Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06KHARTOUM1362
2006-06-08 10:17:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Khartoum
Cable title:  

SUDAN/UN SECURITY COUNCIL VISIT: STROKING THE

Tags:  PREL PGOV UNSC SU 
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VZCZCXRO1939
OO RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1362/01 1591017
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 081017Z JUN 06
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3129
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 KHARTOUM 001362 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR D AND AF/SPG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/07/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNSC SU
SUBJECT: SUDAN/UN SECURITY COUNCIL VISIT: STROKING THE
LEADERSHIP TO REACH A YES ON UN PEACEKEEPING

REF: KHARTOUM 1354

Classified By: Charge Andrew Steinfeld for reasons 1.5 (B) and (D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 KHARTOUM 001362

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR D AND AF/SPG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/07/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNSC SU
SUBJECT: SUDAN/UN SECURITY COUNCIL VISIT: STROKING THE
LEADERSHIP TO REACH A YES ON UN PEACEKEEPING

REF: KHARTOUM 1354

Classified By: Charge Andrew Steinfeld for reasons 1.5 (B) and (D)


1. (C) Summary and Comment. The UN Security Council held a
series of meetings in Khartoum on June 6, including with
President Bashir and FM Lam Akol. SRSG Jan Pronk counseled
the group to be aware of Sudan's sensitivities with regard
to international intervention and Sudan's sovereignty as it
pressed on the need for a transition from AU to UN
peacekeeping. In his opening remarks at the key meetings
and at a press conference, UK perm rep, Emyr Jones Parry,
leader of the group, stressed the respect that the UNSC had
for Sudan's sovereignty, and promised that any transition
to UN peacekeeping would be done in full coordination, or
even in "negotiation" with Sudan's government. That said,
he and others pointed to the need for rapid progress on
transition to UN peacekeeping, as the AU/UN assessment team
was about to arrive in the region. The voice of the UNSC
came across as largely united, since the Chinese and
Russians had little space to sound more solicitous of
Sudan's sensitivities than the group's chief spokesman.
With regard to pressing the government to permit greater
unimpeded access to humanitarian work, only U.S. Ambassador
Sanders raised this repeatedly.


2. (C) The response from Sudan's leaders with regard to UN
transition showed some signs of an increasingly open
attitude, but was not devoid of the usual posturing. Both
the President and FM pointed to the lack of any reference
to UN transition in the Darfur Peace Agreement as raising
the issue of why AMIS could not simply continue its work
(or why this matter was not tackled at Abuja). Chapter VII
provisions were also rejected. But the FM also said that a
page had been turned in the heretofore contentious
relations between the UNSC and Sudan, stressed that the
assessment mission would be welcome, and commented that
"the stage is set for very serious and substantive
discussions." While President Bashir took a harder line
and ceded less, several of our key interlocutors tell us

that UN peacekeeping is now seen as largely inevitable by
Sudan's leaders.


3. (C) The generally careful and polite approach the UNSC
and its principal spokesman took to the UN transition issue
should serve to preempt further disinformation and
hyperbole here with regard to perceived malevolent
intentions of the international community. The other
message (or promise) left behind -- both privately and
publicly -- is that whatever transition does take place
will be developed only with the full cooperation and
consent of Sudan's government. End Summary and
Comment.

Itinerary/Participants
--------------


4. (SBU) The UN Security Council began its mission to
Sudan with a full day of meetings in Khartoum on June 6.
All 15 countries were represented from NYC, with a mix of
perm reps or deputies. P-5 participants were the UK,
French, and Chinese perm reps, a Russian deputy, and
Ambassador Jackie Wolcott Sanders for the U.S. (Sanders
was accompanied by LtCol Pat Murray from USUN.) UK perm
rep Emyr Jones Parry was the group's leader and principal
spokesman. The group traveled on to Addis on June 7, and
will continue to Juba, back to Khartoum, and then to Darfur
and Chad. Some members will then go on to Kinshasa.


