MEETING WITH MINISTER OF CABINET AFFAIRS DENG ALOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001410

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/14/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV KPKO US SU
SUBJECT: MEETING WITH MINISTER OF CABINET AFFAIRS DENG ALOR

Classified By: CDA Cameron Hume, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: At the request of CDA Hume, Minister Deng
Alor intervened on behalf of pending USG visa requests.
Acting FM Karti said he would authorize issuance of the
visas, pending receipt of further details on these persons.
(Note: Subsequent to the meeting, MFA advised that the visas
would all be issued in Washington on June 14. End note.)
Deng Alor shared his insights regarding infighting among NCP
members of government, particularly the impact on the
position of VP Taha. End Summary.

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U.S.-Sudan Bilateral Relationship Important, but Strained
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2. (C) On June 14, CDA Hume at his request met with Minister
of Cabinet Affairs Deng Alor to discuss the state of
U.S./Sudanese relations and pending visa requests. Hume
acknowledged that the bilateral relationship was unusual and
strained, but at the same time it was an important
relationship for both sides. In these circumstances, it was
essential to manage the inevitable difficulties as well as
possible, rather than adding additional aggravations. In
this context the Sudanese failure to issue visas to
individuals necessary for USG support of the Darfur Peace
Agreement (DPA) was troubling.


3. (C) Hume recalled that VP Taha had asked Deputy Secretary
Zoellick for USG support in negotiating the DPA. The USG had
responded, including a week-long effort by the Deputy. The
President had directly urged the Darfur leaders to sign the
agreement for the benefit of all Sudanese, and he had offered
USG assistance with verification of implementation. Without
these major efforts by the USG, it was unlikely that the DPA
could have been concluded. Now the failure by the Government
of Sudan to follow through even to issue visas to individuals
needed for continued USG support of the peace agreement had
raised a large red flag in Washington. Was the Government of
Sudan committed to implementing the DPA? Did it want the
bilateral relationship to improve or to worsen?


4. (C) Minister Deng Alor agreed that the relationship was
both unusual and strained. He immediately called the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs about the visas. FM Lam Akol was
away in Paris; Minister of State al-Wasila al-Samani was
traveling. He talked with Minister of State Ali Karti, who
was left in charge. According to Deng, Karti said he was
aware of the visa requests. The USG took weeks, at times
months, to respond to similar Sudanese requests, so delay was
normal. Karti complained that he did not know the specific
reason why these individuals were coming to Sudan. When Deng
said he understood it was to assist with USG support for DPA
implementation, Karti said he could authorize issuance of the
visas if he had a brief description of the roles the
applicants would perform. (Note: Embassy Khartoum is
providing that information immediately. End note.)

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Actions Speak Louder than Words
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5. (C) Hume thanked Deng Alor for his intervention.
However, more effort on both sides would be needed to keep
the relationship on track. For example, when the Deputy
Secretary had tried to speak with VP Taha several weeks ago,

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Taha,s office had not put the call through. Was this a
signal to the U.S., or was it just a symptom of politics in
Khartoum? Hume noted that Taha had not met with the UNSC
delegation nor yet with UN USYG Guehenno.


6. (C) Deng Alor said it was a symptom of politics within
the National Congress Party. Looking at a newspaper headline
reporting that Minister of the Interior Al-Zubair Bashir Taha
had said that Sudan did not need UN troops, half-joking he
said Al-Zubair was probably a member of Al Qaida. Deng
assumed that Bin Laden still had associates in Blue Nile
State, where he earlier had investments. Within the NCP,
Taha,s position had been difficult ever since he signed the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) with John Garang.
President Bashir had rejected Taha,s list of proposed
ministerial appointments. Harder line NCP ministers, such as
the ministers of defense and interior, tried to keep Taha
under pressure.


7. (C) As an example, Deng Alor talked about Idris Hassan, a
Taha ally and fellow Shaygeia. Hassan had been
editor-in-chief of Al-Rai al-Aam, a paper owned by President
Bashir,s family. Bashir fired Hassan and replaced him with
a nephew. Taha was then able to place Hassan as editor of
Al-Wahda, a smaller circulation, independent newspaper
associated with Taha.


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Diplomatic Shell Game, Access a Matter of Calculation
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8. (C) When Taha was dropped from the UNSC program, Deng
Alor urged Taha to find time for the meeting. Taha, who was
departing later on a trip to Jordan, said he had to pack.
Deng Alor asked Taha to reconsider, commenting that Taha
never had to pack his own bags. To &balance8 this
situation, President Bashir ordered Assistant to the
President Nafie Ali Nafie, a hardliner, to cancel his own
meeting with the UNSC and go to South Darfur for another
meeting. In place of both, Deng Alor was sent to meet with
the UNSC. Summing up, Deng Alor indicated that Taha,s
failure to meet with the UNSC or to take phone calls was not
accidental. Either President Bashir had limited Taha,s
freedom of action, or Taha had simply decided that it was
prudent for him to be less exposed as the favorite Sudanese
government interlocutor of the international community.

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Comment
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9. (C) In Khartoum diplomatic circles speculation is always
rife regarding the status of VP Taha. Three facts stand out:
first, after President Bashir he remains the most important
NCP political figure; second, hard-liners contest his
position; and third, in terms of NCP politics, Taha,s
relations with the international community are a liability,
not an asset. End comment.
HUME