Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06KHARTOUM1439
2006-06-19 07:16:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Khartoum
Cable title:  

SUDAN/DARFUR: FUR TRIBAL LEADERS READY FOR PEACE

Tags:  PREL PHUM KPKO MOPS SU AU UN 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO2831
PP RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1439/01 1700716
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 190716Z JUN 06
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3287
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001439 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR D AND AF/SPG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/18/2016
TAGS: PREL PHUM KPKO MOPS SU AU UN
SUBJECT: SUDAN/DARFUR: FUR TRIBAL LEADERS READY FOR PEACE

Classified By: DCM Andrew Steinfeld; REASON: 1.4(B) AND (D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001439

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR D AND AF/SPG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/18/2016
TAGS: PREL PHUM KPKO MOPS SU AU UN
SUBJECT: SUDAN/DARFUR: FUR TRIBAL LEADERS READY FOR PEACE

Classified By: DCM Andrew Steinfeld; REASON: 1.4(B) AND (D)


1. (C) SUMMARY: SLA/W Leader Abdel Wahid Nur may yet sign
the Darfur Peace Agreement, Fur tribal leaders told CDA Hume
on June 14. Hume emphasized the USG,s encouragement and
support for the peace process, pointing out President Bush,s
personal letter to Nur. The leaders -- including some who
had recently met Nur in Nairobi --responded with gratitude,
noting that DPA was a way to move forward despite its faults.
Nur,s refusal to sign the agreement seemed to be based more
on his personal feelings than on any reasoned argument about
the text, they suggested. The key task now is to persuade
Nur to join, which should convince many Fur the DPA is not
simply a Zagahwa agreement8 Hume encouraged the leaders to
work together to build consensus in favor of peace, and to
engage the AU and UN to find ways to increase security on the
ground. END SUMMARY.

--------------
Four Fur Leaders Favor DPA, with Reservations
--------------


2. (C) Charge Hume met with four prominent Fur tribal leaders
on June 14 in Khartoum to mobilize their support for the
Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA). All four are generally in
favor of the agreement, with reservations; several are close
to Fur SLA/W commander Abdel Wahid Nur, whom they recently
met in Nairobi. Hume listened to their frustrations about
the DPA, but emphasized that the agreement was the product of
nearly two years of negotiations by the parties themselves,
together with the African Union. It could be a real turning
point for Darfur, he said, but only if the parties decided to
make the turn. Nur and others who had not signed the DPA had
complained that the U.S. was pressuring them to join the
process, just as it had pressured Mini Minawi, but Hume
rebutted these charges by sharing a copy of President Bush's
letter to Nur. "This isn't pressure -- this is encouragement
and support," the Charge said. Hume announced he would
travel to El Fashir and Nyala soon to meet with other Fur

leaders, and asked them to help him mobilize Fur opinion in
favor of the DPA.


3. (C) Ahmed Adam Rijal, the hereditary maqdum (district
chief) of Nyala, thanked Hume and recounted his recent
meeting with Nur in Nairobi. Nur remained obstinate in his
refusal to sign the DPA, but was unable to fully explain his
objections. Rijal told Nur they agreed that the DPA had many
problems, but asked Nur what other alternatives he had. Nur
had never answered this question. Rijal plans to see Nur
again soon, and will continue to try to persuade him to join
the peace process.

-------------- --------------
President Bush Letter Seen as Guarantee; UN Force Necessary
-------------- --------------


4. (C) Salih Mamoud, a lawyer for the Sudan Organization
Against Torture (SOAT) and Communist member of the National
Assembly thanked the U.S. for its support. Despite the
failings of the DPA, no one was prepared to go back and
re-open the negotiations. "We have to find the best ways,
the most practical ways, to bring back Abdel Wahid," he said,
noting that Nur had never had a good, trusted advisor.
However, Mamoud cautioned against thinking that Nur's
participation was not necessary, or that there could be peace
in Darfur without the Fur, who remain the largest ethnic
group in the region. Mini Minawi, a Zaghawa, may control
more territory or have more troops than Nur, but he still
represents a minority tribe. Mamoud especially welcomed
President Bush's letter, noting that he had never seen it
before; "This is a guarantee!" he exclaimed. He also argued
strongly for a UN force in Darfur, because an AU or Arab
League force would not be trusted by the people. Moreover,
to be seen as legitimate, the UN force had to include troops
not from Africa. Justice was also critical issue, but the
question of compensation should not stop the DPA from moving
forward.