5. (SBU) Meetings here were held with SRSG Pronk,
Minister for Cabinet Affairs Deng Alor, FM Lam Akol, and
President Bashir. The UNSC also met in separate meetings
with groups of parliamentarians, NGOs, and opposition
leaders. They also gave a well-attended press conference
(reftel). Although a meeting was requested with VP Taha,
the government did not arrange one. COMs in Khartoum
accompanied the group, but were asked by the Presidency not
to attend the Bashir meeting.

SRSG Jan Pronk: Stroke Sudan; Invite Abdul Wahid to NYC
-------------- --------------


6. (C) The day began with an extensive briefing from SRSG
Jan Pronk, who recalled the recent Brahimi mission, in
which the government granted permission for the joint UN/AU
assessment team only the very last half hour. He
emphasized to the 15 that the green light was for the

KHARTOUM 00001362 002 OF 006


assessment mission only, not for the transition to a
blue-hatted force. Pronk spent considerable time
describing Sudanese sensitivities: foreign activities in
Sudan caused special sensitivities in the fiftieth
anniversary year of Sudan's independence, the government
was upset that it had received no congratulations for
signing the Darfur Peace Agreement in Abuja, the there was
a sense among Sudanese of a lack of respect for Sudanese
sovereignty. Pronk suggested that these be taken into
account during UNSC representations to the government.
With regard to rehatting, he said the international
community was now in a period of "negotiations" with the
GNU. The transition could not be forced; rather, Sudan
wants to be able to invite the UN in. He described
extraordinary GNU sensitivity to Chapter VII provisions,
but, he argued that a much more robust PKO than AMIS was
needed that would have to include Chapter VII. This should
be explained the GNU as not being against them, but rather
helping to curb the activities of spoilers. The message to
the government should be: "you may need UN peacekeepers to
help you to implement your agreement."


7. (C) With regard to the security situation on the
ground in Darfur, Pronk reported that, while May was very
violent, the first week of June had been quiet. Turning to
Abdul Wahid and other non-signatories, Pronk told the group
that AW had been complying scrupulously with all the
previous agreements he was signatory to, and it was
imperative to "get him on board" with the DPA. "Do not
be cross with him," he pronounced, but invite him and Mini
Minawi to NYC and give them the red carpet treatment.

-- The south and the east


8. (C) Pronk said Sudan was far from being a failed
state. The problem was the division of wealth between
center and periphery. Implementation of the CPA was not
going badly, he said, but there were some commissions that
were rarely meeting or not established, and others that
were underutilized. Pronk also referred to security
problems in the south that were tribal, economic, and
military in nature (non-integration of the other armed
groups). Abyei still need to be resolved. On the LRA,
Pronk reported that, in light of the GOSS decision to speak
to Kony, fighting has stopped. Pronk intimated that he
agreed with the need to keep the political track open, and,
as he has done often before, criticized the timing of the
ICC indictments of LRA leaders. He also mentioned talks
about the East to start next week in Asmara, indicating
some optimism with regard to Eritrean mediation. "Talks in
Libya have always been a non-starter," he said.


9. (C) During qs and as, UK ambassador questioned the
advisability of courting Abdul Wahid, which would be seen
as appeasing him and might weaken Mini. Pronk said that,
although AW is a very difficult person, he must not be
counted out, as you need the Fur on board, of whom most
still consider AW their leader. He has a lot of support in
the camps, as well, noted Pronk. Pronk said the signatures
could easily have gone the other way -- with AW signing and
Mini not, adding that he was not surprised, given the
animosity between them, that one SLA leader signed and the
other did not. (Charge privately told Pronk later in the
day that Washington believed firmly that AW had missed his
last chance, but Pronk persisted, clearly convinced of the
necessity of bring AW on board.) In response to other
queries, Pronk said that Bashir's relationship with Salva
Kiir was improving, and that JEM's interest in Darfur was
waning as its involvement in the East grew. He told the
group that Sudanese leaders were quite fearful the UN
peacekeepers might be tasked to carry out ICC tasks. With
regard to the inability to get a meeting with VP Taha,
Pronk intimated that it could be because he has now agreed
to the clear need for a transition to UN PKO. He said that
AMIS had gotten less effective in the field over time. On
the question of janjeweed, Pronk speculated that 60 percent
could be brought under the control of the government, while
40 percent were "completely out of control." In fact, the
government was afraid of them, and one way to weaken the
intransigents would be to deal with those more flexible.
The government needed to come up with a good plan on how to
disarm the militias.

