SUDAN/DARFUR: FM LAM AKOL ON IMPLEMENTATION, THE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 001367

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR D AND AF/SPG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/08/2016
TAGS: PREL SU PGOV
SUBJECT: SUDAN/DARFUR: FM LAM AKOL ON IMPLEMENTATION, THE
SITUATION ON THE GROUND, AND LATE ADHERENTS TO THE ACCORD

REF: KHARTOUM 1362

Classified By: Charge Andrew Steinfeld for reasons 1.5 (B) and (D)


1. (C) Summary: FM Lam Akol told Charge and USAID director
on June 7 that, within the context of trilateral
consultations among the GNU, UN, and AU, discussions would
now proceed on a transition to UN peacekeeping. Sudan had
always said there could be role for the UN after a peace
agreement was signed, and it would be contradictory for Sudan
to accept one in the South and not in Darfur. Akol recalled
with some bitterness international activities in the past
months, taken without consulting Sudan's leaders, that led to
the AU's request for transition under pressure from the U.S.
(an illegitimate act by the AU in his view),and to a series
of UN Security Council resolutions, some of which included
language insulting to Sudan. He also raised, as he and
President Bashir had the day before with the visiting UN
Security Council, the fact that a security role for the UN is
not mentioned in the Darfur Peace Agreement. Akol indicated
some willingness to consider a role for NATO in order to
strengthen AMIS, but the proposals needed to come from the
AU. Akol suggested the possibility of joint military
operations between Sudanese forces and those belonging to
Sudanese Liberation Movement-Minni Minawi faction against
rebel forces opposed to peace. He also said the government
wants to broaden the base of the agreement by permitting
members of the SLM-Abdelwahid faction and JEM to join the
peace agreement, arguing that they needed some political
rights to entice them to do so. End Summary.


2. (C) On June 7, Charge, USAID country director
Almquist, and poloff met with FM Lam Akol and MFA Director of
the Americas el-Diridieri. Charge began by formally
introducing Almquist in her new role as USAID mission
director. Almquist detailed USAID's substantial aid program
for Sudan. The FM promised the government's cooperation in
our efforts.

Strengthening AMIS and moving towards transition
-------------- --


3. (C) Charge began by asking for the FM's evaluation of the
UNSC's meetings the day before with Sudan's leadership.
Charge stressed the USG's keen interest in moving forward
rapidly on implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement
(DPA),which meant strengthening AMIS in the short-term and
moving towards a UN PKO by the end of the year.


4. (C) FM Akol launched into a lengthy recapitulation of the
past months in which he bemoaned the lack of dialogue with
the GNU. He argued that the AU had been pressured into
requesting transition to UN peacekeeping, particularly in the
run-up to the U.S.'s presidency of the UNSC in February, when
in late January, the "non-papers were flying all over. We
saw them all," he asserted. Continuing with the past, he
said that one reference in a UNSC resolution (1663) that
talked about parties in Abuja "including the GNU" was
particularly insulting. He also asserted, as he has before,
that the AU had no political or legal authority to ask for
transition to UN peacekeeping. With regard to the funding
argument, Akol said that no one was deluded into thinking the
AU could fund itself, but the EU, USG, withheld funds to
prompt the AU to request a transition to the UN.


5. (C) Striking a more positive note, the FM said that now
that a peace agreement had been reached, the dynamic had
changed. The GNU has continually affirmed its willingness to
discuss the role the UN can play in ensuring security in
Darfur after a peace agreement. He emphasized the GNU has
been clear about this issue in all of its public statements.
It would be a contradiction, according to Akol, to accept
such a mission in the south but reject the same role in
Darfur.