-------------- --------------
Highest Priority: Safe Returns of People to Villages
-------------- --------------


5. (C) Adbulgassem Seif Al-Din, a SPLM member of the National
Assembly -- and Abdel Wahid Nur's father-in-law -- agreed,
but noted that the highest priority was the return of the
people to their villages in safety. "There should be no such
thing as blood money at this stage," he remarked. He also
welcomed President Bush's letter, remarking that he would
encourage Nur to write back, and recalled Bush's recent
comments to Iraqi PM Al-Maliki: "When America makes a
promise, it keeps it." Al-Din also echoed Mamoud's

KHARTOUM 00001439 002 OF 002


observations about the lack of good advisors around Nur, at
one point suggesting the U.S. send Alex de Waal to Nairobi,
and emphasized the importance of the Fur to the peace
process. "If Abdel Wahid signs, the Fur will support the
agreement," he noted, adding that he was cautiously
optimistic Nur would listen to other Fur leaders.

-------------- --------------
DPA Vague, General; Signing Reflects "Tribal" Views
-------------- --------------


6. (C) Ibrahim Ahmed Diraige, a consultant for the World Food
Program and son of Federal Democratic Alliance chair Ahmed
Ibrahim Diraige, remarked that Nur feels guilty, and even
personally responsible, for the genocide in Darfur, which has
led 70 percent of his tribesmen to lose life or property.
Nur's refusal to sign was based on his personal feelings, not
on a careful reading of the agreement. "The DPA is very
vague and general," Diraige noted, "but there are grounds to
move forward." He particularly emphasized the "tribal way of
thinking" in Darfur, especially in the split between Menawi
and Nur. "The Fur in the camps think that the Zagahwa
support the DPA because Minawi has signed, but that they
won't support it until Abdel Wahid does. But if Abdel Wahid
signs, there will be dancing in the camps." Diraige also saw
reason to think that Nur might join the process: "If anyone
can influence him, they can!" he joked, pointing to Mamoud
and Al-Din.

--------------
Hume: Security and Justice
--------------


7. (C) Hume thanked the leaders for their comments, and
addressed the twin issues of justice and security. The U.S.
understood the need for immediate compensation to help those
in camps rebuild their lives, but the question of justice was
more difficult. If we can't stop the killing, we can't get
to justice, Hume noted -- to the agreement of all present.
Security was even harder. Ultimately, the people of Darfur
must start trusting their own government again, but in the
meantime, they must rely on the AU and the UN, and work with
them. Hume asked them to identify specific districts where
peacekeepers might be able to start making progress on
security.

--------------
Fur: No Al-Qaida in Darfur
--------------


8. (C) The leaders responded by noting the importance of
community policing in building security. In some camps, AMIS
had even deputized young men to help maintain order in the
camps, drawing on an old Fur system of "hakura," or local
enforcement. This system helped residents monitor foreigners
who had taken up residence in the camps, including those from
Chad, the Central African Republic, Burkina Faso, and
Mauritania. (Note: Hume asked whether there was any truth
to government reports that there were Al-Qaida cells in
Darfur; "Nonsense!" Al-Din responded, noting that the Fur
would quickly root out any Arab that came into the camps.
Al-Qaida attempted to land a plane once, but the people
killed them, he recalled. End note.) The leaders also
agreed that there were more opportunities for building
security in some areas than others, but warned against
attempts to create model villages, which the Government had
tried in 2004. The people want to go back to their original
land, not some new area, Diraige noted. Anything else would
be ethnic cleansing.
HUME