Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06KHARTOUM1257
2006-05-26 12:48:00
UNCLASSIFIED
Embassy Khartoum
Cable title:  

SUDAN: PRESS REFLECTS ON DARFUR DEVELOPMENTS,

Tags:  PREL KPAO OIIP PGOV PINR SU 
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VZCZCXRO9223
OO RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1257/01 1461248
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 261248Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2955
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 001257 

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STATE FOR AF/SPG/, AF/PD (A. JOHNSON, S. WESTGATE),
IIP/G/AF, RRU-AF

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL KPAO OIIP PGOV PINR SU
SUBJECT: SUDAN: PRESS REFLECTS ON DARFUR DEVELOPMENTS,
EMERGING U.S.-SUDAN RELATIONS

REF: Khartoum 1210

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 001257

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR AF/SPG/, AF/PD (A. JOHNSON, S. WESTGATE),
IIP/G/AF, RRU-AF

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL KPAO OIIP PGOV PINR SU
SUBJECT: SUDAN: PRESS REFLECTS ON DARFUR DEVELOPMENTS,
EMERGING U.S.-SUDAN RELATIONS

REF: Khartoum 1210


1. SUMMARY. Sudanese press commentaries suggest growing
consensus in favor of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA).
Opposition continues, however, to the proposed transition
from African Union (AU) to UN peacekeepers in Darfur
(something explored with the Sudan Government this week
by UN Special Envoy Lakhdar Al-Brahimi, septel),and
growing perception of government confusion in this
regard. Speculations also continue concerning the U.S.
role and motives in Darfur, with some thinking an
improvement in relations is in the air.
--------------
Growing Acceptance of the DPA
--------------


2. Compared to the diffuse rejection of the DPA that was
common in opposition circles a few weeks ago, most
comments now focus more on how to can be fixed and made
to work. A piece by Khartoum Monitor editor Alfred
Taban, for instance ("Darfur in Crisis" May 18),begins
by condemning the DPA:

"What should have brought the people of Darfur their
rights is now a naked power struggle between Khartoum and
Darfur, and between the Darfuris themselves. What is
clear is that the DPA has not answered even a quarter of
the aspirations of the people of Darfur. It is grossly
in favour of the government in Khartoum."

His prescription, however, point to an unromantic
compromise among rival leaders jockeying for power:

"Unless there is a formula found whereby the three
political leaders... are given prominent roles, there
will be no peace in Darfur. Many of these leaders, while
they talk of the rights of their people, are actually
referring to their rights to leadership positions. That
is a reality that has to be taken into consideration."


3. Pro-government writers continue to defend the DPA.
Idriss Hassan (a columnist known to be close to Vice-
President Taha) suggests the agreement should be followed
up with discussions with civilian as well as armed groups
(Al-Wihda, May 18). Abdel Hamid Musa Kasha - a Rezeiguat
Arab from Darfur and former Minister of Foreign Trade,

notorious for his role in channeling funds to the
Janjaweed in 2003-04 - takes aims at the rebels who have
not yet signed:

"Those opposing the Darfur Peace Agreement seem to be
oblivious to the fact that there are people in Darfur who
are still suffering.... These same people are waiting for
the rains, the schools and their lives to begin again
following the signing of the agreement. I call on all
warring factions in Darfur to sign the agreement so as to
first establish a cease-fire, and squabble later about
the details."

--------------
UN Rehatting Still Controversial
--------------


4. There is still considerable opposition to the proposed
"international intervention" of UN peacekeepers in
Darfur, representing for some a real blow to the Sudanese
state:

"The GOS is risking loss of credibility with the Sudanese
public. The deployment of international forces to Darfur
gives the impression that their own government is not
capable of assuring their safety, and that it must resort
to UN forces in order to maintain security. National
sovereignty is the government's responsibility and no
other party can be responsible for that" ("Restoring
National Sovereignty." Al-Sudani, May 18).


5. Some -- especially in the pro-government Sudan Vision
-- still nurture hopes that an expanded UN presence can
be avoided. One editorial calls for Darfur's traditional
chiefs to use their lore to bring about peace, obviating
the need for foreign troops ("Revive Traditional Wisdom,"
Sudan Vision, May 18). Another argues that, in light of
popular opposition to deployment of UN forces in Darfur,
the special UN Envoy should consider alternative roles
for the UN to play in that region (Sudan Vision, May 21).


