07/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNSC KPKO MOPS AU SU
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT BASHIR TELLS UN AND AU THAT NO TO UN PKO
IS "FINAL"
REF: A. KHARTOUM 1459
B. KHARTOUM 1458
Classified By: DCM Andrew Steinfeld for reasons 1.5 (B) and (D)
1. (C) Immediately after UN Guehenno's and AU Djinnit's
carefully worded, but not entirely forthcoming, briefing to
30 or so diplomats afternoon of June 22 on the AU/UN
assessment mission, DCM pulled SRSG Pronk aside and asked him
what had actually transpired at the meeting among the AU, UN,
and President Bashir the previous evening (June 21).
2. (C) Pronk reported that Bashir's, and the government's,
position had hardened considerably (as reflected in Bashir's
public comments). Pronk said that Bashir could have said,
let's see how AMIS strengthening goes, and then we'll see.
He did not, said Pronk. He could have dwelled on Chapter 6
vs. 7; he did not, said Pronk. Rather, in polite, but firm
tones, Bashir, according to Pronk, repeated three times: We
have looked at possible UN peacekeeping, and we do not want
it in Darfur. The decision is final. Pronk emphasized the
Bashir used the word final three times.
3. (C) Bashir told his AU and UN interlocutors that the
decision had nothing to do with Sudan's view of the UN.
Rather, he pointed to the U.S. and other Western countries as
having other agendas in Sudan, that they would attempt to
carry out through a UN PKO in Darfur.
4. (C) All the meetings this time around were tough,
according to Pronk. In a separate meeting with FM Akol and
Interior minister Taha, Pronk reported that the latter was
simply insulting. He accused Guehenno of having written his
report in NYC, before ever arriving in Khartoum.
5. (C) In discussing next steps, Pronk indicated that the AU
as an institution was weak on this issue. Konare, he said,
continued to repeat that the U.S. was behind a move earlier
in the year to undermine AMIS, by having argued that funding
AMIS was difficult. Even Djinnit, he said, while a strong
voice on AMIS strengthening, never spoke directly about UN
transition to Sudanese interlocutors. Thus, further AU peace
and security council meetings, and the Banjul summit (at
which Kofi Annan's participation was confirmed),would be
unlikely to move Bashir.
6. (C) Pronk reported that there will be a UNSC meeting on
Sudan on Tuesday. He will urge Kofi Annan to consult further
not with the entire Council, but rather, with the P-5, who
have a real interest in peace and security in Africa.
Picking up a theme discussed between Charge Hume and Guehenno
the day before, Pronk agreed that working with the Chinese
would be critical. China matters to Sudan. And the Russians
will follow China on issues related to Sudan.
HUME