Deng Alor: CPA progress mixed; GNU moving on UN in Darfur
-------------- --------------

-- UK intervention

KHARTOUM 00001362 003 OF 006




10. (C) Taking his cue at least to a degree from Pronk's
counsel, UK perm rep opened the meeting (and subsequent
ones) with the following message: the UN respects Sudan's
sovereignty, Sudan deserves respect, Sudan took a
courageous step in signing the DPA, the UNSC is here to
help Sudan with implementation, and the security of the
people of Sudan is first and foremost Sudan's issue. But
he also stressed firmly that transition from AMIS to a UN
force was necessary: the task had become too large and
too long-term for AMIS's resources, and AMIS itself had
asked to be relieved. But, Jones Parry stressed, the
transition would be managed in partnership with the GNU.
Other Ambassadors added the following. Ghana noted that,
because of Sudan's size and geographical position, Sudan's
future was Africa's future. Russia urged non-signatories
to the DPA to sign, said the council would listen "most
attentively" to the GNU views, and any transition would
require the "consent and willful cooperation" of the
government. China hailed the new stage in relations
between the UN and Sudan, noting that we respect your
government and want to be helpful; "we are partners."
Amb. Sanders noted the U.S.'s long interest in Sudan, its
huge aid program of more than one billion dollars, and the
critical need to move forward with UN transition.

-- North/South


11. (C) Minister for Cabinet Affairs Deng Alor (SPLM)
focused largely on north-south issues in his extended
comments. He said that the establishment of the GNU
signified a big change in the right direction with regard
to Sudan's governance. But there were successes and
failures in CPA implementation. A big success was the
formation of the government itself. Problems included
serious security problems in the south, with some other
armed groups still maintaining ties with the Sudan Armed
Forces. LRA remains a large concern, Deng said, adding
that that is why talks with Kony are necessary. But, in
general, the pace of implementation is too slow: it took
the SPLM a while to recoup after Garang's death, and there
are many commissions and institutions that are either not
formed, or not functioning. There is still a pervasive
lack of trust and confidence between two parties who had
fought each other for so long.


12. (C) Deng gave relatively positive spin to the recent
high-level NCP-SPLM meeting, saying that the two sides had
agreed to deal with their differences head-on. He reported
the development of additional structures for partnership,
and concluded that, although the two sides had political
visions that diverged, they are now partners. He noted
that the unresolved issue of Abyei could threaten the
entire CPA. He critiqued the current Assessment and
Evaluation Commission (AEC) because, having to report its
findings to the Presidency, the AEC could find itself
deadlocked. This should not be repeated for whatever is
set up for DPA implementation. He concluded N/S by saying
that there can be no return to war, but that the peace
dividend is too slow.


13. (C) Deng thanked the donor community for its support,
but complained in rather strong terms about his
disappointment over lack of international support for
refugee returns, terming it "not a priority" for the
donors.

-- Darfur


14. (C) Deng said he (personally) would be happy with UN
support in Darfur. While there had indeed been differences
and suspicions in the past, a new page has been turned, and
there can now be cooperation with the UN. Consensus is
being built within the GNU, he reported, to cooperate with
the UN. He said that the SPLM was talking with
non-signatories of the DPA, including Abdul Wahid. He said
that internal discussions were taking place within the GNU
on how to deal with the janjeweed; disarming them is easier
said than done. Who will disarm them, he asked
rhetorically: the SAF? the SPLM? the joint integrated
units? the UN? On support for Chadian rebels, he said that
the SPLM and NCP had decided at their meeting to suspend
support for any dissidents in any neighboring countries.