6. There is a general perception that the government is
in a quandary on the issue:


KHARTOUM 00001257 002 OF 003


"The contradictory statements issued by the GOS regarding
international forces' deployment to Darfur are striking.
We have one official affirming that the government will
not accept the deployment... and another official
asserting that the GOS is still reviewing this proposal.
The President is currently engaged in intensive
discussions with NCP leaders on this matter. I hope that
he chooses to extend his consultations to include the
opposition as well. The issue at hand is huge and the
two parties in power should not be the only ones
responsible for making this decision." "An Issue as Big
as Our Nation," Al-Sudani, May 22).


7. Another editorial, noting the advent of the UN special
envoy, suggests that this should be a lesson to the
government, "not to make vows in the name of Allah"
before better weighing the odds.

"We have been hearing conflicting statements by senior
Sudanese government officials about the presence of UN-
led forces in Darfur. But much of that is simply meant
for local political consumption. The government is
looking for justifications to convince the Sudanese
public as to why it has to step down in the face of all
the strong avowals it made earlier in its rejection of
foreign intervention in Darfur. ("Driving the Nail
Home," Khartoum Monitor, May 22)

--------------
Perceptions of the U.S. Role
--------------


8. Others reflect on why the U.S. is promoting a U.N.
presence in Darfur. One columnist commends a recent
press interview with the U.S. Charg (reftel),but
wonders about what was left unsaid:

"The U.S. Ambassador to Khartoum sees Sudan's future in
an optimistic way. His upbeat view of the Sudan should
be compared with the bleak assessments of certain
Sudanese politicians.... but there seems to be a question
missing... why does the U.S. insist on deployment of
international forces to Darfur? Does the deployment of
forces help to feed the thousands who were displaced in
Darfur? The problem of Darfur is that its social fabric
has been ripped apart: can foreign troops fix that? " (Al-
Rai Al-Aam, May 23)



9. "What is the Price of Submission to the U.S.?" another
editorial asks:

"The deployment of international forces to Darfur was met
with massive rejection by the Sudanese public. This
proposal... was submitted by the U.S. Administration to
the UNSC. It is only logical for us to ask the GOS what
it will gain from cooperating with the U.S.
administration in the deployment of international forces.
An even more pertinent question is: is the expected gain
worth the humiliation we are doomed to face?" (Al-Sudani,
May 21)

--------------
U.S.-Sudan Relations may Improve?
--------------


10. The U.S. role in facilitating the DPA, the U.S.
Charg's recent interview, the dropping of Libya from the
Sponsors of Terrorism list -- all have stimulated new
reflections on U.S.-Sudan relations. Some reject any
reassessment. One columnist criticized a Sudanese
official spokesman for characterizing U.S.-Sudanese
relations as being "good."

"This adjective... cannot be used to describe relations
between Sudan and the U.S. The Presidential Press
Secretary might have considered his statement a routine

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courtesy, but I think he should be more exact - when he
refers to a relationship viewed by many as the worst ever
found between two countries ."


11. Another columnist, reviewing a recent meeting between
the MFA Minister of State Al-Sammani Al-Waseela and the
U.S. Charg d'Affaires ("Putting the Cards on the Table,"
Al-Wihda, May 24),detects mixed signals:

"The meeting also covered the issue of deploying
international forces to Darfur, given the U.S. conviction
n

KHARTOUM 00001257 003 OF 003


of the importance of [such] deployment.... The U.S. was
the party responsible for the escalation of war in
Darfur, for internal electoral reasons. It is trying now
(and for the same reasons) to calm down the crisis in the
troubled region. The U.S. administration has also
expressed, through its Charge d'Affaires, its support for
the Abuja agreement. Nonetheless, and surprisingly, it
is still pressuring the GOS."


12. "It is Time for America to Change its Foreign
Policy," concludes the pro-government Sudan Vision (May
23). Praising the normalization of U.S.-Libyan
relations, the paper calls for a similar deal for the
Sudan:

"We at Sudan Vision believe that it is high time for
America to review its policy towards Sudan and normalize
bilateral relations by lifting Sudan's name from the list
of terrorist countries, in addition to lifting unilateral
sanctions. We see no reason why these two measures
remain imposed when USA is saying it is genuinely
brokering peace in Sudan. South Sudan and Darfur peace
agreements need the support of the International
Community, including the United States."

Whitehead