UN PEACEKEEPING USYG GUEHENNO SEEES AU FALTERING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001459

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZIER AND AF/SPG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/21/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV KPKO MOPS UN SU AU
SUBJECT: UN PEACEKEEPING USYG GUEHENNO SEEES AU FALTERING
IN DARFUR

REF: KHARTOUM 1402

Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES CAMERON HUME; REASON: 1.4 (B) AND (D)


1. (C) Summary: UN USYG Guehenno told CDA Hume that, although
the situation in Darfur had improved in the wake of the
Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA),the AU mission was weak and
liable to falter. The U.S. should make sure that the
upcoming African summit backed transition to the UN in no
uncertain terms. His assessment mission with AU ASYG Djinnit
had gone well, but the Government of Sudan consistently took
the line that transition to UN forces was not needed or
wanted. Guehenno said the UN needed an improved approach to
policing and a strong role in the Darfur/Darfur dialogue.
The key to overcoming any Sudanese opposition, Guehenno
suggested, could be renewed U.S./Chinese cooperation. End
summary.


2. (C) On June 21 CDA Hume at his request met with UN Under
Secretary-General Guehenno to discuss Darfur. Hume reported

SIPDIS
on his own recent trip to the area. The security situation
had improved significantly in North Darfur and South Darfur
(but not in West Darfur),a result of more cooperation among
SLA forces loyal to Minny Minawi, AMIS, and GoS forces.
Local leaders stressed the importance of improving security
and offers of economic support that would enable IDPs to
return home. As for the AU, there was no evidence that it
had the capacity to mount the kind of sustained political
activity needed for the Darfur/Darfur dialogue. The AMIS
Force Commander, while acknowledging the overall improvements
in security, had closed out his meeting by asking that the UN
be sent in as soon as possible, please.


3. (C) Summing up, Hume said he came away with two
impressions. First, in the weeks since the DPA had been
signed the situation had improved but was still fragile. In
particular more had to be done to involve the people of
Darfur in the peace process, especially on security and
political issues. Second, AMIS was like an athlete carrying
a too heavy weight, beginning to stagger toward an eventual
collapse if help were not sent soon.


4. (C) Guehenno agreed that AMIS was losing its ability to
handle the situation, let alone assume full responsibility
for DPA implementation. He described his own assessment
mission accompanied by the AU's Said Djinnit. He said that
Djinnit was frank and helpful throughout, usually operating
at the limit of the range of cooperation permitted by his
political leaders. At the technical level AU staff was
concerned that it could not succeed with the operation; the
political leadership seemed unconcerned with such details.


5. (C) Guehenno urged that the USG coordinate with key AU
leaders before the upcoming PSC meeting and AU summit to make
sure that decisions taken at that level would back a
transition to the UN. He said that during meetings earlier
in the day Interior Minister Taha and Foreign Minister Lam
Akol had taken the line that things were going well in Darfur
with DPA implementation, AMIS forces were doing a fine job,
the DPA did not specify a UN role, so maybe the UN was not
needed. Guehenno was concerned that this line might be
deployed at the AU meetings in an effort to weaken support
for transition to the UN. He stressed that AMIS risked
faltering, and any delay would be an error.


6. (C) As for the UN's own timetable, Guehenno said he hoped
he could have UN units arriving in January. He thought it
was important that the initiation of the UN role be seen as a
real change for the better by people in Darfur. Gradually
they had lost trust in AU peacekeepers. The UN forces would
have to make a difference, especially in the role of
protecting civilians. He described a probable UN force
structure of one division, with three brigades. He thought
there would be a need for 3-4,000 civilian police monitors
and several thousand civilian employees, in addition.


7. (C) Hume asked how the UN would plan to approach improving
security. Guehenno said that he would want immediate,
regular, 24/7 patrolling of the perimeters of IDP camps;
plus, the civilian police monitors would have to work to
improve camp security. He acknowledged that was a difficult
task that could only be done with the cooperation of camp
leaders and the Sudanese police. In an aside he commented
that the Sudanese concern over sovereignty was more
pronounced regarding police work than regarding peacekeeping.
He expected his report would recommend the inclusion of one
or more formed police units.


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8. (C) Guehenno expressed concern over unity of action on the
political and peacekeeping fronts. The AU did not have the
capacity to staff and conduct a comprehensive Darfur-Darfur
dialogue, but Djinnit had opposed shifting any responsibility
for political affairs to the UN. The only way for the UN to
succeed at peacekeeping was to operate in the context of a
political process that was succeeding. Hume agreed that this
was a major challenge. The AU did not have the capacity to
manage the simpler tasks of coordination with local leaders
that were needed under the original mandate, let alone take
on responsibility for tasks under the DPA. It was essential
that the AU accept a strong UN role in organizing and
staffing the Darfur/Darfur dialogue.


9. (C) Guehenno said that he wanted to begin sending a
"shadow staff" to work alongside AMIS units, helping to
strengthen the operation before the UN would take over. He
said the AMIS plan to reorganize into three brigades from the
current eight sectors reflected UN views.


10. (C) Hume asked how Guehenno would suggest dealing with
the Sudanese opposition to Chapter VII. Guehenno said that
he would explain that the Security Council was master of its
resolutions, but it would act on the SYG's definition of
tasks. He thought that the pattern used with UNMIS could be
applied; Chapter VII would be invoked only with the task of
protecting civilians, not with the overall mission. Hume
commented that repeating this formula would have the virtue
of a good precedent in securing Chinese support. Guehenno
said the best way to keep pressure on the Sudanese was for
the U.S. and China to work together.


11. (C) At the end of the meeting SRSG Jan Pronk arrived to
tell Guehenno that he and Djinnit would meet with President
Bashir at 18:30.
HUME