No reference to UN transition in the DPA
--------------


6. (C) In what has now become a prominent rhetorical point
for the government, Akol emphasized that the text of the DPA
only mentions a role for the AU and there is no explicit
discussion of the UN,s role in the security provisions of
the agreement. Akol asked AU negotiator Salim why the AU did
not include a role for the UN in the draft if that was the
intention. According to Akol, Salim responded that the AU
felt the GNU would not have signed had a role for the UN been
included. Akol asked why Salim assumed this, given the
position of the GNU that there indeed could be a role for the
UN after a peace agreement, intimating that it was wrong
simply to assume that reference to a UN security role would

KHARTOUM 00001367 002 OF 003


have been a deal breaker. The Chairman of the PSC told Akol
that his vision of the UN mandate equated to striking out all
of the references in the DPA to the AU and replacing them
with the UN.

Moving forward trilaterally
--------------


7. (C) Sudan has now agreed, he continued, on a mechanism
for trilateal discussions among the UN, AU, and GNU. Akol
balked at the term "assessment team" in reference to the
group of UN and AU advisors about to arrive in Khartoum,
calling the meetings instead a &joint political meeting of
the UN, AU, and GNU.8 Following these initial discussions,
the group can &go and make an assessment.8 The UNSC has
now agreed that the GNU must play a role in any discussions
regarding a potential transition, and the GNU is willing to
talk to AU-UN representatives in Khartoum about the possible
role of the UN in Darfur. He feels the time is now right to
&let quiet diplomacy do the work.8 There is a need to move
forward to ensure the agreement is implemented and the GNU is
duty bound by the DPA to work with the AU to allow them a
role. All parties are in agreement the AU must be
strengthened in order to do its job effectively.

A role for NATO?
--------------


8. (C) In the context of the immediate need to strengthen
AMIS, Charge asked about a possible role for NATO. He
outlined the various ways in which NATO might help with
logistics, command and control, and training. Akol stated
that NATO should work through the AU with regard to a
possible role. Since all parties agree that AMIS needs to be
strengthened, the only point of contention was how.
According to Akol, the AU needs to present a plan of action
for how they will adjust to become more effective. The GNU,
in response, will look at the proposal, discuss the points,
and negotiate. It will not be a problem for the GNU if the
AU suggests NATO technical support. When pressed on whether
the GNU would look favorably on a NATO role, Akol indicated
it could.

Enhancing security
--------------


9. (C) In response to Almquist,s question regarding
Akol,s perspective on what the GNU can do to help the
security environment, the FM offered that the cause of
insecurity must be analyzed. The GNU is asking the
international community to ensure Chad does not become &the
spoiler.8 Akol referred to a recent speech by Sudanese
President Bashir, in which Bashir mentioned using incentives
to induce militias to disarm. The GNU has plans in place
regarding disarmament and has already begun the process of
collecting arms through the use of incentives, such as money.
According to Akol, the militias are strong because of the
N,djamena cease-fire agreement, halting the government's
ability to pursue the perpetrators of violence. Sudan must
ensure the border with Chad is sealed so no incursions can be
made into Sudanese territory to further destabilize Darfur.


10. (C) Akol stated that soon the forces opposing the DPA
will be forced by the GNU and Minni Minawi,s faction to
cooperate. Akol envisioned the potential for joint
Sudanese/SLA military operations against the remaining
opposition forces. He said that if rebels opposed to the
agreement do not put down their arms, that might be the only
solution. With regard to calming the militia, they need to
see that they will not be attacked by armed groups, and that
the government can provide for their security.

What about Abdul Wahid and those who adhere late?
-------------- --------------


11. (C) Akol expressed a desire to see members of the
opposing factions join the agreement to encourage better
prospects for peace and security. Discussion ensued
regarding the legitimacy of the claimed representatives of
the opposition factions, some presently in Addis Ababa
preparing to sign "Declarations of Accession." Akol took the
position that the AU already knows some of these individuals
because they participated in the peace talks in Abuja. He
indicated that they had legitimacy as leaders, and that if
they adhered to the DPA, they should be given political
rights. Charge and USAID director stressed the importance of
not undercutting Minni, who was the only rebel leader
actually to sign the DPA in Abuja. The FM countered that new
adherents needed political incentives to join; otherwise, why
would they.

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STEINFELD