MEETING WITH UN SPECIAL ENVOY LAKHDAR BRAHIMI

C O N F I D E N T I A L KHARTOUM 001230

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR D AND AF A/S FRAZER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/24/2016
TAGS: PREL KPKO UN AU SU
SUBJECT: MEETING WITH UN SPECIAL ENVOY LAKHDAR BRAHIMI


Classified By: CDA Cameron Hume for reason: Section 1.4(b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: On May 25 CDA Hume at his request met with
UN Special Envoy Lakhdar Brahimi to discuss prospects of
transition to a UN peace-keeping force in Darfur. Brahimi
was accompanied by A/SYG for peacekeeping, Hedi Annabi.
During the 90 minute meeting Brahimi sought USG views on the
viability of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA),on activity to
secure additional public support for the DPA, on capacity of
the African Union to lead the process of implementation, and
especially on government of Sudan positions. Brahimi has a
series of meetings with top officials over the next two days,
ending with President Bashir on the evening of May 26. He
will then write his report, most likely recommending a
specific mandate for a UN peace-keeping force. U/SYG
Guehenno will lead the UN's technical assessment mission to
Sudan. End Summary.


2. (C) CDA Hume said he had requested the meeting to go over
a number of points regarding implementation of the Darfur
Peace Agreement (DPA). Whatever the flaws of the agreement
or the difficulty of the situation in Darfur, the agreement
provided a better basis for international activity than did
the prevailing conflict and chaos. However, early action was
needed to improve the situation. First, the Sudanese
government and the African Union mediation should work to
secure support for the DPA. On the one hand, if Abdul Wahid
and Khalil Ibrahim could not be persuaded to sign the
agreement on behalf of their groups, then attention should be
given to securing adherence from their supporters. On the
other hand, the African Union should coordinate a public
information campaign throughout Darfur to publicize the
agreement and to counter the negative and inaccurate
information being spread by the Abdul Wahid and Khalil
Ibrahim factions, as well as by Hassan al Turabi and Sadiq al
Mahdi.


3. (C) Second, the African Union lacked many of the
organizational resources and instincts needed to keep
implementation on track and moving forward. Whatever the
good intentions of donors and troop contributors, the AU
would not be able to deploy additional, more capable troops
into Darfur in the near future. The AU Force Commander
lacked resources for strategic planning and for logistics,
and implementation of the cease-fire provisions would have to
begin before any outside support would arrive. Third, the
African Union needed to put arrangements in place for the
Darfur-Darfur Dialogue, and it had made practically no
preparations for this task. Given that most of the people of
Darfur were in no way represented at the peace talks, this
dialogue was urgently needed.


4. (C) Hume asked if Brahimi could consider steps the UN
might take to meet these needs. Could the UN lend assistance
to the AU for a public relations effort to secure popular
support for the DPA? For example, Hume had recently urged
the government to grant the UN permission to begin UN radio
broadcasts, and such broadcasts could greatly help in getting
out correct information. The UN could help the AU to
organize and launch the Darfur-Darfur dialogue. Likewise,
the UN could give early assistance for strategic planning and
logistics, well before transition to a UN command. Finally,
it was important for the UN to continue its lead on
humanitarian issues. Relations between the government and
the NGOs were poor, but in the context of a peace agreement
UN leadership could improve this situation.


5. (C) In response Brahimi said he was well aware of the
weakness of the AU and problems with the AU mediation. He
appreciated the strong USG role during the peace talks,
without which an agreement would not have been made two weeks
ago. He thought the UN could provide early help to the AU
both in terms of organization and public outreach and in
terms of military planning and logistics. He would push for
authorization for the UN radio to go on air. With regard to
AbdulWahid and Khalil Ibrahim, he asked for the USG view on
the way forward, including with regard to the threat that
they would be listed under UNSCR 1591. Hume said the USG
position was that the DPA was a valid agreement that both
should be encouraged to sign, perhaps stating their
reservations but not changing the text. Whether or not they
signed before any AU deadline, it would be best for them to
support DPA implementation. Surely they were bound by the
cease-fire provisions, and cease-fire violations by their
forces could be a basis for their being listed under 1591, as
could extensive political efforts aimed at blocking
implementation. A mere failure to sign, however, might be
seen differently.


6. (C) Brahimi asked a series of questions about the
position of the government of Sudan. Earlier in the day he
had met with leaders of parliament, who had handed him a
resolution adopted in February that opposed a UN
peace-keeping operation. Did the conclusion of the DPA
change that position? What were the key points of possible
opposition to a UN operation? Annabi recalled that during
his visit to Khartoum in mid-April the pictures of former
Liberian President Charles Taylor being escorted by UN
peace-keepers to The Hague seemed to have created some
hostility.


7. (C) Hume said that the conclusion of the DPA had created
a new opening, but it had not eliminated all opposition.
President Bashir was the key decision-maker. Vice Presidents
Kiir and Taha, as well as Minister of Intelligence Gosh,
seemed to have accepted that a UN operation was a key part of
the package needed to secure peace in Darfur. Bashir's
Darfur negotiator, Mazjoub Khalifa, was of the same view.
The stiffest opposition was likely from the Minister of the
Interior and Minister of Defense. During negotiation of the
security provisions of the DPA a key sticking point had been
whether only the Sudanese police or also the movements police
liaison officers and the AU police monitors had executive
policing authority to arrest suspects, either for violations
of local law or pursuant to International Criminal Court
decisions. There had been rumors that the UN would seek such
authority. Annabi clarified that few potential contributors
of civilian police monitors would permit their police to
exercise such authority; Brahimi recalled that Canadian
police had refused to do so in Haiti, even in the absence of
any Haitian police.


8. (C) Brahimi said would explain that the purpose of a UN
peace-keeping operation would be to secure the implementation
of the DPA. In itself, that was a hugely complicated task.
If asked, he would state that it would be unusual for a UN
operation to have executive policing authority, and he did
not intend to recommend that it seek such authority. On the
other hand, he was in no position to commit the Security
Council to any course of action. On May 24 and 25 he planned
to meet with numerous Sudanese officials, including Vice
President Kiir and Vice President Taha, as well as the
ministers of interior and defense.


9. (C) Brahimi said he had talked with UK Permrep
Jones-Parry about the upcoming visit by a delegation of
security council members to Sudan. Brahimi thought the
result of such a brief visit was somewhat unpredictable; the
best one could hope for was a message that the international
community supported full implementation of both the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement with the south and the DPA.


10. (C) In conclusion Brahimi said that surely by the end of
his last meeting on May 26 with President Bashir he would
know the official position on a UN peace-keeping operation
for Darfur. He expected Bashir to accept an expansion of the
UNMIS operation, with a similar mandate to the one it has in
the south and following the same practices. He already
thought that, given the AU's limitations, a transition to the
UN should be sooner rather than later. The UN was ready to
follow up on his mission by sending out the technical
assessment team called for in the recent UNSC resolution,
and, given the importance of the matter, Under Secretary
General Guehenno would head the team.
HUME