DARFUR: UN PKO WORRIED ABOUT AU/UN TRANSITION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001402

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF/SPG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/13/2016
TAGS: PREL MOPS KPKO SU UN AU
SUBJECT: DARFUR: UN PKO WORRIED ABOUT AU/UN TRANSITION

REF: KHARTOUM 1391

Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES CAMERON HUME; REASON: 1.4(B) AND (D)


1. (C) Summary: The UN is worried about the transition from
an AU to a UN peacekeeping force in Darfur, UN Peacekeeping
Under SYG Guehenno confided to the Charge on June 12.
Guehenno hopes to both bolster the current AU force and pave
the way for a UN deployment in January 2007 -- difficult
enough tasks, made harder by the AU's insistence that it will
handle the politics, and leave the peacekeeping to the UN.
Having the "right person" in charge at the upcoming AU summit
will be critical. Worse, the UN must negotiate not only with
the AU, but also with the Sudanese, who seem increasingly
unable to form a common position. The Security Council
members' recent visit to Khartoum might have sidestepped the
question of a Chapter VII mandate, but the timing of the
Council's upcoming meeting with the ICC prosecutor in New
York might be "catastrophic." End Summary.

AU Not "Really Happy" About Re-hatting
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2. (C) UN Under SYG for Peacekeeping Operations Jean-Marie
Guehenno told CDA Hume on June 12 that he was worried about
AU support for the transition to UN peacekeeping operations
in Darfur. "I'm not sure (AU Special Representative in
Sudan) Kingibe is really happy about the decision to transfer
the mission," Guehenno confided, though the Charge assured
him the AU representative would not be an obstacle. The UN
hopes to improve security on the ground and raise support for
the peace agreement in the short term by shoring up the AU
Mission in Sudan (AMIS) with additional logistical support;
at the same time, the UN must prepare its own people, and
establish its own camps, before the taking over the mission
in January 2007 -- a two-tracked approach that Guehenno
admits will be "horrendously difficult," and risks blurring
responsibilities between the two organizations.


3. (C) Though AU and UN interests are closely aligned, their
understanding of the division of labor is not. The AU thinks
it can do the politics while the UN will do the peacekeeping,
but if the AU botches the politics, UN peacekeepers will be
in danger, Guehenno predicted. Hume agreed, noting that the
AU has limited strategic vision and no experience bridging
the political/military divide. "We have to put the right
person in the chair" at the AU summit in Banjul on July 1,
Guehenno urged. But he had no suggestions on who the "right
person" was to lead the transition, while Hume noted that AU
mediator Salim Salim was likely out of the running.

...and neither is Khartoum
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4. (C) Moreover, Guehenno lamented, the UN had to fight a
"two front war" against the AU on one side and the Sudanese
on the other. The Government does not want the UN in Darfur,
and though the rebels might want UN peacekeepers, they do not
necessarily want the peace agreement; splits between the
Government and the opposition parties, or among different
rebel groups, might even worsen as the UN prepares to take
over the AU mission. (Note: Guehenno met with both
government and Arab opposition leaders during his visit to
Khartoum; he also plans to meet with prominent Fur leaders
during an upcoming trip to Darfur). A war between the
Zagawha and the Fur, or between different Zagawha clans,
would be the worst case scenario for the UN, but not the
worst case for the government, Guehenno observed. Managing
the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue (DDD) is critical. An
Afghan-style "loya jirga" is one possible model for a DDD
preparatory committee, he suggested, and might be helpful in
identifying chiefs and other local opinion leaders who could
help turn the Abuja agreement into a solid basis for peace.
"Without grassroots involvement in the preparatory committee,
the government will simply stack the deck with its own
supporters," he said.

UNSC Meeting with ICC Prosecutor: Bad Timing
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5. (C) Continuing debate about a Chapter VII mandate in
Darfur -- and investigations by the International Criminal
Court (ICC) -- has also made the AU-UN transition more
difficult, Guehenno said. UK Ambassador to the UN Emyr Jones
Parry had massaged the Chapter VII issue during the Security
Council's recent visit to Khartoum, but had not settled the
question; many in the government still fears allowing UN
peacekeepers to police Darfur will be another step towards
regime change in Khartoum. (Note: Surprisingly, during an
earlier meeting with Guehenno, the Minister of the Interior

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did not rule out allowing UN peacekeepers into Darfur, but
"left the door open"). Referring cases to the ICC at the
same time the Security Council is discussing a peacekeeping
mandate only reinforces these fears. The Sudanese ambassador
to the United Nations even confided to Guehenno that the
timing of the Council's upcoming New York meeting with the
ICC prosecutor was "catastrophic," and that Khartoum views
ICC action as a threat, not just as a warning sign. "There
must be a stick, of course," Guehenno recognized, but showing
it now could jeopardize the broader goal of peace.
HUME