AU HEAD OF MISSION AGREES TO USG SUPPORT FOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L KHARTOUM 001254

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR D AND AF A/S FRAZER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/25/2016
TAGS: PREL KPKO AU UN SU
SUBJECT: AU HEAD OF MISSION AGREES TO USG SUPPORT FOR
DARFUR PEACE IMPLEMENTATION

REF: A. KHARTOUM 1207


B. SECSTATE 84676

Classified By: CDA Cameron Hume for reason: section 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (C) On May 26 CDA Hume, accompanied by USAID Director
Almquist and OTI Officer Jeanne Briggs, met AU Head of
Mission Kingibe to discuss USG support for Darfur
implementation. Following up on his discussion earlier in
the week (REF A),Hume reiterated that the USG thought it was
urgent to step up activity in support of the Darfur Peace
Agreement (DPA). Teams were ready to be dispatched from
Washington to make specific arrangements with the African
Union, assuming some initial agreement on the concept of
operations.


2. (C) Hume suggested the USG had concepts for operations in
Khartoum and in El Fasher to support the DPA. In Khartoum,
where the AU had its HQ, there was still a need for a base of
operations for signatories to the agreement; they would have
to staff numerous meetings in Khartoum, where they had no
infrastructure. In El Fasher, USAID had already identified a
facility that could serve as a base for AU outreach in favor
of the DPA. Briggs explained that this facility was located
near to the AMIS HQ and the airport, and it was large enough
for several offices and a meeting space large enough for
fifty people.


3. (C) Kingibe welcomed both suggestions. He said the best
way to secure support would be for the USG and other donors
to enable the AU and the Sudanese signatories to be effective
in promoting the DPA, so these should be AU, not USG offices.
Sam Ibok would arrive in Khartoum with a matter of days and
take over operational coordination of AU activities to
promote the DPA. He noted that the UK had made an offer of
technical assistance for media activities. Almquist noted
that she was sure the U.S. and UK could coordinate their
contributions with Ibok.


4. (C) Hume raised the problem of cease-fire violations and
the need for the AU to insist that the cease-fire be
respected by all, regardless of whether or not they had
signed the DPA. Kingibe confirmed that JEM troops, armed and
supported by President Deby's half brother, had gone on the
attack against SLA/Minnawi units. Kingibe was considering
making a public statement condemning the cease-fire
violations, and was going to contact UN SRSG Jan Pronk about
making it a joint statement. Hume encouraged him to do so,
noting that this matter should then be pursued through the
DPA mechanisms of the cease-fire commission and joint
commission.


5. (C) The two sides agreed to arrange meetings between
technical teams from USAID-OTI and the AU to prepare for
quick action to set up the separate facilities in Khartoum in
in El Fasher.
HUME