FM Lam Akol: UN transition is not specified in the Darfur
Peace Agreement
-------------- --------------

KHARTOUM 00001362 004.2 OF 006


--------------


15. (C) Jones Parry opened with a similar presentation to
the one he had made to Deng Alor, stressing UN-Sudan
partnership, respect for sovereignty etc. Noteworthy was
his comment that the UN/AU peacekeeping assessment mission
would "negotiate" a turnover of the mission to the UN with
the GNU (in the press conference he used the word again).
With regard to humanitarian access, he said he understood
that it was "a little bit intermittent;" improvements were
needed. The French delegate stressed the need for
protection of civilians. Ambassador Sanders pushed hard on
the humanitarian access issue, as well as on AMIS
strengthening and UN transition.


16. (C) Lam Akol opened by saying the meeting was
important, as it marked the turning of a new page in the
UNSC's relations with Sudan. Too much earlier had been in
the media, and it was important to have this tte--tte.
The visit of the UNSC would serve a useful purpose in
helping to allay mutual suspicions; it would create a new
atmosphere. He commented the Darfur dialogue was critical
to consolidating the agreement. Disarming the janjeweed
was also key; arms could only be carried in the future by
recognized groups. On the issue of humanitarian access,
the FM said that the GNU had extended the moratorium on
restrictions on aid delivery, and was now contributing food
to the WFP.

-- On UN transition; and signatories


17. (C) Lam Akol stressed that any future role for the UN
in Darfur would have to be in the context of the DPA.
Therefore, the trilateral meetings among the AU, UN, and
GNU to take place with the arrival of the assessment
mission would be crucial in hammering this out. As no
transition is mentioned in the text of the DPA itself, he
said, there was a question about what role the UN would or
could have: the same as the one outlined for the AU? Or a
different one? He stressed that the GNU was open to
discussions with the assessment mission, recalling that the
government had always said they were open to a UN role
after the signing of a peace accord. "The stage is set for
very serious and substantive discussions" on this issue.


18. (C) Regarding Abdul Wahid's refusal to sign the
agreement, he indicated that the clock had run out. The
agreement cannot be held hostage to latecomers; quick
implementation was key. That said, it was important to
broaden the base of support for the agreement in some
manner. (Comment: There is debate here about the
question of whether or not to continue to court Abdul
Wahid, and on what rights and privileges late adherents
might have vis--vis the agreement. The FM did not go into
detail on these matters at this meeting.)

-- LRA: Give peace, and Kony, a chance


19. (C) The FM said that the attempt by the Government of
South Sudan to negotiate with Kony had the support of the
GNU. Kony has said that he is now committed to peace, and
we need to give this a chance, he said.

President Bashir: tough line on transition
--------------


20. (C) The following are key points from the UNSC's
meeting with President Bashir, from which, as noted
earlier, resident COM's were excluded.

-- Sudan will not accept UN forces under Chapter VII.

-- The DPA does not take a UN force into account. The
mandate of the DPA is to be accomplished by the AU; if the
AU was not capable of accomplishing the objectives in the
DPA then it should have said as much before signing on.
Moreover, the AU does not have the authority to transfer
its responsibilities to another entity.

-- Sudan (along with the AU) is capable of accomplishing
the tasks in the DPA, outside help is not needed.

-- There are 150k troops in Iraq and there is no peace
there, Sudan does not want the same thing on its soil.

-- The Sudanese people are not ready for outside forces.
Locals accept AMIS because AMIS troops have the same

KHARTOUM 00001362 005 OF 006


features and same culture.

-- Ultimately, it is the Darfurians who will have to
resolve their differences, as they have a history of
working out their own problems.

--A significant portion of the problem in Darfur is with
Chadian rebels who are well armed and supplied by President
Deby. Sudan has adhered to the provisions of the Tripoli
Agreement, Chad has not.

Meeting with Parliamentarians
--------------


21. (SBU) The meeting with the parliamentarians was
reported to have been lively, including attacks on the U.S.
with regard to Iraq policy. Chapter VII was rejected by
the parliamentarians. There were double standards in the
manner in which the international community dealt with
global issues; Sudan was being unfairly treated.

Meeting with NGO's
--------------


22. (SBU) National and international NGOs were given an
opportunity to brief the UNSC for approximately one hour.
Both national and international NGOs emphasized the need to
implement all UNSC resolutions on Darfur. Common themes
were protection of civilians, quick start to disarmament of
janjaweed, strengthening AMIS while preparing for a UN
transition, and removing obstacles to humanitarian access.
The situation on the ground so far has not improved as a
result of the DPA, according to the NGOs, and IDPs will be
extremely reluctant to move out of the camps until there is
security. The DPA itself is quite controversial, and most
NGOs are reluctant to raise the topic with beneficiaries or
be directly associated with outreach efforts. The
Darfur-Darfur Dialogue must be well-run, and cannot be seen
as a Government initiative. "Nobody" trusts the Government
in Darfur, which will have to work hard to restore any
credibility.


23. (C) The NGOs also emphasized the problems of CPA
implementation in the south, citing the issues of Abyei and
the status of DDR and integration of forces through the
JIUs, among others, as well as noting ongoing zones of
insecurity in Equatoria and Upper Nile due to the Lord's
Resistance Army and Other Armed Groups that still require
attention. These issues all need more attention from the
international community. Problems in the east and three
areas were also cited. Several NGOs, both international
and national, urged the UNSC to take a more holistic
approach to Sudan, rather than dealing with the fundamental
problems of peace and security in the country piecemeal, by
region, as it is now being done.

Opposition parties meeting
--------------


24. (SBU) Participants included:

Sadiq al Mahdi, Chairman, Umma Party
Ali Mahmoud Hassanien, Deputy Chairman, Democratic Union
Party
Hassan al-Turabi, Chairman, Popular National Congress Party
Mohamed Ibrahim Nugud, Secretary General, Sudan Communist
Party

Leaders of the major northern opposition political parties
welcomed the visit of the UNSC, expressed measured support
for the DPA and the CPA, but contended that both agreements
would have been better had the opposition parties
participated more fully in both the Naivasha and Abuja
talks. They universally criticized the CPA for being a
bilateral agreement between the NCP and SPLM, resulting in
only a 14 percent share in power for the opposition parties
in the north. This imbalance is now further complicated by
the DPA, which allocates part of the 14 percent to Darfur,
but does nothing to the NCP's 52 percent stake.
Nonetheless, all expressed support for elections that are
mandated in the CPA as the legitimate way of redressing
these imbalances and allowing the people of Sudan to decide
who their leaders are. In the meantime, they warned, Sudan
was in danger of "Somalization" if a more comprehensive
approach to the country's problems is not taken. Already
the east and the north are vying for the same kind of
attention that the south and the west is now receiving. In

KHARTOUM 00001362 006 OF 006


response to a question on the likelihood of the Government
to accept transition to a UN force, the consensus was that
ultimately the Government would agree but to expect that it
would continue to object loudly for a while longer. In the
words of the deputy chairman of the DUP, "This is the way
it always works."

Press conference
--------------


25. (SBU) The day concluded with a press conference, in
which the UK, Ghana, and China spoke. The preeminent theme
was that the UNSC wanted to cooperate with the GNU in order
to implement the DPA and achieve security in Darfur. There
was no intention to invade or take over territory in Sudan;
the GNU would be fully consulted with regard to any UN
transition. In fact, as noted above, Jones Parry said a UN
transition would result from "negotiations" with the GNU.
(See Khartoum 1354.)
STEINFELD